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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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Akhromeyev Addresses U.S. Congress Subcommittee

LD0905194990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 9 May 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Hearings on arms control have begun in a Senate subcommittee at the U.S. Congress. Marshal of the Soviet Union Akhromeyev, adviser to the USSR president, addressed the sentors on the first day. He set out the position of the Soviet side on questions of arms control and replied to a number of questions. [video shows still of Akhromeyev sitting at a table]

Chernyshev Views 'Open Skies' Budapest Meeting

LD0705221190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1508 GMT 7 May 90

[Report by Vladimir Chernyshev, TASS observer on military issues]

[Text] Moscow, 7 May (TASS)—The second, "Budapest" stage of the "Open Skies" program talks finishes on 10 May. Together with the first stage which took place in Ottawa this forum is a major international event. Essentially it is the first time in history that 23 countries—members of the different military-political alliances, the Warsaw Pact and NATO—are putting their efforts together to try and create a system which would enable the participants of the future agreement to undertake the unarmed aircraft flights over each other's territories and observe military activities from the air.

"Open Skies" is called upon to become an active addition to the national means of monitoring the fulfillment by the governments of the agreements in the area of disarmament and arms reduction. The monitoring from the air is being assessed by the experts as especially effective means of control which will make secret military activity impossible. And this means that the working out of the new agreement will become a new step toward the strengthening of trust between the countries in the military sphere. And the readiness to allow the flights over their own teritories with the aim of observing military activities in itself is evidence of the reaching of a completely new stage in West-East relations.

What are the special characteristics of the second stage of the talks? During its course considerable progress has been made on many issues. However, it was not possible to achieve a unity of opinions on a number of key issues. Differences of opinion still remain, for example, on the question which types of aircraft should be used in the course of the monitoring flights. According to a number of opinions, the country which carries out the flight should determine the types of the aircraft which it will use, in other words, the monitoring side. The Soviet Union holds a different view: The right to choose should belong to the side over which the flights are being carried out.

No agreement was reached on such an important issue as the choice of the onboard control and monitoring equipment. Some participants think that there should be no limitations here, others advocate imposition of certain limitations of the equipment's sensitivity, and the third suggest using only such equipment which could easily be purchased on the world market.

The problem of using the information thus gathered is not of a less principal nature. The main argument here is whether such information should belong only to the country whose crews are making the reconnaissance flights or should it be an offer to all countries which have signed the agreement.

Thus, as it is seen from the abovementioned unsolved problems, it is still not possible to conclude the work on a mutually acceptable agreement even at the second stage. However, in my opinion there should be no grounds for pessimism. It is necessary to take into consideration that the negotiations in such a sensitive area as security usually take a long time. I think that during the break the participants in the talks will do their best to work out compromise suggestions to the remaining controversial problems. The main thing is to stop trying to achieve a unilateral gain at the expense of other partners in the negotiations.

Military Inspectors Arrive in Sardinia

LD0805140690 Moscow TASS in English 1339 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Rome May 8 TASS—A group of Soviet military inspectors arrived today at the Cagliari Airport (Sardinia) for a two-day inspection in accordance with provisions of the accord reached at the Stockholm Conference on Security, Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures in Europe.

The Soviet military specialists will observe an amphibian ship's landing operation in the course of the NATO Dragon Hammer-90 exercise off Teulada Cape.

Shevardnadze Opens USSR-EC Commission Session

LD1005093290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0632 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 10 May (TASS)—TASS correspondent George Mikhaylin reports:

Today Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and Frans Andreissen, Commission of European Community External Relations Commission vice president, opened the first session of the joint USSR-EC (European Community) commisison here.

The commisison was set up in accordance with the agreement between the Soviet Union and the community on trade, commercial, and economic cooperation that has been in effect since 1 April this year. It is the result of appropriately implementing the framework agreement and should promote the conclusion of this sectoral (branch) accords based on it.

For two days, the Soviet Union and European Community delegations headed by the joint commission cochairmen: Ernst Obminsk, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Horst Krenzler, European Community External Relations Commission general director, will discuss possible joint practical steps in order to fulfill the agreement between the USSR and the European Community within the specified framework.

Role of NATO in Future Europe Discussed

Bush, Woerner Discuss Summit

PM0905132190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 90 First Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Likely Dates Discussed"]

[Text] Washington, 8 May—NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner declared here on Monday that the NATO member countries' summit proposed by U.S. President Bush recently will most probably be held in London in the first half of July. Woerner said this during a stopover in the U.S. capital on his way to Canada where a session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group is scheduled for 9-10 May. On Monday Woerner met with President Bush in the White House for half an hour.

According to a statement after the meeting by Marlin Fitzwater, the president's press secretary, Woerner and Bush discussed the likely venue and timing of this meeting and its agenda. It is proposed that NATO's political tasks, the bloc's objectives at the conventional arms talks, the role of the U.S. nuclear forces in Europe, and the future of the CSCE process will be discussed at this meeting.

Nuclear Planning Group Meets

LD0905183590 Moscow TASS in English 1816 GMT 9 May 90

[By TASS Correspondent Valentin Vasilets]

[Text] Ottawa May 9 TASS—The NATO Nuclear Planning Group meets for its regular session at the Canadian military base in Kaninaskis, Alberta. The group develops the bloc's military strategy with account of the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Major Jacques Trambly, a spokesman for the Canadian National Defence Ministry, told TASS that the defence ministers of all NATO member-countries are arriving in Canada to attend the session. Only French and Icelandic ministers, whose countries are not integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty miltitary structure, do not attend the session. As usual, discussions will be held behind closed doors and the session agenda is not disclosed in advance. However, political observers say one can hardly doubt that the ministers will focus on issues related to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The forthcoming unification of Germanys and changes in East Europe compel western strategists to revise the role of separate types of nuclear weapons in the NATO arsenal. The presence in this arsenal of lance short-range missiles is viewed as utterly absurd now. Their short range means that NATO can use them only on the territory of East Germany or East European states.

Recognising these realities, U.S. President George Bush has recently announced that the United States drops plans to modernise lance missiles, on which it stubbornly insisted until now. The Canadian Gazette points out that Washington's new position is the statement of the obvious.

Europe's security could be enhanced several times more efectively if all tactical nuclear weapons were destroyed. However, Bush has spurned this idea once again.

Speaking in Stillwater, Oklahoma, last Friday, Bush stressed that nuclear weapons would continue to play a key role in the NATO military strategy in Europe.

NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner also stated in his talk with reporters in Washington on Monday that the alliance was against turning Germany into a nuclear-free zone.

Tarik Rauf, a staffer of the Canadian Ottawa-based Centre for Arms Control, regards the Washington decision on Lance missiles as only a replacement of one system with a new and more sophisticated one, rather than renunication of nuclear weapons.

It is common knowledge that NATO has been developing now the so-called short-range, tactical assault missile. This air-launched missile will travel 400 kilometers and have one 100-kiloton warhead. It is designed to be launched from an aircraft outside an enemy's territory.

British-American Security Information Council Director Daniel Plesch predicts that the United States will ask Canada to allow it to test the new missile on its territory.

According to David Shorr, a staffer of the same council, the appearance of the new missile in the NATO arsenal will offset to a considerable extent the positive effect of the Soviet-U.S. treaty to eliminate short-range missiles.

Neither sweeping changes in Europe nor the end of the cold war have weakened the NATO military strategists' commitment to nuclear weapons. Their cares are now boiling down to introducing changes in the scenario of their use with account of new realities.

Woerner Vision Disputed

PM1005092790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[A. Suvorov "International Commentary": "The Architecture of Europe: View from NATO"]

[Text] Of late people in the West have once again begun to talk animatedly about NATO. Interest in this topic was roused by the discussion of the possibility of a future united Germany's inclusion in the North Atlantic alliance, but the framework of the debate has gradually broadened and become global in scale. It centers on questions relating to the future of NATO and the role of the alliance in international, above all European, affairs. This was discussed last week in Brussels at a NATO Council session, and U.S. President G. Bush voiced an opinion on this subject on two successive occasions 3 and 4 May. He stressed NATO's significance as "the bastion of democratic values and security" and proposed that his allies hold a summit meeting to "determine their tasks for the next century."

Without doubt, people within NATO are carefully examining the map of changing Europe and are trying to determine the continent's future as the outline of the new political picture emerges. Brussels already has some ideas about this. These are not being covered up, although they are not being specially advertized either. You get the impression that the NATO plan for the Europe of the future is being given a dry run, so to speak, at present. In late April NATO Secretary General M. Woerner had a working tour of a number of West European countries. In Italy he delivered a lengthy speech in the Senate and in Britain he addressed a press conference. "The new European architecture," he said, "should be seen as the continuation of the Atlantic community."

Woerner was basing his arguments on two initial ideas.

First. Woerner reckons that none of the current European structures (apart from NATO, of course) can guarantee European security. Although it is the "most dynamic European organization," the EEC, for instance, cannot nonetheless perform this role since security questions do not come within the remit of the community's institutions. As for the CSCE process, the NATO secretary general is convinced that it lacks "legally secure commitments," institutional status, and also a mechanism for settling conflicts based on "real powers to adopt measures and sanctions." Consequently, he concludes that neither the EEC nor the CSCE "can individually or together replace the transatlantic alliance and take on such tasks as ensuring stability and democracy throughout Europe."

Second. NATO guarantees Europeans their links with the United States and Canada, which "have safeguarded Europe's security and stability for 40 years now." Woerner develops this idea by noting that the North Atlantic alliance is the "only model of its kind for collective management of security."

While not questioning the opinion of the general secretary of the West's leading military-political alliance on certain details, I will nonetheless venture to voice counteropinions on the fundamental problems.

One can hardly doubt that the bulk of the path from confrontation to cooperation in Europe lies within the mainstream of the all-European process based on the Helsinki accords and the CSCE mechanism. Certainly, it lacks legally firm commitments but they are after all being elaborated in the course of various negotiations! An attempt to suggest NATO as the supporting structure of the all-European process is not merely a throwback to "bloc" thinking. It is a poorly concealed endeavor to subordinate the trend of the entire European process to the interests of one military-political alliance.

Nor does M. Woerner's second idea stand up to criticism. On the eve of Woerner's working visit to London Britain's FINANCIAL TIMES, analyzing U.S. Secretary of State Baker's idea of giving NATO new political functions—such as supporting the processes of democratization in the countries of East Europe, promoting East-West trade, and making capital investments—concluded that the main aim of the U.S. efforts is to perpetuate its leadership in West Europe via NATO.

This "architecture" for the Europe of the future will hardly suit those people who are pinning their hopes of a truly good-neighborly existence within a single "common home" on this future.

Batenin Comments on Security Concepts for Germany

AU0905093090 East Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 4 May 90 p 3

["Exclusive" article by Major General Geli Viktorovich Batenin, military expert of the CPSU Central Committee: "Preferred Variety: All of Germany in NATO"]

[Text] While most Germans are currently calculating the costs and benefits of the monetary union or are worried about the small print of the state treaty, foreign policy experts in Europe and North America are intensively dealing with the question of which role a future Germany will play in the world. In preparation for the "Two Plus

Four" talks over the weekend, we asked Geli Viktorovich Batenin, a leading USSR major general and military expert of the CPSU Central Committee, for his analysis of the security policy concepts for the unification of GDR and FRG:

Of all events of the political life in Europe the unification of Germany is the most important one. With the emergence of a new Germany on the continent, Europe's postwar history comes to an end.

After Helsinki Yalta and Potsdam became an anachronism of the cold war, whose primary intention was the division of Germany. This intention led to the military confrontation between East and West. It was the focal point of the attention of a European security policy, which was based on purely military principles of the balance between the military forces of the organization of the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In this balance the FRG and the GDR played a key role. This probably also explains the continuing existence of the four-power status of Germany over a period of almost half a century.

Even though the project of the single European home, as proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev, turned the vector of European relations in the direction of political, economic, and scientific-technological approach between East and West, it avoided the question of the unification of the two Germanys. The syndrome of the "anschluss" still burdened our political thinking one or two years ago, when we tried to predict the future.

Could we imagine during Gorbachev's triumphant visit to the FRG in the summer of 1989—where the German question was in the air—that we would be witnesses of the establishment of a monetary, economic, and social union of the two German states today? Hardly one of the Soviet analysts was able to think through those military strategic problems, which are linked with the unification of two Germany states, for instance their separate membership in the Warsaw Pact and in NATO.

With the unification of Germany the traditional line of military East-West confrontation, that is, today's national border between the FRG and the GDR, is eliminated. The Vienna negotiations of the 23 states will not help in this respect. Their mandate to achieve general stability in Europe was worked out long before the events which have shaken up all East European states. And this mandate is naturally based on the foundation of the current bloc membership of the two German states. Only somewhere at the end of the tunnel, which was to lead to stability, the politicians saw the all-European security structure: some in form of military political cooperation, others in integration, in the abolition of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the course of history overtook our common European boat in which we are still sitting. Each on his own side. Germany is uniting.

In our view the most complicated question, which is today faced by all European countries, by the United States and Canada, is the determination of the military strategic position of the new Germany. This particularly applies to the transitional period on the path toward an all-European nonaligned structure of mutual security within the framework of the CSCE process. This will need at least 5 to 10 years. About the same period will be needed for a complete economic merging of the two Germanys, for adjustment in the social and legal fields, and for the establishment of firm federative relations. There are various concepts for this transitional period: Complete or limited NATO membership of Germany; simultaneous membership in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact; neutrality; and nonalignment. Two of these concepts—Germany remains completely in NATO or Germany will be a country which belongs to both blocs at the same time—have already been recognized as official standpoints. The U.S. leadership and the NATO heads came out in favor of the first concept, the Soviet foreign minister has come out in favor of the second one. In this connection, the Soviet side has made it clear in a sufficiently direct way, that a NATO membership of the united Germany is not desired.

Thus, one has to look for compromises. And this has to be done because the so-called special responsibility of the four states for Germany is not abolished by anyone as long as these four states do not delegate their rights, which were set down in Yalta and Potsdam, within the framework of the CSCE process. What is needed is a new document, which must have even greater political importance than the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It is probably realistic to assume that such a document—the setting down of principles for a new security system—will be drawn up by the end of the year. However, one will need years to implement it.

I would like to stress that a neutral or nonaligned Germany would hardly be in line with European security interests. The military and economic potential of a united Germany concentrated in the center of Europe would give rise to serious concerns among its neighbors who would be deprived of the possibility of integrating Germany in a joint security systems by means of political instruments. In addition, Germany will not only become an economic but also a political giant. Therefore, chances are slim that it will voluntarily accept "military-political impotence."

The concept of "double membership" of a united Germany in the two blocs would only be useful if the Warsaw Pact would have good perspectives for the future. However, in view of the new governments in the East European countries, there is no hope for such perspectives. The transformation of the organization of the Warsaw Pact from a military-political into a political-military organization is currently under way. The CSFR, one of the most important Warsaw Pact countries in military terms, is virtually on the verge of leaving the alliance. Similar developments are to be observed in Hungary and Romania. The ideological basis of the Warsaw Pact—born out of barracks-type socialism and supported through the efforts of the former party and state leaders—has been destroyed. As a matter of fact, "double membership" is pursuing the goal of somehow balancing the military-strategic situation in central Europe. However, given the current situation, this concept might yield opposite results. In addition, the concept of "double membership" may have a destabilizing influence on the process of unification of the two Germanys because in this way confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO will continue to focus on the territory of the united Germany.

There are two aspects to membership in NATO of a united Germany—a political and a military aspect. A sovereign state has the right to choose a security system. NATO has developed political structures. The best variant will be to include the whole of Germany into the political organization of NATO. The military jurisdiction of NATO will remain effective on the territory of the present-day FRG. In other words, concerning its military incorporation in NATO, Germany will retain its current status during the entire transition period. The Bundeswehr, being part of NATO's United Armed Forces, will remain within the boundaries of the Western part of a united Germany. In the Eastern part, the National People's Army will continue to exist, however, it will no longer be under the operational control of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact. The pace of this process will be coordinated with the pace of the process of unification between the two states.

A nonaligned army will develop on the basis of the National People's Army, which is subject only to national control. As a result, the military-strategic balance will be considerably upset in this region. To prevent a dramatic destabilization of the strategic situation, the military presence of the USSR in the GDR will continue to be required. Just like the presence of U.S. forces in the FRG, Soviet presence must be regulated on the basis of agreements to be concluded in Vienna, as well as on the basis of new documents that we expect to be adopted at the second all-European CSCE meeting which is scheduled to be held in the fall.

The demilitarization of Germany can only be viewed in connection with European disarmament. It is not realistic to demand such a thing from an economically and politically potent country. However, the further development of the idea of the common European home and the creation of new security structures on the continent opens up good perspectives for coordinated and comprehensive disarmament measures. The Vienna talks on general stability are in part directed toward this goal.

I have now briefly discussed the need for Soviet and U.S. military presence in Germany. We believe that this need will even increase during the transition period, particularly the need for Soviet presence. As already pointed out, one must not allow a disruption of the balance of power during this period. Such a danger does exist. It will be caused by membership in NATO (even mere political membership) of the future Germany and the weakening of the organization of the Warsaw Pact, which partly results from the elimination of the National People's Army from its operational control.

I would like to stress that this only applies to the transition period. With the gradual formation of a nonaligned system of mutual security, the need for foreign military presence will disappear.

Soviet Delegate Addresses Disarmament Commission

LD0905100290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0139 GMT 9 May 90

[Text] United Nations, 9 May (TASS)—Soviet representative Boris Krasulin has spoken at a session of the UN Disarmament Commission taking place here.

The work of our session comes at a memorable time, he said. The bloodiest war in human history, which had painful repercussions in all corners of our planet, ended 45 years ago. One can evaluate the past years in various ways but we have all probably become convinced of one main thing: that humankind has no future on the edge of the abyss of military madness. Everything possible must be done to ensure the survival of civilization and to build a new model of international security.

The main direction of the formation of such a model is the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons, the Soviet spokesman continued. We hope that the forthcoming summit in Washington will bring an agreement on the 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States significantly closer. We believe that after this agreement is signed it is necessary without delay to move on to the next phase of reducing nuclear arms to ensure that this process is continuous.

As for the Soviet Union, we have begun to implement the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, and we are conducting this work on the basis of the new defensive military doctrine. The USSR's military budget for 1990 will be R71 billion which is 8.2 percent lower than last year.

U.S.-Soviet Trans-Pacific Meeting Reported

LD0905122590 Moscow TASS in English 1146 GMT 9 May 90

[By TASS special correspondent Andrey Sidorin]

[Text] Portland (Oregon State) May 9 TASS—The radical changes in the Soviet Union prompted by new political thinking, bold peace initiatives and new approaches to world and regional problems greatly influence the political atmosphere and relations between Asian and Pacific states.

Participants in the eighth annual American-Soviet trans-Pacific conference on a new era in trans-Pacific relations which opened here, point to interdependence between these processes. The representative scientific forum sponsored by Lewis and Clark College, a leading U.S.

higher educational establishment training international affairs experts, is being attended by specialists in Asian and Pacific problems from the United States, the USSR, China, Japan and Taiwan.

They will discuss the present situation in the region, strategic trends for its development and specific ways to expand all-round cooperation.

Robert Scalapino, director of the Institute of East Asian Studies, noted that a noticeable improvement in the political climate in the area took place after the Vladivostok initiatives which were amplified by Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk two years ago.

In his opinion, the normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China was one of the greatest accomplishments of the new thinking policy in Asia.

The director said that the Soviet-Chinese summit in Beijing, the recent return visit to Moscow by Chinese Premier Li Peng and the Soviet-Chinese agreements help decrease military confrontation in the region, revitalise economic relations, and resolve complicated regional conflicts, including a Cambodian settlement. Scalapino expressed opinion that there were also positive changes in the approach to Korea's problem. The recent relaxation of tension in Soviet-Japanese political relations is of great importance for the general normalization of the situation in the region.

This idea was also stressed by Professor Shinichiro Tabata of the Slavic research center at Hokkaido University, Japan.

Most forum participants concur that the Asian and Pacific region has a huge potential to develop economic relations and advance world-wide progress.

Speakers noted that the political position and influence of Asian and Pacific countries is largely determined by their economic development rather than armed forces.

The time of "power politics" is receding into the past. This is corroborated by Japan which proved that it is possible to achieve the status of a world power not relying on militarism, and by the United States which is losing its positions and influence in the region, despite an impressive military presence there.

James Hanson, economics professor from Columbia University, spoke about the great interest displayed by the business community in the U.S. West in developing close trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Far East.

Despite numerous difficulties caused by a shortage of information about peculiar features of the Soviet market and structures, lack of systems for rapid business communications, many U.S. companies insistently seek to realise joint projects and look for partners in the Soviet Far East.

Margaret Niles, U.S. international trade lawyer, stressed that American businessmen foresee huge mutual profits from the development of that rich area.

Speakers noted that U.S. businessmen are also prodded to step up their activities in the Soviet Far East by competitors from other Asian and Pacific countries, including South Korea, that increased five times their goods turnover with the USSR in the past year.

G-7 Conference Proposes Economic Aid Measures

PM1005092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA Press Service report: "Developed Countries Ready To Give Aid"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA has already reported (see issue No. 128) that an agreement to increase IMF financial resources by 50 percent was reached at the conference of G-7 finance ministers and leaders, held behind closed doors in Washington. REUTER and UPI reports point out that the special communique adopted on this question was signed by the representatives of the United States, Britain, France, the FRG, Italy, Japan, and Canada. The planned $60 billion will go primarily to support "democratic processes in East Europe and help needy third world countries." The conference participants welcomed the course of developing the market economy in East European countries, and undertook to provide aid to support these reforms.

As we now know, the conference also examined the question of the economic consequences of German unification. The communique expressed the hope that it will contribute to inflation-free global development and reduce trade imbalances.

The implementation of the agreement reached in Washington has no easy road ahead. First, it must be examined at IMF and World Reconstruction and Development Bank sessions which are shortly to be held. And the agreement has to be ratified by the 85 voting IMF member countries. Second, although the G-7 countries are ready to pay out, the United States, for example, has demanded that the increase in IMF capital be linked to the elaboration of a plan of stringency measures regarding 11 countries whose outstanding debt comes to $4 billion. In accordance with the decision adopted at the conference, these measures envisage the withdrawal of the debtors' voting right at the IMF.

Film on Kim Philby To Be Aired on TV

LD0905143890 Moscow TASS in English 1410 GMT 9 May 90

[By TASS political analyst Sergey Kulik]

[Text] Moscow May 9 TASS—The British intelligence service classified as secret all materials connected with Rudolf Hess' flight to Britain on the night of May 10, 1940 until the year 2007.

They have recently been declassified by the USSR State Security Committee (KGB) and will be made public in the next few days.

Soviet television will show the film "Cambridge Graduate" about Kim Philby on May 11 which will contain many historical sensations. One of them will be a file on Hess which was kept secret at the KGB for 50 years.

The file contains a Hess' photograph, documents forwarded to Stalin and Molotov, secret message from "Soehnchen" (Philby) about Hess' stay in Britain, his meeting with Lord Hamilton and other previously top secret materials.

Judging by dates, "Soehnchen" learnt about Hess' flight to Britain the next day. It took him another day to check the information. On the third day the news was in Moscow.

The film will also show Philby's liaison intelligence officer Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya (alias Rybkina) who now lives in Moscow. She says that Philby's information was highly valued. The Soviet intelligence community trusted him.

It would have been possible to save hundreds of thousands or even millions of human lives, if Stalin had trusted Soviet intelligence officers' reports about Nazi Germany's preparations to attack the Soviet Union.

And yet, he did heed sometimes to their information, and "Soehnchen" did much to convince Stalin of their messages' trustworthiness.

In any case, when Philby, the first among intelligence officers, sent a message to the Soviet command about the "Citadel" operation, including an intercepted decoded radio message with an assessment of Soviet troops in the area of the Kursk bulge, Stalin became finally convinced of the Nazis' intention to launch the summer campaign of 1943.

Philby's message was received approximately in April and gave the Soviet command a chance to prepare for the great battle back in the spring, massing troops to the area.

Since 1940 Philby conducted operations in the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) spearheaded against Germany's secret services, trying to disclose the Nazis' plans.

Philby had an access to top secret materials received as a result of decoding intercepted German radio messages. Many of them, received in Moscow, helped catch German intelligence agents smuggled into the USSR and save thousands of Soviet people.

Philby also transmitted first data on Germany's intention to use new types of military hardware at the Eastern front. The "Cambridge graduate" also helped thwart Nazi attempts to conclude a separate peace with the Western allies.

Later, Winston Churchill wrote in his memoirs that he was shaken by the depth of Stalin's perception into the essence of the British policy in North Africa during the Second World War.

However, this "perception" was based on precise information received from the SIS where Philby was making a sky-rocketing career. Philby also stood behind the reply to questions by numerous journalists who covered the Potsdam conference.

They were puzzled "Why was Uncle Joe so calm?" or "Why was he smiling so cunningly?"

Going to Potsdam to resolve the destiny of the post-war world, Stalin had information about the allies' plans received from Philby.

Soviet intelligence officer Kim Philby died in Moscow on May 11, 1988. He had ample grounds to say: "I did my best to help the anti-Nazi coalition countries to defeat Nazism."

United States & Canada

Bush Stance on Lithuania 'Well Thought Out'

90UF0141A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 18, 5 May 90 p 8

[Article by Grigoriy Oganov, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA political observer: "Will We Show Discretion Over Valor?"]

[Text] "What would happen if..." Many in Lithuania are asking this kind of question—and outside Lithuania as well, including people in places far from its shores. In the euphoria of the awareness of their "inexorable" stand, unfortunately, those carried away by it are not asking themselves questions of a different nature—no one in Lithuania has thought seriously about whether or not it is wise to immediately renounce their position within the framework of the Union at precisely the moment when the country is developing practicable ways and means of overcoming serious distortions in the economic policy of our common Union, and in its political policy as well, measures we could only dream about in the very recent past.

Today Washington values good relations with Moscow. But they are letting us know that Soviet economic sanctions against Lithuania could nudge, as it were, the West towards worsened Soviet-American relations at precisely the time when the idea is maturing in the United States that restrictions such as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment might be repealed and a Soviet-American trade agreement drawn up on a basis of mutual benefit.

An ill-fated agreement! First it became an occasion for Israeli speculation on people's right to emigration. And now it elicits a strange kind of discussion on "giving up a means of applying pressure on the Soviet Union," as if this were the single real weapon capable of somehow ensuring that Moscow would continue its movement towards liberalization of the question of ties and relations among people.

It is urgently necessary under these circumstances to return to an awareness of the realities, to that kind of sober self-evaluation which is especially useful when history is experiencing sharp turns.

A few lines from THE NEW YORK TIMES: "It is fine that President Bush is cautioning against the use of force in Lithuania; but it would be more appropriate if, at this given moment, he would warn the Lithuanians not to push President Gorbachev even more towards the use of force. If the Lithuanians stubbornly stand their ground, mistakenly believing that an America full of sympathy will support them to the end, this might lead to catastrophic consequences for the Lithuanians themselves..."

This is why the frank and honest warning given the Lithuanians by Moscow, the "inexplicable (to them) passivity of the West," and the Bush administration's unwillingness to interfere in our internal affairs (as serious American politicians view it), really do not at all appear as "threats" and "passivity," but rather as a well-thought-out approach which realistically takes into account all aspects of our mutual relations, including the influence of recently held views and foreign policy stereotypes.

The times demand cautious but still decisive measures, carried out by people who have as their aim the constructive consolidation of people, of all our society—so as to further, as it is formulated in the "Song of Lenin," the efforts of the USSR President, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev, towards effecting the civilized and free development of our motherland.

U.S., Soviet Trade Groups To 'Build Bridges'

PM0905105790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[V. Romanyuk article: "Small Business Building Bridges"]

[Text] The USSR Association for Foreign Economic Cooperation Between Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and the Chicago International Trade Club have signed a protocol of intent on the creation of an international association of small and medium-sized enterprises.

Let us put it this way: The Soviet side has recently signed a lot of "memorandums of intent." But these do promise to turn into long-term agreements in the small business sphere. That is what this IZVESTIYA correspondent was told after the protocol signing ceremony by V. Rulev, chairman of the Soviet association, and S. Danber [name as transliterated], president of the Chicago Club.

The international association's main task will be to build bridges between small businesses in the United States and the USSR. It is a question not only of concrete assistance in organizing small enterprises—including joint ventures—but also of correlating [stykovka] the two countries' legislation in the economic sphere. S. Danber admitted that U.S. businessmen have a poor grasp of the workings of the Soviet economy and therefore experience difficulties in opening up the Soviet market. V. Rulev noted on this score that cooperation with the Chicago Club will be highly useful for Soviet businessmen and will help them to enter the world market—including at the small enterprise level. It is no secret that foreign trade organizations only show an interest when it is a question of multimillion ruble deals—they do not want to handle "trivial" deals of R50-100,000.

The Chicago International Trade Club numbers around 600 medium-sized and small enterprises. Slightly more than half of them are involved in the production of various goods and electronics, which they are ready to offer to Soviet customers. The rest specialize in providing services in the international business sphere. The club includes a bank ready to grant credits to set up small production facilities; a law firm able to provide the most varied advice; and a specialized firm which can provide high-speed, high-quality translation of the product catalogs of Soviet enterprises requiring this service.

Like the Soviet association, the Chicago Club is a noncommercial organization. The partners in the international association intend to provide information services to medium-size and small enterprises on the world market outlook and to organize exchanges of experience in running small businesses under such different economic conditions.

S. Danber is also vice president of a major Chicago firm, on whose behalf he signed a memorandum of intent with the Soviet "Interyer" Association. The joint venture will produce specialized furniture for computers and consumer electronics. It is planned to sell 70 percent of the output in the Soviet Union and to export the rest. The Moscow City Soviet has expressed an interest in contacts with specialists in urban planning and the development of municipal services. The international association intends to pool the efforts of the two countries' specialists to implement large-scale projects for the reconstruction of Moscow.

I asked S. Danber whether there is any chance of success for the plans to transfer to Soviet soil the American experience of creating "incubators" to "grow" small enterprises and privatize the means of production—as provided for, incidentally, by the draft law on the development of small enterprises in the USSR. In response the U.S. businessman replied that he prefers doing rather than discussing. That, he added, is the best way of learning something in general.

The international association is still just being set up, but various spheres for possible cooperation between the two countries' small businesses have already emerged. These include the sphere of new technology and the implementation of conversion programs. And finally the AIDS problem, bone-marrow surgery, artificial limbs, and a number of other noncommercial projects. As a Vietnam war veteran, S. Danber is ready to make an effort to establish contacts between U.S. and USSR veterans' organizations.

An international conference will be held in Chicago at the end of May to discuss the problem of trade with East European countries in the nineties. For the first time one of the sponsors will be a Soviet organization—the USSR Association for Foreign Economic Cooperation Between Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises—and the main report will be delivered by V. Vologzhin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Economic Reform Questions.

Supreme Soviet-U.S. Congress TV Debate Aired

Lithuania, Other Issues Discussed

LD0905095490 Moscow TASS in English 0908 GMT 9 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 9 TASS—Participants in the Moscow-Washington TV linkup which was aired over Soviet Central Television on Tuesday evening, favoured the continuation of the frank and honest dialogue between the U.S. Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet and the development of the disarmament process.

On the American side, Senator Robert Dole and House of Representatives Speaker Thomas Foley and, on the Soviet side, members of the Soviet parliament leadership Ivan Laptev and Aleksandr Dzasokhov, as well as Soviet and American legislators participated in the sixth TV meeting between the two countries' lawmakers.

The linkup participants debated the situation in Lithuania and other Soviet Baltic republics, changes in Eastern Europe and disarmament problems.

Dealing with the declaration of independence by the Lithuanian leadership and Lithuania's withdrawal from the Soviet Union, whithin which it had developed during the past 50 years, Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission on International Affairs, noted that the present activities in the USSR in the sphere of ethnic relations cannot be considered in isolation from nation-wide democratic changes in the country.

The Soviet parliament prioritises ethnic relations. Dzasokhov pointed to the great number of laws adopted on this issue. "Soviet people more than anybody else are interested in resolving difficult situations which have emerged," he stressed.

Dzasokhov pointed to the need to settle this issue on the basis of the USSR Constitution and stressed the great state wisdom of President Mikhail Gorbachev who is doing his best to settle the present situation peacefully.

Soviet and American legislators pointed to the great personal role of Gorbachev as the initiator and driving force of perstroyka in the USSR.

Dzasokhov called on the U.S. congressmen to recognise the present-day realities in the world and to remove obstacles to signing a trade agreement between the two nations and to broader cooperation between them.

Laptev described radical changes in East European countries as a practical implementation of new thinking. He stressed at the same time that Germany's unification should not upset stability and security in Europe and interfere with the construction of a European home.

Soviet and American lawmakers agreed that it is necessary to push forward the disarmament process and stressed the importance of the forthcoming Gorbachev-Bush summit.

'Independent Monologues' Criticized

*PM1005101790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 May 90 Morning Edition p 4*

[Yu. Makarov article under the rubric "TV and Us": "No One Was Willing To Concede"]

[Text] I do not know precisely how many millions of American and Soviet viewers were able to see the latest "Capital to Capital" program from the cycle of USSR Supreme Soviet-U.S. Congress television hookups, but I think that there was a sizeable audience on both sides of the ocean. Our peoples' tremendous interest in one another is, after all, further roused today by the coming summit meeting. Our hopes of mutual rapprochement is in many respects pinned on whether the two countries' legislators find a common language.

Despite my respect for those involved in the television hookup on both sides, it was in itself distressing. After setting out to meet one another over a theoretical bridge in space, the program's participants got stuck in the middle, as it were, in an attempt not to give way to anyone at any price. We simply did not see the dialogue which the audience of millions was expecting, although the meeting over the airwaves lasted for an hour and a half.

There were high-level participants. Speaker Thomas Foley and Robert Dole, leader of the Republican minority in the Senate, represented the American side. Our Supreme Soviet was represented by I. Laptev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union, and A. Dzasokhov, chairman of the International Affairs Committee. There were experienced commentators—P. Jennings and L. Zolotarevskiy. Our two countries' leadership in the nineties was the most interesting subject. Why was there no dialogue?

I may seem biased, but I believe that viewers will confirm that Americans were the first to begin to turn the dialogue into two independent monologues, casting aside the main topic of discussion having hardly mentioned it. Our parliamentarians made several attempts to bring the discussion back to the subject in hand but failed, and the meeting descended into one-sided statements, continually interrupted by the ubiquitous American advertisements.

They spoke to us about Lithuania. We asked them about Lithuania in return. They said: "What will you do if a united Germany joins NATO?" We said: "What will you do if it joins the Warsaw Pact?" The American legislator suddenly tried in a patronizing tone to teach his Soviet colleague the rudiments of democracy. Our commentator wittily cast doubts on the quality of the professors at Georgetown University...

Advertisements for oatmeal flakes or wonder tablets to prevent dog odors were the response to all the hard questions...

I am by no means thinking of telling such eminent participants in a television hookup how to conduct their conversation. But I wanted so much to hear the word "WE" during the program. What can WE, the representatives of two great powers, do together to ensure that peoples on earth breathe more freely and have a hopeful view of the future? How can WE act together in a particular complex situation? Honestly, esteemed ladies and gentlemen, comrades, that is precisely what people were waiting for, not a contest in inflexible ambition. I can understand Academician Ye. Velikhov, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, being upset by the actual tone of the conversation.

At the end of the program Senator R. Dole expressed the hope that his Soviet colleagues would visit Washington during M.S. Gorbachev's visit and there would then be an opportunity to continue the dialogue face-to-face rather than over the airwaves. It only remains for me to support this hope.

China

'New Pattern' of Soviet-Chinese Relations Viewed

*OW0905142890 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 0600 GMT 9 May 90*

["Excerpts" of undated NOVOYE VREMYA article by Doctor of History (Bazanov)]

[Text] The recent visit to the Soviet Union by Li Peng, member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Politburo and premier of the PRC State Council, has contributed to the continued progress in opening the future of Soviet-Chinese relations, according to this distinguished guest himself. The new pattern of these relations was established in the course of Comrade Gorbachev's talks held one year ago in Beijing. We had paid a big price because we were unable to design this pattern at an early date.

Living in harmony with a neighbor is a most important principle that all people should try to adhere to for the sake of their own interests. Yet not everyone can do this at all times. Our country, like many other countries, often used force to settle disputes so as to subject the weak to our own will. This was the way we dealt with Eastern Europe. Not long ago, the people of Eastern Europe did what they should do sooner or later: They freed themselve from the external shield. We also attempted to direct everything in the East, but the coercion policy we carried out there continuously produced adverse effects on Soviet interests. In China such adverse effect was especially serious and appeared earlier than in any other places.

China is a big country. The attempt to admonish that country gave rise to Soviet-Chinese confrontation in the early 1960's. The wrangle with China forced us as well as all our compatriots to pay a high price. Now, when we are beginning to forget the bad things, it is necessary to mention the price we have paid.

For years, Soviet national defense was under dual pressure, and it became imperative to increase its defense against China. Soviet-Chinese confrontation posed a threat to the security of other peoples, and the threat proliferated to more and more countries and regions. Soviet-Chinese confrontation brought about an arms race and various conflicts, both big and small. The Soviet Union hoped to use confrontation with China to consolidate its political position and prestige in the world. As a matter of fact, however, the result was just the opposite.

While in conflict with Beijing over the issue of the so-called purity of the Marxist-Leninist theory, Soviet society has become conservative. Instead of overhauling our no longer operaable social mechanism, we devoted all our efforts to preserving the mechanism forever. In China's reform, Moscow found an excuse to criticize China for practicing revisionism and going against the truth. One should note that the Soviet Union did not use its financial and material resources to develop productive forces in Siberia and the Far East, but instead used them to build fortfications along the Chinese border. Being at odds with the neighbor, the eastern part of the Soviet Union became a closed, uninhabited, unexploited, and not so developed area. Brezhnev's leading group made this a remote area. It did not strengthen the security of the motherland but, on the contrary, made our country increasingly weak strategically. It goes without saying that the living standards of the people of various nationalities in the Soviet Union were also sacrificed.

Other socialist countries also weakened as they were busy fighting so-called class enemies and opportunists of all description. As a result, they lagged behind the advanced world level in a disastrous way. These were the dire consequencies of the 20 years of confrontation between the Soviet Union and China. We should thank our fate, because leaders have ultimately appeared in the Soviet and Chinese capitals who recognized the stupidity of what happened in the past and put out the furious fire.

Gorbachev's visit to China in May 1989 put an end to the past. We cannot say that all the problems were resolved at the time. It was only the beginning. There was a need to conclude a border treaty and reduce to the lowest level the number of armed forces the two countries deployed along their borders. There were still differences between the two countries in their policies toward international issues and in their stands toward certain aspects of the development of socialism. However, the leaders of the two countries agreed that problems and differences should not weaken friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and Chinese people.

A year has passed since then. It was by no means an ordinary year. A lot of things happened in both the Soviet Union and China. Their renewed bilateral relations have triumphantly stood the rigorous test. Representatives of the two countries did not make demands on the other side. Moscow and Beijing began to demonstrate their ability to resolve their differences in a civilized way, instead of resorting to lecturing and denouncing each other. With such good will, the two countries have reached a new milestone in their bilateral relations; namely, the visit to the Soviet Union by Li Peng, member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council.

Talks held between Soviet leaders and Li Peng have laid the material foundation for cooperation. A number of very important documents were signed. These documents deal with issues in the political, economic, scientific, and technological fields. The two sides reiterated their preference of socialism and stressed the need to improve their socialist system by themselves. What is important is that as two neighboring countries carrying out profound reform and experiencing economic difficulties, they can rely on each other in discharging their economic and social tasks. In the area of trade, China offers the most promising market for Soviet technological products, such as civil airplanes, space equipment, and nuclear facilities. At the same time, China would extend loans to the Soviet Union for the purchase of large numbers of urgently needed consumer goods. Strengthening cooperation for the production of consumer goods is also expected. The size of projects which employ Chinese experts and workers to build agricultural bases in Soviet eastern regions will probably expand. The Soviet Union will continue to help China build and renovate more than 20 industrial facilities. The two countries also have many other projects and programs. Of course, there are difficulties which must be overcome before these projects and programs can be completed. However, the supplementary nature of the two countries' economy, the distance between the two countries, and the Soviet intention to accelerate the development of Siberia and its Far East have created conditions for the expansion of cooperation. This will help realize the reform in the Soviet Union and China, which determines the future of these two large countries.

Northeast Asia

Frolov Receives Japanese Embassy Official

PM0905110590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report under the general heading "Meetings At the Editorial Office"]

[Text] I.T. Frolov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chief editor of PRAVDA, met on 8 May with Mr. Takao Kawakami, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at the Japanese Embassy in the USSR. Their discussion on questions of mutual interest was held in an atmosphere of sincerity and friendliness [druzhelyubiye].

USSR, DPRK Sign Cooperation Agreement

SK1005033390 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 7 May 90

[Unattributed talk from the "Annals of Friendship" program—read by announcer]

[Text] As we have already reported, the 24th regular meeting of the Soviet-Korean Intergovernmental Consultative Committee on Economic and Scientific and Technological Affairs was held in Pyongyang 24-27 April. The Soviet delegation was headed by Vladilen Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, and the Korean delegation, by Kim Pok-sin, vice premier of the DPRK Administration Council. Bilateral commerce and economic relations and issues on the status and prospects of scientific and technological cooperation were discussed at the meeting. The issue of how to fulfill each side's duty for the supply of goods and the status of the (?transfer) of production capacities of industrial plants built in the DPRK with the technological assistance of the Soviet Union were objectively analyzed.

A mutual agreement in principle on [words indistinct] in trade is of great significance. An agreement was reached to expand cooperation in the power industry, the production of light-industrial goods by way of [words indistinct], the shipbuilding industry, the electronic industry, and the agricultural sector.

In the field of scientific and technological cooperation, direct ties between offices, enterprises, and research institutes and, primarily, direct ties in microbiological, medical, and machinery sectors will be expanded. It is also expected that joint research will begin on developing maritime resources and protecting crops from insects and disease.

A protocol on commodities and [words indistinct] for 1990 was signed between the Soviet Union and the DPRK. According to this protocol, the Soviet Union will supply the DPRK with machines, plant facilities, petroleum and petroleum products, and other products that are important to the DPRK. The DPRK will supply the Soviet Union with metal-cutting machine tools, [words indistinct], and people's consumer goods.

A basic issue of mutual economic ties between the Soviet Union and the DPRK is to develop these ties into more vigorous and effective ties and to further contribute to solving (?social and economic problems). This is what the leader of the Soviet delegation said before returning to Moscow. [passage indistinct]

Outcome of Increased Unrest in ROK Considered

SK0505082290 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 4 May 90

[Commentary by station commentator (Sergey Petrov) from the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] It is not too much to say that Korea is in a stormy season. Labor disputes are being aggravated there.

The strikes involving the workers of the Hyundai Heavy Industries Company and the employees of the Korean Broadcasting System are ongoing. The workers of many other companies and enterprises join their strikes.

The government again has mobilized a large number of police forces to crack down upon the advance of South Korean workers. These two strikes are unpleasant and unexpected events to the Korean Government.

It was thought that the merger of the ruling party and two opposition parties to form the Democratic Liberal Party would provide South Korean society with peace and stability. President No Tae-u has repeatedly urged Korean business leaders to conclude negotiations with labor unions and remove the sources of labor disputes.

The temporary stability has failed to last long. Why has the situation developed in this way? In my opinion, it is necessary to clarify political and economic causes.

First of all, democracy in Korea is very crude. Chongwadae [Korean presidential residence] and the administration have not removed all legacies of the military dictatorship. The hackneyed method of resorting to armed force in checking conflicts remains.

It is proper for the Korean Government to try to rapidly restore the economy in recession at this stage. Even though there is a noble cause, it does not justify [words indistinct] means. The more the government depends on the power of the police, the more the movement of solidarity with strikers will be intensified.

The student movement and the strike of workers can be explained by the loss of tradition, the corruption of youth, individualism, and the spirit of consumerism. It is true that there exists an economic cause behind the movement and strike.

Society is distinguished according to strata. Also, the distribution of income is exorbitantly unfair. As technological production increases, laborers are to gain more income.

The strikers are demanding wage increases. The government does not accept their demands, saying that wage increases will lower the economic growth rate. As a consequence, strikes frequently occur.

Under this condition, South Korean society is faced with the danger that officers under the former Chon Tu-hwan administration and social activists increase their influence. In other words, there is the danger that the antidemocratic method of operating the economy and society can be revived. This is confirmed by the recent mass advances.

Labor disputes will continue in South Korea. Seoul should contrive a new method for controlling labor disputes.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

CPSU Delegation Visit to SRV Reported

PM0805130990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Interparty Ties"]

[Text] In accordance with the plan for interparty ties, a delegation of CPSU party workers led by A.S. Pavlov, chief of the CPSU Central Committee State Law Department, was in Vietnam 26 April through 5 May and familiarized itself with the experience of the party leadership to ensure socialist legality and to combat crime. Nguyen Duc Tam, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, received the delegation.

Commentary on SRV Party Chief's Wish to Visit PRC

OW1005051190 Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia 1100 GMT 9 May 90

[Nikolayev commentary]

[Text] Listener-friends: Accoding to a KYODO dispatch, Nguyen Van Linh, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV], expressed his wish to visit China to promote the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations. He made remarks to this effect while meeting in Ho Chi Minh City with Watanabe, a leader of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party. Watanabe visited Vietnam from China. In this connection, station commentator Nikolayev writes:

Vietnam and China, two neighboring countries, have a long history of friendly relations. Unfortunately, more than 10 years ago disputes occurred in relations between the two countries because of differences—mainly because of the conflict in Cambodia. Some of the issues between them are ones of bilateral relations. Of course, they cannot settle all these issues overnight. This is why the Vietnamese proposed to the Chinese long ago that they hold talks on issues concerning the normalization of relations between the two countries. Encouraging progress was made in this regard last year—the Vietnamese and Chinese representatives resumed direct political contacts. Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Dinh Nho Liem visited Beijing again earlier this year. The situation along the Sino-Vietnamese border remains stable, and bilateral trade is becoming increasingly brisk. This shows that relations between the two countries are improving.

Progress is also being made on the Cambodian issue. What should be pointed out first here is that Vietnamese troops withdrew from Cambodia last autumn. True, China takes a different view on this issue. Apparently, this issue can be settled. UN observers can be invited to check on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Nguyen Van Linh mentioned this issue while meeting with Watanabe.

On the other hand, Vietnam and China can make joint efforts to seek an early settlement of the Cambodian issue after improving relations. Now, Vietnamese, Chinese, and Thai representatives can hold meetings as proposed by Thailand.

The Vietnamese leader holds that the differences between Vietnam and China are temporary and that such differences are insignificant compared with peace and development, which represent the long-term fundamental interests of the people of the two countries. The Soviet Union also supports the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations. At his meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Moscow, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said that an early normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations would be an important factor for the health of the situation in Southeast Asia.

Near East & South Asia

Andreyev Comments on Role of Press in Iran

NC0905122090 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1800 GMT 7 May 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Iran's Islamic Guidance Ministry recently reported that more than 1,000 newspapers are now being published in Iran. This is an extremely great strength. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev states his views on the role of the press in he Iranian society.

[Name indistinct], a famous German military leader of the last century, once said: Be quiet if you want to talk to me. I think that this sentence very well reflects the relationship between the press and the Iranian Government in the first years of the Islamic Republic.

The full freedom of the press in the first months after the downfall of the shah's regime gradually vanished, and the censorship of all political reports and articles increased more and more each day. Brutal methods were used toward unruly correspondents. Suffice it to say that three months after the victory of the revolution, 20 journalists of the AYANDEGAN newspaper, which was a democratically inclined newspaper with the largest circulation at that time, were arrested.

But the true attack on the press started sometime after that; and AYANDEGAN newspaper was a pretext for this. This liberal newspaper published the text of an interview with Khomeyni by France's LE MONDE which was not intended for Iranian readers. Khomeyni reacted very strongly. He said that he [words indistinct] AYANDEGAN (?the objectives of which are) contrary to Islam.

The interesting point is that after the imam cursed this newspaper, its circulation increased from 250,000 to 350,000 copies. Naturally the officials noticed this increase and [words indistinct]. Six months after the victory of the Islamic revolution the government approved the press law [words indistinct]. AYANDEGAN, AZADI, and other independent newspapers, namely [names indistinct], were closed down and the press was placed under full government control. Following this, Imam Khomeyni said: We have rid ourselves of irresponsible correspondents who upset the minds of the people. These remarks (?marked the end) of press freedom in the Islamic Republic.

But it seems that after Khomeyni's death the era of the Islamic unity of the Iranian press has ended. The policy of openness is gradually being strengthened in Iran, and many of the Iranian newspapers reflect the views of various political groups more and more openly each day. Of course their opportunities are still limited and taboos in criticism exist, as in the past. Meanwhile, it should be noted that Interior Minister Abdollah Nouri clarified the issue at a roundtable discussion devoted to a study of political and (?legal) problems. He said: The opportunity to state views and exercise political freedom in Iran will be extended only to those who support the Islamic regime. But the contradictory phenomenon is that the political differences within the ruling hierarchy are becoming more and more obvious. It should be noted that this trend is becoming increasingly apparent in the press.

I think that the Iranian press is now divided into three camps. The first comprises the newspapers that are close to the government, like the TEHRAN TIMES and KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL, which support serious reforms in Iran's social life. These newspapers not only [word indistinct], but insist that [words indistinct] freedom be ensured. They try to ease the pressures of existing laws and to (?encourage) the thousands of experts who are needed to return to their homeland from abroad. They want to (?improve) Iran's image in the international scene and help it to emerge from the dark (?conditions) of the past so that the necessary investments for reconstructing the country after the eight years of war with Iraq may be attracted to the country. These newspapers actually support the liberalization of the political life within the framework of an Islamic system as well as the (?participation) of the private sector in the economy.

There are other newspapers like JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI and ABRAR which express the views of the Islamic conservatives and very decisively (?oppose) any sign of [word indistinct] (?flexibility). If in the first months after Khomeyni's death their major struggles were in support of (?the role of) Islamic [words indistinct], now they are making political accusations. Remarks are being heard on deviations from Imam Khomeyni's views. Accusations against an American-style Islamic [word indistinct] are being made. More and more (?threats) are being heard on [word indistinct] (?press). The newspapers of the Islamic conservatives are becoming more and more [word indistinct] and their pages carry more and more criticisms on [words indistinct]. JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI and ABRAR (?criticize the idea) of handing over government units to private owners and demand that Islamic (?traditions) be maintained.

Moreover, there seem to be [words indistinct] in the Iranian press. Newspapers like ETTELA'AT, KEYHAN, and RESALAT every once in a while shift their support from one group to another group. Their stands are apparently very similar to the political wind that is now blowing in Iran.

The press is sometimes described as the [word indistinct] government. This is not an exaggeration because whoever controls the press controls everything.

Andreyev Comments on Petrovskiy's Tehran Visit

NC0905124590 Moscow in Persian to Iran
1500 GMT 8 May 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary from "The World Today"]

[Text] Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy arrived in Tehran on Monday [7 May] and handed a message from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze to 'Ali Akbar Velayati. Our commentator Yuriy Andreyev writes:

Reports from Tehran state that the two parties intend to discuss a great variety of topics during the current round of Soviet-Iranian talks. The visit by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovskiy will probably continue until Thursday. So far he has met and talked with Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati.

An official spokesman for the Islamic Republic's Foreign Ministry has stated that the two sides are to discuss all matters of mutual interest. Apparently the talks will center around Moscow's mediation in solving the Iran-Iraq dispute.

Since the declaration of the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, a full implementation of the UN Security Council Resolution 598 has not been achieved. Despite several rounds of talks and the mediation by the UN Secretary General, not even one step forward has been taken, and the two sides continue to disagree greatly on a number of key issues.

It was under such conditions that in January this year the Soviet Union proposed to play the role of mediator in the Iran-Iraq talks. Moscow suggested that a meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran, Iraq, and the Soviet Union be held. This Soviet proposal does not mean a diminution of the role of the United Nations in solving the Iran-Iraq dispute. The Soviet officials have pointed out that the objective behind Moscow's diplomatic initiative is not to weaken the UN peace plan but to strengthen its basis.

Tehran and Baghdad have announced their readiness to participate in the tripartite consultations. Immediately after this, practical steps to prepare for the meeting started.

The Soviet Union's good relations with both Iran and Iraq can help the Soviet Union to play the role of mediator effectively. Moreover, the Soviet Union is a permanent member of the UN Security Council; and during the tripartite contacts, the UN peace plan will be taken into consideration.

Obviously intensive diplomatic activity and Vladimir Petrovskiy's visit to Tehran are not at all accidental. We know that Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati recently stated that he is ready to start direct talks with Iraq immediately. But Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz did not go to New York a few weeks ago to talk with the UN secretary general. This may have been a prologue to ensuing direct talks.

Under such conditions, the organizing of a tripartite meeting gains great significance. Petrovskiy's visit to Tehran shows that Soviet diplomacy is persistently striving toward a resumption of the Iran-Iraq talks.

Afghan-Soviet Border Situation Portrayed

PM1005104090 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 90 p 3

[Special correspondent Captain V. Filin report under the rubric "Exceptional Circumstances": "Halt, Who Goes There?"]

[Text] **For orientation: According to available operational information, armed Afghan opposition groupings still intend to carry out a series of hostile acts on the USSR border. On the part of Mullo Amanullo's and Khafis Arbob's groups [names as transliterated], it is possible that border detachments will be fired on and sorties made into Soviet territory with the aim of seizing weapons and border guards....**

...A small garrison in a border settlement on the edge of a great desert. Bleached verges, dented asphalt roads. Barracks and headquarters dating from the time when the struggle against the basmachi movement began.

From a combat dispatch: While driving in a worn-out section of the signaling system, a "GAZ-66" truck carrying an alert group consisting of Lieutenant I. Kovalenko and Privates V. Chugunov and V. Grigoryev blew up on a mine. All three suffered contusions. The truck is beyond repair.

The biggest beach in the Union, so the joke goes. True, it is a good way to the sea, "two paces on the map," and there is as much sand and sun as you like. They also describe this border post as an "import." In the sense that all food products have to be brought in. Never mind about the people, even the dogs cannot stand it. Once a fourlegged friend died of the heat. But for the officers, a year becomes 18 months. Just as it does, incidentally, at the same border post in the environs of Tallinn or Pitsunda.

The dull day brought only one pleasure. The sappers received their money allowance. The privates signed for seven rubles, the sergeants for 12. Otherwise everything was the same as usual. No "work" was as yet foreseen on the border.

From an official character reference: While fulfilling the task of clearing a sector of the locality of mines as part of a combat group, Pvt. I. Idrisov independently detected and rendered harmless a mark TS-2.5 mine. By order of the unit commander, he was rewarded with a short-term leave pass for the motherland.

For reference: The TS-2.5 mine, Italian, an antivehicular mine, in a plastic casing. Contains 2.5 kg of explosives. Enough to blow the wheel off an armored carrier or truck or the road wheels off an infantry combat vehicle.

Konstantin Rudenko, lieutenant, platoon commander:

"We have 17 mines to our credit in all. Mostly Italian TS-6.0 mines. An antivehicular mine, six kg of explosives. There have been British MK-3's and American M-19's. They still call it the 'Diplomat,' the shape is similar. It has 11.5 kg of explosives. I once saw a motorcyclist hit one of those on the 'other side,' and all that was left was his head and the front wheel. Everyone knows how many mistakes a sapper is allowed. None of us has made any mistakes yet.

"The most experienced are Ivan Belya, Yanis Maurin, Lesha Selivanov, Tolik Markovets. Ilshat Idrisov is a novice, but he has distinguished himself. We work in groups, under cover of two or three combat vehicles in case of an ambush. We let the dogs go first, and the sappers follow them with probes. In a day we can 'sweep' 15-20 km. On foot."

For reference: Among those who, only a year or two ago, were called "dushmans," and are now called the "armed Afghan opposition," there are different kinds of people. For some, the "shuravi" [Russians] are enemies, for others laying mines is only a way of earning money. A mine, for instance, the sappers told me, can cost 35,000-40,000 afghanis. Comparatively small money. But if an armored carrier blows up on the mine, the "hero" can receive 100,000-150,000 afghanis. Enough to feed a family of eight to 10 people well two or three times.

War is also a means of existence. If there were another, less risky means, perhaps there would be fewer problems. But there are not many such sources, unless you count the free Soviet aid, which the border guards help to hand over. War....

From a combat dispatch: During the transportation of grain for handing over to the Afghans, a border detail consisting of Lt. Chuprina, Pvt. Nikolenko, and Pvt. Akhmetov came under attack from a group of armed violators of the USSR State Border. In the armed clash

that ensued, Lt. Chuprina and Pvt. Nikolenko were wounded. The GAZ-66 truck was burned out and is beyond repair. The violators' attack was rebuffed.

Viktor Chuprina, border post deputy chief:

"We were carrying grain in sacks. Vasiliy Nikolenko was in the back, and Akhmetov and I were in the cab. It was hot and dust hung in the air. The armored carrier in front had left, in the direction of the border. Suddenly there was shooting. Akhmetov dropped the wheel and reached for his submachinegun. I told him: 'Drive on, you fool!' Out of the corner of my eye I saw a bearded man in a turban behind us, to the right. The Kalashnikov in his hands jumped. All at once the front and side glass flew out. We fell out of the left-hand door. From under the vehicle, we were shooting at anything that moved. Nikolenko, in the back, was silent. I yelled again, thinking, he's had it. I heard him say he was alive, but wounded. Somehow he managed to let off a rocket. To let people know we were fighting there. Then a machinegun opened fire on us from up above us on a hill, 200-300 meters. I was wounded in the hand, I tucked it into my belt so it did not get in the way. The truck caught fire. Somehow we pulled Nikolenko out of the back and shoved him into a hole. But the machinegun stepped up the pressure, apparently they were in a hurry. We decided to escape under a smokescreen. All we had was cartridges... Then our men came up. I lost consciousness, I heard heavy firing. Major Zaydulloyev turned up next to me, I remember he was on one knee, firing in long bursts. That's all I remember."

For information: The Afghan territory opposite this sector of the border is inhabited mainly by Pushtun tribes. Sometimes they engage in hostilities with neighbors living further into the territory. And the neighbors, in revenge, sometimes try to provoke the border guards to take action against the border tribes, including Pushtuns. The simplest method is to adopt the guise of the rival tribe's armed groups, and attack a border detail. Or lay mines. On both Afghan and Soviet territory. There is an oriental diversity of tactics. And in principle, were it not for the border guards' work to prevent such "actions" and the free aid, there could be even more attempts to test the strength of our border.

Smugglers are regarded as a serious adversary. (They carry drugs, money, sometimes medical supplies.)

In the main they are professionals. They spend their whole lives transporting goods. There is a permanent route to Iran. There, if they catch you, it is instant death. In Afghanistan there are plenty of drugs, but no peace. Your rivals could lay a mine, shoot at you, organize an ambush. Or inform the Iranian border guards about the route and time of movement. Or the Soviet border guards. In short, it is a risky business. But the prices for drugs justify the risk.

Trained men go into "action." Excellently adapted to local conditions, tough. Armed. They can shoot by ear, in the dark, and not miss. They know that the Soviet border guards are also well armed and organized. When they are trying to get through to Iran via Soviet territory, they prefer not to become involved in fighting with the border guards.

...On this distant plot of Soviet soil Anatoliy Andreyev is "god, czar, and military chief." The task of the officers and men he leads is to prevent border violations and the crossing of our territory by individuals and groups of smugglers.

During a period of duty the border detail headed by Captain V. Budnik detected movement by a group of smugglers and detained them. In the armed clash which ensued, two border violators were killed. Foreign currency totaling 18.87 million Iranian rials was seized. There were no losses on our side.

Viktor Budnik, border subunit chief of staff:

"My watch said 2140. An alert came in from Lt. Avdeyev's group: 'They're coming!' We waited. Our nerves were at full stretch. They were passing between our two groups. So close you could have reached out and touched them. We waited for the trap to spring shut. There was the usual shout of Halt!," a shot into the air, and a rocket flare. They scattered. There were terrible cries. One of the submachine guns swept round in a semicircle. No one was hit. But our nerves gave way, and a reply from 15 or so gun barrels stopped them completely.

"In the morning we opened the bags and counted the money. On some of the packages there was a banker's listing, three days old. We never saw such a pile before. We spent a week writing it up."

...Immediately after the Soviet troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan the border guards found themselves face to face with a major adversary.

First, there are the special services of Western countries and certain states of the Muslim East. Apart from them, but closely linked to them, there are extremist Islamic centers that have not given up the idea of creating a "pan-Islamic" state living by the laws of the Shari'at and incorporating the Central Asian republics of the USSR.

Various armed Afghan opposition formations represent a great danger. Many of them are under the influence of these special services and Islamic committees. Some are semicriminal and engage in robbery and brigandage.

Last year in this border district's sector we recorded on the order of 250 attempted hostile acts on the USSR border. These were attempts to fire on border details, mine-laying, attempts to engage Soviet citizens in illegal contacts, and the transmission of Islamic literature calling for a "jihad" (holy war).

Our soldiers, most of whom are 18- or 19-year-old young men, are not always ready to operate intelligently and with minimum risk to life in extreme situations. Two years of service is simply not enough to learn everything.

And perhaps in some salients we need reinforcements made up of professional border guards on the model of the "spetsnaz" [special forces] groups that exist at the KGB and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs].

Boris Agapov, major general, deputy chief of the district's troops:

"I do not want to enter into an argument about a professional army. This is a matter for the politicians rather than the military. But we must find ways to avoid 'exposing' yesterday's schoolchildren to risky situations.

"And another thing.

"Hard as it may be, we cannot give up providing free aid to Afghanistan. On the border this still acts as a kind of buffer between the 'shuravi' and those who could shout at them, but do not, those who bring mines, but do not lay them on the border roads. The more of these people there are—people who do not shoot and do not lay mines—the better it is for us."

...My departure from Andreyev's and Budnik's "place" also coincided with the distribution of money. On the same scale. There was a young boy who did not take part in this. Sashka.

Sashka Chepakov, son of the deputy for political affairs:

The day was drawing on. The water truck brought the water. Sashka marched confidently up and down in the midst of an armored carrier assault squad. As if it was normal. Sashka can recognize cartridges by their markings, probably better than he knows the letters of the alphabet. But there are no other amusements. It is boring. True, sometimes Alim Khamrakulov, the cook, shows him how to make nunchaki [meaning unknown], or Rinat Khatmullin is practicing tactics with the lads. It is more cheerful when the mail comes. Sashka knows how things then become festive in the barracks. You would not notice that it is a former stable with a cement floor and bunk beds. Though in the corner there is a real set of weights and dumbbells.

On the little parade square the soldiers are laying out their sleeping bags, bags for grenades and magazines, boxes of machinegun belts, and helmets. This is called equipping yourself. The drivers, talking among themselves, have gone to the dump to look for spares they are short of. Soon the lads will go on duty.

From a combat dispatch: In the sector of the... border post an armed clash took place between armed smugglers and Sergeant Yu. Shimanovich's border detail. Border violators used hand grenades. During the fighting one violator was killed and another arrested. Sgt. Shimanovich was slightly wounded by grenade fragments.

Sub-Saharan Africa

U.S. Green Beret Role in Africa Criticized

EA0305212390 Moscow International Service in Amharic 1530 GMT 25 Apr 90

[Text] According to the American news agency, UPI, it is intended to reestablish the Green Berets special Army team in (?Fort Bragg) U.S. Army barracks for deployment in Africa. The establishment of the Army team will start at the end of next June, and it is intended to have 1,300 men in it after two years. Members of the team will be trained in guerrilla warfare and commando tactics. Here is a commentary on this issue:

It seems as though this is news from six or seven years ago. It is to be recalled that at that time, the American administration used to deploy commandos in the name of a neo-globalism policy. It was planned to deploy these forces in Africa as well. It is also to be recalled that there was a centralized command with the abbreviation Centcom [Central Command] for this purpose. The duty of Centcom was to cover Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Egypt in Africa.

At that time, American leaders were using it as a pretext for safeguarding their interests. Inasmuch as international sanctions used to be decided mostly by the confrontation between military pacts, it was possible to understand and explain the need for that type of step. But the difference between the situation then and now is like the difference between winter cold and summer warmth.

In light of the perestroyka movement initiated by the USSR, the changes evident in other socialist countries, and the regular talks between the leaders of the USSR and the United States, the road has been opened for a new concept in international relations. This has allowed solutions to be sought for many varied situations through political means, instead of through force. This is a consequence of the understanding that political dialogue is much more powerful than military confrontation and force.

If we look at Africa, clear evidence of this fact is the declaration of a free Namibia in southwest Africa, due to the efforts made to rectify the situation. It is understood that favorable conditions are being prepared for the introduction of a fair system in South Africa, through political dialogue. The opposing sides in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Western Sahara are opting for peaceful dialogue.

It is a fact that many problems have been facing these governments up to now. But there is one fact that is undeniable, and that is: Priority must be given to the constructive development of the people. Why, then, are the Green Berets to serve in Africa in such a situation? Who needs these forces among the African population? These are some of the questions which come to mind. According to the UPI news agency, in the future, in

Africa, and probably in Zaire, a military base for these commando teams may be established. It is no secret that the American CIA is giving support to the Angolan antigovernment group, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola at the Cabinda base. Would this military base be given to the Green Berets in the future?

If we take all this into consideration, we shall not be far from the truth if we say that it is intended to destabilize the situation on the African Continent. In fact, members of the team may serve as military trainers or advisers for African governments. It is well known today that American men in uniform are, for instance, playing a similar role in Liberia. But when we recall that the current defense budget in Africa is about $12,000 billion annually, it is not hard to conclude that advisers who work out how best to use this defense expenditure for peaceful purposes are [words indistinct] are very different from the military trainers.

What need is there for the services of guerrilla warfare experts in African countries faced with difficult social and economic problems? It is a fact that the Americans ought to determine what kind of army teams they need, and in which continent they should be deployed. When considering this, our reporter, says concluding his commentary, one should remember the sad results of the Vietnam war.

East Europe

Departing Troops 'Blackmail' Local Hungarians

LD0905174890 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1600 GMT 9 May 90

[From the "Evening Magazine" program]

[Text] The commanders of the Soviet troops withdrawing from Hungary are blackmailing the local communities with ultimatum-like threats. During the National Assembly recess, deputies drew the attention of the acting government's defense minister to this. The MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] deputy, for example, stated that the commanders of the Soviet military installation in the village of Tab are demanding 5 million forints in exchange for not demolishing the general foodstore, school and nursery school belonging to the barracks. Ferenc Karpati has promised to brief the Hungarian Government Commissioner for troop withdrawals about this and similar cases.

Victory Day Celebrations in CSFR Reported

Yazov Greets Counterpart

PM0905114390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 90 Single Edition p 1

[Defense Minister Yazov Greetings to CSFR's Vacek on Liberation Anniversary]

[Text] To Army General Miroslav Vacek, minister of national defense of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic

Esteemed Mr. Minister!

Accept sincere greetings to the Czechoslovak Army soldiers on behalf of the USSR Armed Forces on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of Czechoslovakia's liberation from the fascist occupiers.

I am confident that the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between our countries' armies will steadily develop in the interests of ensuring peace and stability in the European continent.

On this holiday I wish the Czechoslovak Army personnel successes in their military labor and the improvement of soldierly skills.

[Signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR defense minister

Ceremonies Held

LD0905191290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 9 May 90

[Report by correspondent A. Samylin]

[Text] The anniversary of liberation and victory over fascism is being marked throughout the whole of the CSFR. It is true that this time there is a great difference from the ceremonies devoted, let's say, to the 40th jubilee. This year, by government decision, military parades in Prague and Bratislava were canceled. The resources which were allocated to them will be spent on ecological projects.

The main ceremonies, which the president participated in, took place in the city of Plzen, which was liberated by the U.S. Army (?and where) the first wreath was laid yesterday by Vaclav Havel at the Olsany Cemetery as a tribute to the servicemen of the UK. A reception on the occasion of Victory Day and of the liberation of Czechoslovakia was blockaded by Prague extremists who almost completely paralyzed the work of our Embassy. Such are the realities of today.

In Bratislava, there were no such incidents. Yesterday, representatives of all parties and movements visited the memorial to Soviet servicemen on Memorial Hill in Slavin and leaders of the government and parliament of the republic laid a wreath. Although, here too, some would like to belittle the role of the Soviet Army. In connection with this, the Slovak newspaper PRAVDA wrote: The Soviet troops who liberated Europe are not in any way related to the crimes of the Stalinist regime and are in no way guilty for the intervention in our country in August 1968, just as the U.S. soldiers who fought against fascism have nothing in common with the aggression in Vietnam. The historical truth remains that the Soviet people bore the main burden of the war on its shoulders.

Slovenia Elects Opposition Government

PM0205153190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 May 90 Second Edition p 6

[Yevgeniy Fadeyev report under the rubric "Correspondents Comment": "Are 'Impossible Unions' Possible"]

[Excerpts] Belgrade—So, as before the republic of Slovenia still leads the way in the many radical events which have been taking place on the Yugoslav political scene recently. Now for the first time elections to the republic assembly (parliament) have taken place on a multiparty basis.

While firmly and consistently advocating freedom and equal rights with alternative movements, the League of Communists of Slovenia-Party of Democratic Reform suffered defeat in the first clash with them. The communists received only 17 percent of the votes and only 14 of the 80 parliamentary seats. The opposition bloc Demos was the victor—55 percent of the vote and more than half the seats—47—in the parliament. But Slovenia, local observers joke, would not be Slovenia if it did not present a surprise once again.

Following the elections to the assembly elections for the republic's president were held in Ljubljana. And here, in spite of the fact that communists suffered a severe defeat only two weeks ago, their candidate Milan Kucan (by the way, until recently he headed the Slovenian League of Communists Central Committee) won a convincing victory over his rival—the DEMOS representative Joze Pucnik. They polled 59 percent and 41 percent respectively. [passage omitted]

In accordance with his election promises Milan Kucan will leave the party for the duration of his term in office. People here write that in terms of the republic's "uncoupling" from the SFRY, his opinion is this:

"Slovenia is demanding not the transformation of our country into a confederation, but our republic's confederative status as part of the SFRY."

And what do the Demos representatives and their leader J. Pucnik think about this? An ultimatum has been made: Either confederation, or they would leave Yugoslavia. Their attitude to the new president? The fact is that it was precisely the communists who were the main target of the attacks during the election campaign and the elections themselves. The opposition's attitude to them has still not changed. [passage omitted]

GDR Voters Back Government Coalition

LD0705092490 Moscow TASS in English 0902 GMT 7 May 90

["GDR's Voters Back Government Coalition at Municipal Polls"—TASS headline; by TASS correspondent Konstantin Savvin]

[Text] Berlin May 7 TASS—East German voters stuck to their general election choices on Sunday as they went to the polls in the country's local elections.

The governing coalition is formed by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the German Social Union (GSU), the Democratic Breakthrough (DB), the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Liberals, dominated.

According to preliminary data issued late on Sunday, the Christian Democrats were the largest winners—20.8 per cent, the GDU—3.8 and Liberals—6.7 per cent.

However, nearly all the parties of the "grand Coalition" suffered losses as compared with the results achieved in the general elections on March 18. The CDU lost 6.6 per cent, the SPD—1.1 per cent, the GSU—2.5 per cent.

Only the Liberal Party won more votes (1.4 per cent) than at the elections to the People's Chamber.

These figures were quoted by the West German Public Poll Institute. The institute attributed losses suffered by Christian Democrats to the fact that about 800,000 voters who cast their ballots for the CDU on March 18 did not go to the polls.

Opposition parties collected over a third of all votes. The party of Democratic Socialistm (PDS) won 14.3 per cent, the Democratic peasants' Party of Germany (DPPG)—4.8 per cent, the Greens—2.7 per cent, the Union-90—2.2 per cent and the New Forum—1.8 per cent.

Civic movements and parties and organizations representating the interests of agricultural workers won more votes. To a certain extent this was a surprise. The DPPG doubled its previous general election vote.

The recently established Peasants' Union participated in the elections for the first time and won over three per cent. The reason for this support is explained by East German agricultultural workers' dissatisfaction with the uncontrolled import of foodstuffs from the West, which has increased in the past few weeks.

The share of imported foodstuffs reached 15 per cent in the GDR, hampering the sale of East German farm products. A decision by the Council of Ministers on urgent measures to protect the domestic agricultural market was made too late, according to farmers.

West Europe

Lithuanian Prime Minister Visits London

Interview Views 'High Hopes'

PM0905133690 London ITV Television Network in English 1800 GMT 8 May 90

[Interview with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, in Lithuanian with superimposed English translation, by reporter Jane Bennett Powell in London on 8 May on channel 4 "News" program as part of a report on Mrs. Prunskiene's visit to London and the situation in Lithuania—recorded]

[Text] [Powell] Mrs. Prunskiene has high hopes, though, of Mrs. Thatcher, whom she'll meet tomorrow.

[Prunskiene] I think that Mrs. Thatcher's involvement in this would in fact make the whole matter much easier to solve.

[Powell] But does Mrs. Thatcher have any real influence on Mr. Gorbachev's thinking?

[Prunskiene] I don't doubt this for one minute, because I think there is a way here to not harm Mr. Gorbachev at all—or the Soviet Union.

[Powell] With the West concerned about Gorbachev's stability when pressed by so many claims for independence, isn't Lithuania's action rightly criticized as damaging his attempts to introduce perestroyka?

[Prunskiene] Yes, I would say, on the contrary, that the... not solving the Lithuanian problem would in fact stop perestroyka, and in fact would help to destruct it.

[Powell] In support of their case, the Lithuanians cite not only the demonstrations in Red Square on May Day, which caused Mr. Gorbachev such angst, but also letters from the Soviet Union backing their claim.

[Prunskiene] Yes, many people have in fact sent many letters that support our position, and it's quite clear that only about 5 percent of the people are negative as regards our situation.

Thatcher Meeting Seen 'Successful'

LD0905224790 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 9 May 90

[Text] The Lithuanian Prime Minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene, has said after her meeting with Margaret Thatcher that the British prime minister promised support to the Baltic states in their bid for independence. The meeting lasted for an hour and half, twice as long as had been planned.

According to a BBC radio correspondent Mrs. Prunskiene beamed after the meeting. Both leaders spoke for practical decisions that would be satisfactory to Vilnius and Moscow and would enable them to preserve the present relationship between the East and the West.

BBC reported that it seems as if Kazimiera Prunskiene managed to convince the British prime minister to estimate the problem of Lithuania from Lithuania's standpoint. In her interview to the Lithuanian radio serivce of Free Europe, Kazimiera Prunskiene confirmed the fact that she would be meeting with the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Bonn on Friday [11 May]. Tomorrow a meeting will take place between Mrs. Prunskiene and the French President Francois Mitterrand. The French representatives have said that the appeal of Mitterrand and Kohl to Lithuanians is going to be discussed.

The appeal urged the leadership of Lithuania to suspend the enforcement of Lithuania's act of independence and start negotiations with Moscow.

Meanwhile in her today's meeting with Margaret Thatcher the Lithuanian prime minister had to enlarge on the development of Lithuanian statehood and the possible decisions on the issue of Lithuania acceptable to Vilnius, Moscow and the world.

Our standpoints were different at first said Mrs. Prunskiene in her interview to Free Europe. However, after Mrs. Prunskiene expressed her approval of Mitterrand and Kohl's position the British prime minister sensed (?the) possibility of playing an influential role in proceeding from suggestions to concrete actions. According to Kazimiera Prunskiene the standpoint of the British prime minister changed after hearing out all the argumentations.

Mrs. Prunskiene thinks that she had managed to convince Margaret Thatcher that it was possible to resolve the Lithuanian issue, reconciling the interests of the world, the position of Mikhail Gorbachev and the further development of democracy. Mrs. Prunskiene said that the meeting was very successful and noted that Margaret Thatcher was also of the same opinion.

After her meeting with the British Prime Minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene met with the Lithuanians residing in London and arrived at the House of Commons. Eighty-five members of the Conservative party signed a resolution of greetings to the Lithuanian prime minister, calling on Margaret Thatcher to support Lithuania.

More Reportage on Visit

WA0905140790

For reports on the visit by Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene to the United Kingdom, including her talks with Margaret Thatcher, please see the United Kingdom section of the 9 May West Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Girenko, Swedish Envoy View Interethnic Relations

PM0905111390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "Exchange of Opinions"]

[Text] A.N. Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received O. Berner, Swedish ambassador to the USSR, at his request 8 May.

During their discussion, which took place in an amicable atmosphere, there was an exchange of opinions on certain questions of interethnic relations in the Soviet Union.

Latin America & Caribbean

Critics of Soviet Aid to Cuba Rebutted

PM0905093790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 May 90 First Edition p 5

[S. Sergeyev article: "Priceless Asset: Thirty Years Ago Diplomatic Relations Were Restored Between the USSR and Cuba"]

[Text] This is how real friends behave. Thanks to us the Cubans, in their time of troubles, were able to stand firm in the confrontation against the Goliath from the north. We recall the economic boycott of the rebellious island, the mercenary aggression at Playa Giron, the threat of direct U.S. aggression and the Caribbean crisis... Now the Cubans help us. They were among the first to send blood to those injured during the Armenian earthquake. Denying themselves many things and repaying kindness with kindness, they lavished heartwarming care on more than 100 of our child victims of the Chernobyl tragedy and found room in the best hospitals for a group of former Soviet military servicemen seriously wounded in Afghanistan.

In the 30 years since the official restoration of USSR-Cuban diplomatic relations our ties have become extensive and multifaceted. They are realized in the scientific-technical, cultural, military, and economic spheres. The latter, furthermore, are of great significance for both Cuba and the USSR. Cuba is our sixth-largest trading partner and the Soviet Union provides over 70 percent of Cuba's foreign trade turnover. The USSR is the only, or main, supplier of most output of importance to Cuba—all its oil and petroleum products, 94 percent of its grain, and almost all its lumber. Our country in turn receives one-third of its sugar, 40 percent of its citrus fruits, and 70 percent of its nickel from Cuba.

During M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Havana in April last year, Soviet-Cuban relations were formalized for the first time in a Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. When signing the treaty the sides not only enshrined in it the capital that they have accumulated but also directed it toward the future which, as M.S. Gorbachev stressed, "places new demands on the quality of our cooperation." The need to find new cooperation mechanisms is due to the development of the perestroyka processes in the USSR, the new political thinking, and the abandonment of administration and command methods of management.

In the main our perestroyka is consistant with the Cuban leadership's determination to intensify the role of the human factor in the solution of all problems, including economic ones. This inspires the confidence that the difficulties involved in the search for ways to increase the effectiveness of economic cooperation will be successfully overcome.

For the above reasons, the USSR's policy toward Cuba is now more open and predictable than ever before and does not harm third countries, including the United States. The latter's continuing economic blockade of Cuba is a complete anachronism today. The restoration of normal economic ties with the republic could promote economic stabilization in that country and signify Washington's direct contribution to the implementation of the "course of support for perestroyka" to which the U.S. administration is oriented, according to statements by officials. Strong-arm pressure, including for example the attempt to capture Cuba's TV audience and the recently mounted and unprecedented U.S. war games off the Cuban coast and at the Guantanamo base, simply do not fit into the context of the new world political relations that are taking shape. The allegations by certain Washington figures that the republic's Revolutionary Armed Forces are "strengthening their offensive potential" are groundless. USSR-Cuban military cooperation has been and remains entirely commensurate with the threat of aggression hanging over Cuba for 30 years now.

Until recently, critical evaluations of Soviet-Cuban relations came mainly from the United States. Now that theme is being actively discussed in our parliament. There have been statements, often very close to philistinism, which boil down to the following: Why are we helping Cuba when we have a great many problems of our own? The people who make such statements do not seem to realize that our difficulties are not due to the fact that we are helping someone else but lie within ourselves and in the disorganization of our economy.

Soviet-Cuban relations have a long-standing tradition. They have had their ups and downs. But even at the most difficult times the close political cooperation, real equality, and sense of mutual respect remained unchanged. This priceless asset must be cherished.

Baklanov Heads Delegation to Havanna

Attends Anniversary Fete

LD0905093890 Moscow TASS in English 0910 GMT 9 May 90

[Text] Havana May 9 TASS—"The 30th anniversary of the restoration of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the republic of Cuba, being marked by our peoples, is not just a jubilee date but a boundary that enables one to appraise the path traversed on its merits. Our relations are based on the principle of equality and are marked with mutual respect, the understanding of each other's real possibilities, a sense of responsibility and internationalist mutual assistance. Fraternal cooperation between the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of Cuba is a major element of the dynamic relations between our states," Soviet people's deputy and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Oleg Baklanov said at a meeting held in Havana to mark the date.

Baklanov leads a visiting USSR Supreme Soviet delegation.

"Our cooperation rests upon a huge potential which should be treasured and multiplied. It is now essential to make our relations more efficient."

Speaking of Cuban-American relations, Baklanov said that the United States should demonstrate a really democratic approach to other countries, specifically to Cuba. Putting American-Cuban relations back on a good-neighbourly footing would promote the process of recovery in the region and the world as a whole. The Soviet Union is ready to promote such a dialogue in all aspects, that would not affect the sovereigns right of either of the sides.

The Cuban revolution has been able to withstand at a time of trial owing to the Soviet Union's firm and timely support," Cuban Communist Party Central Committee Politburo member Jose Ramon Machado Bentura said. He expressed gratitude to thousands of Soviet specialists who had made an inestimable contribution to the development of the Cuban economy, science and technology.

First secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers Fidel Castro attended the celebration meeting.

Completes Visit

LD1005091890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0436 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Havana, 10 May (TASS)—The visit to Cuba by the Soviet delegation headed by Oleg Baklanov, USSR people's deputy and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has ended. The delegation was seen off at Jose Marti International Airport by Army General Raul Castro, second secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, first deputy chairman of the republic's Council of State and Ministers, and minister of the revolutionary armed forces; by Juan Escalona, chairman of the National Assembly of the People's Government; and by other officials. Among those seeing them off was Yuriy Petrov, USSR ambassador to Cuba.

Political & Social

Further Reportage on Red Square Victory Day Parade

Parade Detailed

LD0905093490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 0552 GMT on 9 May begins carrying a 63-minute live relay of the victory parade marking the 45th anniversary of the victory in World War II held in Red Square in Moscow.

At this time Moscow Domestic Service in Russian begins carrying a parallel relay of the proceedings in Red Square.

Against a background of martial music, the television camera shows the slogan "Victory—in the Name of Life on Earth" on the Historical Museum on Red Square. Other huge posters read "Patriotic War" and "1990." The screen then cuts to the eternal flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior. Camera then cuts to shots of armed forces detachments drawn up on the Square and of milling crowds.

At 0554 GMT archive film is shown of crowds standing in the rain to welcome the victors on the first Victory Day, and of Marshals Zukov and Rokosovskiy riding out to participate. The standards are seen being paraded across Red Square and Nazi standards are seen being thrown into a pile.

At 0557 GMT the camera returns to the scene at Red Square and the shouting of military commands is heard.

At 0559 GMT Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Lukyanov, Supreme Soviet leaders, leaders of the Communist Party, and military commanders are seen ascending the steps of the Lenin Mausoleum. Gorbachev is seen waving as the crowd applauds.

At 0600 GMT the Kremlin's chimes are sounded. The ranks stand to attention as Marshal Yazov, standing in an open limousine, emerges from the Kremlin. Colonel General Kalinin reports to Yazov and Yazov's limousine drives down Red Square for Yazov to inspect the troops.

At 0602 GMT Yazov delivers the traditional greeting on the occasion of Victory Day and the soldiers respond with three cheers. Yazov greets the Frunze Academy cadets and cadets from the Suvorov and Nakhimov Academies. Yazov's limousine is seen disappearing past the Historical Museum.

The television announcer says at this point that for the first time the parade is not organized by the Defense Ministry but on the instuction of the president.

At 0610 GMT Yazov's limousine and an accompanying car are seen arriving back on Red Square and drawing up to the entrance to the Lenin Mausoleum. The announcer says that church bells are ringing across Moscow. Yazov climbs the steps to the mausoleum.

At 0612 GMT Yazov begins his address which he concludes at 0619 GMT. (Text of Yazov speech was published on page 51 of the 9 May Soviet Union DAILY REPORT).

As Yazov concludes his address the soldiers respond with cheers.

At 0620 GMT the Soviet national anthem is played. As the anthem is being played the camera pans along the top of the mausoleum showing the leaders lined up from left to right of screen as follows:

Three unidentified generals, General Lushev, General Moiseyev, two unidentified civilians, Slyunkov, Medvedev, Yakovlev, Zaykov, Yazov Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Lukyanov, Shevardnadze, Vorotnikov, Maslyukov, Vlasov, Revenko, Primakov, Yarin, and Bakatin.

(Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0800 GMT on 9 May carries a short news report on the parade in which the news reader lists those present on the mausoleum as follows: "Gorbachev, Vorotnikov, Zaykov, Kryuchkov, Ligachev, Maslyukov, Medvedev, Ryzhkov, Slyunkov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Vlasov, Lukyanov, Primakov, and members of the Presidential Council, as well as distinguished military leaders.")

At 0622 GMT the parade is drawn up to attention ready for the march past. Drummers and fifers from the Moscow Military Music Academy lead the parade. A large symbol of a child in the arms of soldiers, as in Berlin's Treptow Park, is carried past as a tableau. This is followed by a victory banner. The banners of the Karelian, Leningrad, Belorussian, and other fronts are then paraded.

At 0627 GMT veterans, Heroes of the Soviet Union, march past. The camera cuts to Gorbachev, Lukyanov, Ryzhkov, and Yazov who are seen waving.

As the veterans march past, the announcer lists the privations endured during the war. Soldiers in World War II uniforms march past.

At 0630 GMT the announcer says that the army unites all kinds of people in a common cause.

At 0633 GMT military academy cadets start their march past. The announcer on the Moscow Radio relay of the parade lists the military academies whose representatives are participating: the Moscow Military Academy named after Frunze, the Moscow Military Political Academy named after Lenin, the Moscow Military Engineering Academy named after Dzerzhinskiy, the Moscow Military Academy of Armored Troops named after Malinovskiy, the Moscow Military Engineering Academy named after Kuybyshev, the Moscow Military Academy of Chemical Defense named after Timoshenko, the Monino Military Air Academy named after Gagarin, the Moscow Military Air Engineering Academy named after Zhukovskiy, the Higher Naval Radio-Electronics School named after Popov, representatives of unspecified airborne assault divisions, the Moscow Higher Border Troops School of the USSR KGB named after Mossovet, representatives of unspecified marine divisions, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops Division named after Dzerzhinskiy, the Suvorov Military School, the Nakhimov Military School, and the Moscow Higher Combined Troops Command School named after the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

At 0638 GMT a brief interview is conducted on split screen with an unnamed cadet who says he wants to be like his heroes, Lermontov, Pushkin, and Tolstoy, who all had a positive attitude to the army.

At 0639 GMT cadets from the Suvorov and Nakhimov Academies are seen presenting flowers to the leaders on the mausoleum. Gorbachev and Ryzhkov exchange a few words with them.

At 0642 GMT the parade of military hardware begins. World War II equipment leads the parade with 21 T-34 tanks, 16 76-mm ZIS-3 guns, and 16 BM-13 Katyusha rocket launchers. Several trucks carrying soldiers in World War II uniforms follow.

At 0645 GMT contemporary military hardware follows. (unit indentifications, where given, are provided by the presenter.) A motorized rifle section of the Taman Division leads off in 21 vehicles described by the announcer as being of a new type on display for the first time. They are equipped with rocket weapons. Their appearance is similar to the BTR-80 but having approximately eight slim tubular objects, with the apperance of rockets, lying horizontally on the superstructure. These are followed by a number of BMP-2 armored personnel carriers, followed by 25 BMD's carrying airborne forces. These are followed by soldiers from the Kantemir Guards Tank Division named after Andropov in 21 T-72 and 21 T-80 tanks, identified as such by the announcer, which is unusual. The announcer on the Moscow radio relay also identifies T-72's and T-80's as they come on the square.

The tanks are followed by self-propelled artillery pieces consisting of 12 SO-120, 12 M-1974, and 12 M-1973 self-propelled guns. These are followed by 12 BM-21 rocket launchers and 12 M-1975 guns.

These are followed by anti-aircraft missiles described by the announcer as belonging to the Guards Putilov-Kirov Air Defense Regiment. They consist of 12 SA-13 carrier vehicles with missiles and 12 SA-8B's. These are followed by 12 SA-10 missiles.

The radio presenter comments at this time about the world's hopes for results from the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit which will be negotiating cuts in armaments.

The unidentified vehicles are followed by approximately 12 Frog-7 missiles, six SS-21 missiles, and six SS-1 missiles.

The radio relay presenter says that in all 429 armored and transport vehicles are taking part in the parade.

At 0653 GMT troops from the Moscow Military Garrison march past as the camera cuts to shots of Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, and Lukyanov chatting on the mausoleum.

At 0655 GMT the camera cuts to a shot of the eternal flame at the Tomb of the Unknown Warrior.

At this time the relay ends.

Yazov Issues Order of the Day

*PM0905135590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 May 90 Second Edition p 6*

["Order of the USSR Defense Minister No. 150; 9 May 1990, Moscow"]

[Text] Comrade soldiers, seamen, sergeants, petty officers, ensigns, warrant officers, officers, generals, and admirals!

Comrade veterans of war, labor, and the USSR Armed Forces!

Today our country and all progressive mankind are celebrating the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War.

In that war, which was imposed on the Soviet Union by German fascism, the fate of the world's first socialist state and of world civilization was decided.

Under the leadership of the Communist Party the Soviet people and their valiant Armed Forces inflicted a crushing defeat on fascist Germany, upheld the freedom and independence of their homeland in bitter struggle against the aggressor, and liberated the peoples of Europe.

Victory in the war was won by the courage, combat skill, and heroism of Soviet soldiers on the battlefields, the selfless struggle waged by the partisans and members of the underground on the front line, the daily feats of labor performed by workers in the rear services, and the combined efforts of the anti-Hitler coalition and the antifascist movement. Our homeland will never forget the patriotic deeds of the generation of Soviet people who bore the full brunt of the rigorous ordeals of the war. It is to them that the country owes the victory.

During the Great Patriotic War the heroic traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces were multiplied. In single combat with the strong and perfidious enemy they convincingly proved the indisputable superiority of Soviet weapons and Soviet military art and set examples of military valor, selflessness, and humanity for the world.

Today the sons and grandsons of frontline soldiers serve in the Army and Navy. They worthily continue the older generations' tradition of loyalty to military service. Our victory lives on through this loyalty, through the indissoluble continuity between generations of defenders of the homeland!

Army and Navy personnel, like all Soviet people, are taking an active part in resolving the practical tasks of perestroyka and socialist renewal. In close interconnection with the political, economic, and legal reforms being implemented in society profound transformations are being implemented in accordance with the demands of defensive military doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency in defense building and in the personnel, structure, and training of the Armed Forces which are the elements of profound military reform.

It is in many respects owing to perestroyka processes within the USSR and under their favorable influence that positive changes are taking place in the world arena. The level of military confrontation is dropping. Political dialogue is developing. The negotiating process is becoming increasingly objective. At the same time the positive improvements have not as yet become irreversible. There is still military danger in the world. The lessons of history remind us of the need for supreme vigilance. One of the most important tasks for the Soviet state and our entire people is to ensure the country's reliable defense capability. The USSR Armed Forces bear particular responsibility for this task.

Soviet soldiers true to their patriotic and international duty vigilantly guard their people's constructive labor, the cause of socialism, and world peace.

I greet and congratulate all Army and Navy personnel and war, labor, and Armed Forces veterans on this Victory holiday.

To mark the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, I order:

That today, 9 May 1990, at 2200 hours local time, a ceremonial 30-gun artillery salute be fired in the capital of our motherland, the hero-city of Moscow, in the capitals of the union republics, in the hero-cities of Leningrad, Volgograd, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Kerch, Tula, Smolensk, and Murmansk, in the hero-fortress of Brest, and also in the cities of Kaliningrad, Lvov, Rostov-na-Donu, Kuybyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Chita, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, and Severomorsk.

Eternal glory to the heroes who died in the fight for our homeland's freedom and independence!

Long live the heroic Soviet people and their valiant Armed Forces.

[signed] Marshal of the Soviet Union D. Yazov, USSR minister of defense

WWII Dead Remembered

LD0905200190 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT 9 May 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow May 9 TASS—The 45th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War, which is being marked in the Soviet Union today, is a festive occasion, but it is also a day of grief over those fallen.

Thanksgiving words and commemoration prayers in memory of millions, who lost their lives in the war, are being said today at all Orthodox churches, Roman Catholic churches, mosques, and synagogues, in all languages of the people who live in the Soviet Union.

Nearly all families in the USSR had losses in the war: father or son, mother, brother, sister or daughter.

On May 9, at 19:00 the Soviet Union observed a minute of silence to revere the blessed memory of those who lost their lives in the fight against Nazi invaders. The eternal flame on the Unknown Soldier's Tomb at the Kremlin Wall was shown on television screens.

"On the day of victory, every family and every human being feel ever-lasting gratitude to those who did not come back from the war," Central Television and All-Union Radio said in their programmes.

Celebrations Throughout Republics

LD0905183490 Moscow TASS in English 1756 GMT 9 May 90

[Text] Moscow May 9 By TASS correspondents: [dateline as received] The whole of the Soviet Union celebrates today the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the war against Nazism.

A naval parade was held in Leningrad, a city on the Neva River. in keeping with tradition, Leningrad government officials, party leaders and military commanders mounted the cruiser Aurora, which was the flagship in the parade.

Dvortsovaya Square in the centre of the city was the next venue of the military parade. It witnessed the ceremonial march-past of cadets from the Suvorov Military school, other military schools and academies, and military hardware. War veterans also took part in the parade.

At midday, thousands upon thousands of Leningraders and their foreign guests visited war memorials. They laid wreaths and flowers on mass graves at the Piskarevskoye Cemetery to the tolling of the peace bell, which was presented to Leningrad by residents of the Japanese city of Nagasaki.

"We were happy to meet again in Leningrad. Each of us remains faithful to camraderie born in the years of the war. Let this holiday to remain a symbol of peace and cooperation," said American Lieutenant Bill Robertson, who was among the Americans who linked up with

Soviet soldiers on the Elbe River in April 1945. He arrived in the Soviet Union with a group of Americans, with whom he served in the same regiment, to attend victory day celebrations.

War veterans and guerrillas were among those parading with troops of the local garrison today through Kiev's main thoroughfare. Thousands of people filled the park of glory in the capital of the Ukraine to observe one minute's silence in remembrance of those who gave their lives for the freedom of their homeland.

Thousands of residents of Volgograd took part in the victory day parade. They laid wreaths in the hall of military glory of the memorial to the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad on the Mamayev Hill and at the eternal fire in the Square of the Fallen Soldiers.

Seamen aboard combatant ships, merchant and fishing vessels, which sailed off from Riga, capital of Latvia, threw flowers into the Baltic Sea to commemorate the sailors who perished during the Great Patriotic War.

The festivities and a military parade in Riga marked the 45th anniversary of victory day and of the liberation of the whole of the republic's territory from fascists.

The holiday in Odessa was opened by a torch-carrying youth march, a symbol of young people's unfading memory of those who upheld the independence of the homeland in the fight against fascism. Troops of the Odessa military garrison paraded through the city.

The parade of ships and troops of the local garrison in Sevastopol was followed up by a ceremonial march of people who participated in the defence and liberation of the city and war veterans. They were welcomed by thousands of city residents, who thanked them for the victory and presented flowers to them.

Strong winds and snow failed to keep residents of Murmansk from marching towards the monument to the defenders of the Soviet Arctic region. The march involved guests from Britain, the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, who participated in the allied countries' convoys.

Defying the appeal to the residents of Lithuania by the republican parliament to refrain from celebrating victory day, thousands of residents of Vilnius and guests of the city filled its central streets prior to the parade of troops of the local garrison.

Wreaths were laid on the graves of Soviet soldiers who perished in the battles to liberate Lithuania from Nazi invaders.

A parade of troops of the Tallinn garrison was opened in the capital of Estonia by war veterans—those who crushed fascism 45 years ago. Among them was Colonel (Retired) Ilmar Paul.

An officer of the Estonian bourgeois army, he became a company commander of the Viljandijskiy Destroyer Battalion, took part in the operation to rout the ERNA [expansion unknown] subversive and espionage group composed of anti-Soviet-minded Estonians.

Paul is one of those who denounced the opening of the monument to ERNA group members in Kautla last summer. He was a regiment commander of the Estonian Infantry Corps when the war was over.

Among those who welcomed the participants in the parade from the stand was ethnic Estonian and war veteran Martin Amelin, the years of his life in the bourgeois republic do not seem bright to him. He met that republic's President Konstantin Pjats, who sacked him.

"I do not support our politicians, trying to draw the Estonian people into the quagmire," Amelin told TASS. "It is not a 'parade of occupation troops' here today as it is in vogue now to speak in Estonia, but a parade of the Soviet people, millions of whom gave their lives in the struggle to liberate the whole of Europe from Fascism."

Festivities to mark victory day were held in other cities of the Soviet Union today.

Commentary on May Day Parade Disturbances

90UN1781A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 6 May 90 p 1

[Commentary by V. Kachurin under the rubric "At the End of the Week": "Who Interrupted the May Day Parade"]

[Text] **I will say right at the start that I do not consider the May Day Parade hopelessly ruined. But it is worth reflecting on the incident that turned into a fly in the ointment.**

Once more I read the May 1 reports and looked at the photographs, which, it seems, have brought us back to the thirties when demonstrations of mass hate were the norm. How did it happen that the free expression of the Muscovites' will (so this part of the holiday was conceived) dumbfounded even many radically minded people?

As we know, it was decided not to hold the May Day Parade to the bounds of the traditions which formed long ago. For the first time they abandoned the customary order of the procession. At the suggestion of the Moscow trade unions, the parade's participants formed by sector and the number of participants was not regulated. A resolution of the parade, at the base of which was an appeal for unity, mutual aid, and worker's solidarity, answered the sense of a Day of International Worker Solidarity, it seemed.

Apparently, proceeding from these favorable motives, the 1 May mass demonstration, organized by the Moscow Association of Voters (MOI) with support of the new Moscow City Soviet, was not at all related to the "alternative" movement even in the official documents.

The new leadership of the Moscow City Soviet sent a letter to the USSR Council of Ministers requesting permission for a meeting on Soviet Square at 1400-1800 on 1 May with the participation of the recently formed political groups and movements.

Probably, proceeding from the desire to unite the various movements of the workers and not divide them, the administration proposed that a joint procession and participation in the May Day Parade on Red Square be organized. Apparently it was believed that the gesture of good will would give rise to a corresponding desire for consolidation on the part of the participants. In any event it was not doubted that each participant would understand the gravity of the event. With the administration's decision the supporters of MOI received exactly the same rights received by the demonstrators collected by the MGSPS [Moscow City Soviet of Trade Unions] for the May Day Parade. There was also no censorship on slogans. Only a single demand was made: They must not be anticonstitutional.

But when the "second wave" of demonstrators appeared on the square, all hope on that score disappeared. There were insulting—beyond the bounds of all decency—slogans defaming the leaders of the country, the CPSU, and the president, obscene shouts, and almost unprintable invective.... All this was one more piece of proof that a significant portion of these people did not aspire to consolidation, but rather thirsted for a huge scandal on the holiday and an intensification of the situation in the capital, which is already complex. Many of the slogans, incidentally, were intended to directly confront the constitutional authority. No wonder that in such circumstances those who stood on the tribune of the mausoleum, including G.Kh. Popov, the recently elected chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, were forced to leave Red Square....

This disgraceful incident leads one to somber reflection. We are compelled again and again to emphasize the immaturity of our democracy and the complete lack of both political and general culture of some enthusiasts of perestroyka who wish to implement their ambitious goals under the noise of the waves of meetings. In fact, what do calls for the destruction and overthrow of the authorities have in common with democracy or, let us say, with progress? This has already happened in our history, and we know what it led to. Are there really people among us who genuinely want to build a new society at the price of "historic shocks," rejecting the route of social accord and reform?

I am once again convinced that we do not have enough culture. Our shortage of this is so great that no comparison can be made with the shortage of soap or sugar. Any product, if you try hard enough, can be obtained. But it is more difficult with a cultural tradition: In this case neither raw materials of the best quality, the newest technology, or purchases abroad will help. Perestroyka comes up solidly against problems of the civilization of the person and the personality. If we do not restructure ourselves and our attitude to our concerns, if we do not nurture in ourselves political culture and the culture of discussion and polemic, then perestroyka will lead to destruction.

Yes, it is necessary to talk about the unpleasant, complicated matters. But we should not dramatize what has happened or give ourselves over to panic. In this I am in complete agreement with V. Bakatin, the country's minister of internal affairs, who spoke the day before yesterday on television on the "Timely Interview" feature. He noted that the government is making its conclusions based on what happened on Red Square. He thinks that it is not a question of henceforth forbidding the free expression of the will of the people and introducing censorship on slogans and placards. Freedom is distinguished from chaos primarily by the idea of a person's responsibility for his actions. This, incidentally, is well understood in those countries which are genuinely called civilized. In this case the organizers of the mass demonstration guarantee order and bear the responsibility if order is disrupted.

It is time for the so-called alternative forces to understand that they also are architects of the future society in which they and their children will live. And that society must enjoy a stable atmosphere of harmony, mutual respect, and tolerance, and not confrontation and hatred. Otherwise our children will not have genuine prosperity.

KGB Anthology To Be Openly Published

LD0705154690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 6 mAY 90

[Text] For the first time an edition of SBORNIK KGB SSSR [Anthology of the USSR KGB] provides an opportunity to readers at large to acquaint themselves with material stamped Top Secret. A special edition of the anthology is devoted to the 45th victory anniversary. It is the first open edition of the anthology. Commenting on this Lieutenant General Tolkunov, the anthology's senior editor, told a KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent that on the whole its material tells of successful operations by State Security workers. A special place is given to a narrative about remarkable intelligence and counter-intelligence agents of the World War II period. A documentary sketch about the exposure of a U.S. CIA agent by KGB bodies will be presented for the readers' attention. They will find out whether Admiral Canaris was an agent of the U.S. special services, and will peruse pages about the history of atomic espionage. The money made from this edition—and the anthology costs R2—will go to aiding invalids of the Great Patriotic War and invalids among the internationalist servicemen.

KGB Collegium Discusses Crime-Fighting Measures

LD0505193790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1525 GMT 5 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 5 May (TASS)—At the USSR State Security Committee [KGB], a working conference and a sitting of the collegium took place, at which there was discussion of the issues concerning the participation of the KGB of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Checheno-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and the KGB administrations for the city of Moscow, Moscow Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, and Kaliningrad Oblast in the fight against organized crime and, in particular, against smuggling and violation of the rules on hard currency operations. Members of the collegium, the leaders of some KGB bodies and KGB administration bodies, and high-ranking personnel of the committee's operational and investigation subdivisions took part in their work.

It was noted that the state security bodies are becoming more and more actively involved in the fight against organized crime. As a result of the operations that have been conducted, the activity of dozens of groups of racketeers, smugglers, currency speculators, and distributors of narcotics has been cut short, and a number of serious crimes in the economic sphere have been averted. Thus, when just one group of shadow-economy dealers and of bank workers who had transferred non-transferable payment resources into cash was investigated, money and valuables were confiscated to a sum of more than R5 million. Approximately R20 million overall were returned to the state from such cases in February-April this year.

Nevertheless, as was emphasized, only the first steps have been taken in the offensive against organized crime. The situation giving rise to crime remains complex. There is a clear striving by criminal elements to make their way into cooperatives and joint enterprises involving foreign firms. There has been an increase in attempts to illegally export abroad significant consignments of strategic raw materials and valuable art objects. One can discern a tendency for an increase in the number of groups of smugglers and currency speculators, and a broadening of their links with similar groups abroad. The involvement of the officials of state institutions and public organizations in illegal operations is becoming a characteristic feature.

Under these conditions people are expecting more resolute and effective actions from the law enforcement bodies, including those of the KGB.

The meeting's participants and the USSR KGB collegium have introduced specific proposals for stepping up the fight against corruption, the shadow economy, smuggling and illegal currency transactions, and for preventing the involvement of officials in criminal activities. Particular stress was laid on the necessity of increasing the coordinating role of the central apparatus of the USSR KGB, and of offering organizational and methodical help to territorial subdivisions. Measures have been planned for preparing specialized cadres, perfecting the analysis and prediction of the development of the crime-breeding situation, improving the technical security of measures carried out, and strengthening cooperation with other bodies of law and order.

Practically all those speaking noted that the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, no matter what efforts they make, are incapable of solving the problem of organized crime on their own. Here the effective, practical help of the public is extremely necessary. Glasnost in this business is one of the most important means for mobilizing broad public support in the fight with this social evil.

V.A. Kryuchkov, member of the USSR Presidential Council and chairman of the USSR KGB, spoke on the questions under discussion.

Afanasyev Views Political Parties, Lithuania

OW0705000890 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1429 GMT 23 Apr 90

[From "Midnight Journal" program on theme of "Will an End Come to the CPSU's One-Party Autocratic Rule?"; NHK interview with Yuriy Afanasyev, visiting Soviet reformist leader, by newscasters Kazuma Yamane and Aiko Doden, and commentator Kenichi Iida; live from NHK studio; interviewers speak in Japanese and Afanasyev in Russian with simultaneous translation given in Japanese; following is from Japanese]

[Excerpts] [Yamane] I would like to begin our interview now. It is my understanding that you seceded from the CPSU on 18 April. Such big names in the reformist camp as Mr. Yeltsin and Mr. Popov have not withdrawn from the party, however. I would like to ask you first why you left the party all alone?

[Afanasyev] It is very difficult to reply to your question in a minute or so. Why did I withdraw from the party, of which I had been a member for some 30 years? To put it bluntly, I came to feel, or rather to be convinced, that the policies of the Soviet leadership cannot serve the purpose of reforming this country. To remain in the CPSU under such conditions would mean that I would have to share moral responsibility for such CPSU policies. That was something I could not accept. I believe the current policies are not those which will benefit the Soviet people—to use only gentle words. Consequently, my remaining in the party would contribute to leaving illusions in society. If I am a party member, I must be able to have expectations of the party. But, when I cannot have such expectations, then I have no choice but to leave the party. That is why I left the party.

There is another reason for my secession from the party. Lenin's party —because of its structure and objectives— is not really the party for me. The reason why not all my friends have seceded from the party is because of the belief that the principle of group action has no meaning here, and that each individual should decide his own course of action. In other words, the principle here is that each should act, based on his own individual conscience without advices of other people. But, there is no doubt that they are acting toward a similar direction. I have to point out one thing in particular. That is that this party is not capable of bringing reforms to the social and economic structure of society.

[Iida] There have been reports that the Democratic Platform faction plans to hold a congress for inauguration of a new party as early as May. But, if the forces are as split as they are now, possibilities are that creation of such a new party would be very difficult. What is your view?

[Afanasyev] It is a little difficult to speak about it beforehand. A meeting of that group will be called in May, and I think there is need for such a meeting—something like an inaugurative congress. Since the CPSU 28th Congress is coming up, something needs to be done before that. This great situation of those party policies becoming fixed and consolidated will happen at the 28th congress.

[Yamane] In a videotape shown earlier, a report from Moscow shows people saying that the time to inaugurate a party is now, and that the party should be formed in a week from now. Will the formation of a new party be possible? Do you think it is coming?

[Afanasyev] I think so. The leadership of the CPSU is now trying to adopt a so-called parliamentary multiparty system. A Liberal Democratic Party has already been inaugurated, and other parties are to be formed. I have no intention of speaking ill of the Liberal Democratic Party, nor of criticizing other parties coming up. But the formation of such miniparties—so small that they would go into someone's pocket—is undesirable. As far as the CPSU is concerned, they can say that a multiparty system exists in the Soviet Union, pointing to these parties. They can say that people can choose from all these parties. But these small parties are really showy ornaments. They are cosmetic. I think what is desirable is a political party or a bloc of political parties, consolidating various existing political powers.

[Iida] I agree with you. Certainly, people would need a sound political party in order to be in politics seriously. Mr. Afanasyev, if you were to form a political party, what would you name it? What ideology would it pursue—would this be socialism or the so-called socialist-democracy, as in the countries of West Europe.

[Afanasyev] The political bloc I am thinking of would be made up of several parties. For instance, a party called the Socialist Democratic Party will be launched in the Soviet Union in May. I think the Democratic Platform Party, to be inaugurated soon, should become a democratic party which will live with the public and therefore will be supported by the public. I do not think the Socialist Democratic Party can be a party for the public. The Democratic Platform Party, on the other hand, may end up being a party supported by a limited number of opposition people. Then, we may need to create a party which has wider public support.

Anyway, a party thus created should be a publicly-supported party, which is democratic and humane, encompassing all nationalities. This should be a party which will do without an exhorbitantly bureaucratic party structure. This party should have no ambition to be a leading power of society. This party should have abandoned the position of being a vanguard, and thus be a nonauthoritarian party. [passage omitted]

[Iida] I would like to pose another question. Mr. Yamane earlier asked you why such people as Mr. Yeltsin had not left the CPSU with you. Mr. Yeltsin actually wants to become president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic's Supreme Soviet, and Mr. Popov has recently been named mayor of Moscow. I think that with the people of leader class acting individually and separately like that, it would be difficult for the new forces of the people like yourself to grow into a large organization. What is your view of this?

[Afanasyev] You are right. United action is desirable. The power to the left of Gorbachev is unsystematic. I would not give them three points out of five. They are quite inadequate. Consequently, it is desirable that all forces of the left wing should get together. To assemble the forces does not mean making things or all these forces equal. All of them do not have to be the same. It is alright for them to have personality and characteristics. If Yeltsin, Popov, or Travkin acts individually, there is nothing wrong with it. What is important is that their actions should be targeted in the one direction of determining the root cause of the problems and at turning themselves eventually into a force to carry out necessary reforms. This is going very well at this stage.

[Doden] Now, I would like to ask you about the system of the Communist Party from which you have withdrawn. As was evident in Romania, one of the vices of one-party autocratic rule is the perquisites. For instance, according to reports, while ordinary people suffered from food supply shortages, officials of the Communist Party did not experience such problems.

[Afanasyev] Well, I cannot explain or define it well in a few words. But, the conditions we are now in are tragic, I must say. It is not just the economy. There is this decay in societal morals. Even the hereditary foundations of nationalities are being shaken. People's life is being lowered or shortened. There are many prejudices in this society. I think these prejudices, caused by the policies of the party, have spread to society. Not just each of the party members, but the whole party is to blame for the situation. I personally feel I, too, should share reponsibilities. The party as a whole, by its policies, has brought on much prejudice. Our society now must see through this situation.

[Iida] I would like to ask a short question. In the Soviet Union, people have to queue up to buy a bar of soap. Do your family members have to queue to buy soap?

[Afanasyev] Of course. There are various coupons looking like this. In my house, I have them hanging in the hall. We are using these coupons to buy sugar, soap, and so forth.

[Yamane] Thank you. Now, I would like to ask you about the Lithuanina issue. This is the issue, on which the world has its eyes on. What do you think about the economic blockade ordered by President Gorbachev?.

[Afanasyev] I am firmly opposed to such economic blockade or sanctions. It has no justification—politically or economically not to mention spiritually or morally. [passage omitted]

[Iida] Mr. Afanasyev, what I think is this. The situation in the Soviet Union is now so bad, with the economy in a shambles and with the ethnic issues aggravating, compounded by increasing crime rates, and so forth. The nation is filled with a mood of anarchy. In a situation like this, a president may have no choice but to take a hardline position, and hence the present situation. But, where the Lithuanian issue is concerned, I think, even Mr. Gorbachev believes the independence of Lithuania is in fact unavoidable. What is the truth in this regard?

[Afanasyev] I think a politician needs to be a realist, and I think Gorbachev is a realist. One cannot say that the Lithuanians are the people who would kneel down and succumb to pressure. This in fact can be be said of other people. We no longer live in time of Stalin. Consequently, Gorbachev must be a realist and must be able to see through this situation. The Lithuanian people intend to secede from the Soviet Union, but also intend to have dialogue—to negotiate. [passage omitted]

[Yamane] Mr. Afanasyev, you are also a historian. From the standpoint as a historian, what is your view on returning Japan's northern territories.

[Afanasyev] I have in the past spoken and written about it. I have made public announcements on this in Japan as well as in the Soviet Union. My position is that the northern territories should be returned to Japan and that this act of justice should be carried out. If a decision to do this can be made, it will bring about results which are mutually beneficial to both Japan and the Soviet Union. Of course, I do not think the matter will be so simple and easy. It needs to be done in steps, but, if such decision can be made, it will benefit not only the Japanese but also the Soviet people.

[Iida] When you, Mr. Afanasyev, were in Japan last week, you made similar remarks and said that the northern territories should be returned. At that time, the CPSU organ PRAVDA immediately reacted with a report saying that the people in the Soviet Union were enraged. I can still remember the time vividly. When you returned to the Soviet Union, did you really find reaction there so severe?

[Afanasyev] There were various kinds of reaction. To be sure, there were many people who were angry. They even called me a traitor or a man who was willing to sell his fatherland. But, these views come from ignorance. In other words, propaganda from the Soviet Government so far has caused it. As a result of the propaganda, everyone thinks the territories are Soviet islands and therefore cannot be turned over to Japan. Since they do not have basic knowledge of the issues, that is the way they think. I have met with voters in my district and have explained to them the history of the islands at length, starting with the 17th century. Now they are beginning to change their opinion, and they are beginning to think more rationally. [passage omitted]

[Yamane] Is there no danger of Mr. Gorbachev becoming another dictator?

[Afanasyev] Generally speaking, I must say that there are some signs of totalitarianism, authoritarianism, or dictatorship. Yes, there are some signs, but this is not a problem due to Gorbachev only. There is no force, nor parliament, to confront the president. Neither is there a tradition of judicial system, or popular support. As you are aware, the president was elected by the Congress and not by the people of the nation. Consequently, there is no balance of power, which is a little dangerous. There is a possibility that the power will tip, giving birth to a dangerous tradition.

Neither Gorbachev himself nor society wants him to be a dictator while carrying out perestroyka. We want to secure a balancing position against him, by pooling the efforts of the democratic forces.

[Yamane] We have heard the views of Mr. Yuriy Afanasyev, a leader of the Soviet reformists, today. We thank you indeed.

Yakovlev Views Anarchist, Other Trends

LD0605090990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0730 GMT 6 May 90

[Text] [Presenter] Probably no one these days would venture to deny the existence of ethnic problems, even antagonisms, in the Soviet Union. And in such a situation, public opinion naturally could not remain undivided. Some people assert that there is russophobia in our country; others, pointing to the fact of the existence of the Pamyat Society, and to occurences such as the January incident at the Central House of Writers, held that antisemitism is gathering strength in our country.

We will return later to the meeting of the INTERFAX Club which we told you about a little earlier in our program, the meeting with Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev. You may like to hear what he said about the ethnic problem:

[Begin recording] [Yakovlev] I don't want to be disingenuous about this and deny the presence of certain antisemitic phenomena which have recently appeared. Actually, they are not only antisemitic. We know that of late there have been signs of monarchistic tendencies and anarchist tendencies of some sort, and a whole spectrum of movements, moods and feelings and so on, of every kind. But at the same time I would not want to exaggerate the significance of all these groups. I am convinced, and simply know, that the real Russian people do not have, and have never had, any chauvinist or nationalist feelings. This sort of thing is being indulged in by individuals, belonging as a rule to the unsuccessful intelligentsia; and it therefore deserves to be regarded in a negative light.

As to what the government ought to do about it, it must take measures regarding the whole spectrum of ultra-rightwing tendencies, monarchist, anarchist, antisemitic, chauvinist, and nationalist. If we single out from the whole spectrum any one manifestation, I do not think that will solve the problem. I would agree with those who are saying that in this repsect the law in our country seems to be dormant, as it were; very inactive, timid. There does seems to be a 1937 syndrome hanging over the law enforcement agencies, which has quite unjustifiably been extended to the law itself. And the social relations are very different.

All the same, while agreeing that these kinds of nationalist, chauvinist, anarchist, and monarchist groups do exist and are active, I would not of course take this lightly or underestimate it. But I do not think one should overestimate it either. The general mood of the people concerning this is quite definite and correct, internationalist and honest.

[Presenter] Radio Mayak, Korshunov. Aleksandr Nikolayevich, you are well aware of the influence that literary magazines have on social and intellectual life. They are not all the same, there are various magazines of various schools of thought. My question is this: Will you enter into a debate with certain Russian publications, notably LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA and NASH SOVREMENNIK, which often dispute the concepts you are defending?

[Yakovlev] No, I won't. [end recording]

Deputy Lopatin's Party Status Still in Question

PM1005105590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Viktor Filippov report under the "Direct Line. IZVESTIYA Correspondents Report" rubric: "Major Lopatin's Fate Is Still Undecided"]

[Text] Vologda—The CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee has suspended the decisions adopted by Fedotovo Garrison primary party organs to expel USSR People's Deputy Major V. Lopatin from the party. IZVESTIYA already reported in issue No. 20 how and why he was expelled.

On the day this Party Control Committee announcement was made public, a communist report and election conference was at work in Fedotovo, electing candidate delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

Several of the formation's primary party organizations nominated V. Lopatin in April as their candidate delegate to the congress. A dispute arose at the conference following the Party Control Committee announcement: Is the major now to be considered a member of the CPSU? Some conference delegates still considered him their party comrade worthy of taking part in the congress. Political department personnel opposed this, arguing that the Party Control Committee's decision conflicts, in their opinion, with the party statutes. The conference adopted a compromise decision by a majority vote: To adjourn their work tentatively until 12 May in order to once again discuss candidacies for congress delegates within primary party organizations.

"The Party Control Committee announcement regarding the suspension of decisions contravening the Law on the Status of a People's Deputy in the USSR makes me hopeful that the conflict will be settled fairly," V. Lopatin said. "But the fact that the Party Control Committee has entrusted the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate with the investigation has greatly reduced my optimism."

The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate in turn turned the personnel matter over to the Navy Political Directorate whose chief, Admiral V. Panin, told the people's deputy in March that the question of his, Lopatin's, remaining within the Armed Forces had already been raised. A commission of three generals visited Fedotovo 5 May, after which it adjourned its work—as already announced at the party conference—until 12 May. None of the investigators has spoken to V. Lopatin regarding the essentials of his case.

The leisurely way in which the commission is investigating V. Lopatin's case is clearly at variance with the increasingly charged situation in Vologda. The party gorkom [city party committee] bureau asked the Party Control Committee to speed up its consideration of the appeal.

Burlatskiy Outlines Editorial Policy

90UN1725A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 18, 2 May 90 p 1

[Chief Editor's Column: "Living as a Free Man Among Free Peoples"]

[Text] Leafing through Seneca's "Moral Letters," which were published in our country recently, I came across the statement: I would like to live as a free man among free peoples.

I was struck by the fact that two millennia ago people were experiencing the same thirst and the same longing we are experiencing now. One could try and find personal freedom by attaching oneself to the elite—the wealthy, prosperous, and successful. One could set off in search of greater freedom to far-off frontiers. But a worthy goal is discovering personal freedom in one's own country among free people.

I have never believed that Russia is condemned by history itself to nonliberty. I have not believed Rousseau's assertions that Russia would never be a democracy. I am more impressed by N. Berdyayev's thought: "It is difficult for the Russians to acquire for themselves relative social freedom not only because passiveness and depression are a part of the Russian nature, but also because the Russian spirit hungers for the absolute divine freedom."

Having made untold sacrifices to our dream of an unprecedented paradise on earth, we are very late for the swift-flying train of world civilization. But our entire great culture from Tolstoy and Dostoyevskiy through Kandinskiy and Prokofyev is testimony to the concealed strength of our spirit. We have for too long sacrificed freedom to badly understood equality. The time for emancipation and the acquisition of freedom has come. For each writer, scientist, worker and tiller, each family, collective, nation, and the whole country.

This is the main thing I would like to say in response to readers' questions concerning the personal standpoint of the new chief editor of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. The activity of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov was a great symbol of liberalism. I am happy that I was able to say this to him publicly a few hours before his untimely end. Liberalism as I understand it is connected with a return to social democratic roots in their contemporary interpretation. Personal rights, national sovereignty, guarantees for the destitute strata, an open society which has thrown off the fetters of nonliberty, isolation, and exclusiveness, a society returning to world civilization—this is the ideal we will loyally serve.

I believe that the staff of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and the USSR Writers Union Board Secretariat, who proposed that I head the newspaper, knew that they were inviting a particular direction, not simply a new editor. Under conditions where LITERATURNAYA GAZETA had begun to yield positions it had won earlier and was increasingly being outpaced and crowded by livelier and more assertive, and sometimes noisier competitors, a change in the paper was needed. Movement along a new channel was required.

We want to continue the best traditions of the generations of gifted journalists of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and its editors. But, as distinct from the past, we now stand with both feet in the soil of reform and radical social change going to the heart of public life and the social consciousness. The precursors of such changes were Nikita Khrushchev's report on Stalin's crimes at the 20th party congress, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" and Vasiliy Grossman's "Life and Fate."

The five-year experience of the perestroyka begun by M.S. Gorbachev has shown how difficult a thing democratization in an undemocratic society is. This was the subject at the president's numerous meetings with labor outfits of the Urals. We want to and will actively assist perestroyka, but not clamorously radical and not pseudorevolutionary perestroyka. Our position is best expressed by the principle of pluralism—a multiparty system in politics, mixed ownership in the economy, free competition of various schools in culture.

Glasnost has already made a sizable breach in the sphere of spiritual freedom. Perestroyka, to refer to its most important aim, is intended to guarantee each individual economic and social freedom. There is frequent argument currently about what kind of system has been built here and what kind of system needs to be built. There is no more dispiriting occupation, I believe, than seeking an answer to such questions by rereading again and again this book, article, or speech or the other, even the most authoritative. Nor is there any need to "build" anything from above in accordance with some hastily prepared new outlines. It is only necessary to remove all the impediments to initiative from below. To allow people to display concern for themselves, then every family, every collective, and the whole of society will grow rich.

It has been cleverly remarked that we live as we work. But something else is no less correct also: We work as we live. The main answer to the acute questions of our existence should be sought not from generations that lived earlier, but from those living now. The main measure of the conquests of perestroyka are the new conditions for man's unfettered activity and full compensation for his labor without any arbitrary withholdings. In other words, it is people's well-being and culture, it is a civilized life.

It is fashionable currently to speak and write about crisis—national, social, political, cultural. The word "crisis" has become the same small change as the words about the "superiority" of our system once were. But a crisis is not necessarily a harbinger of catastrophe. In the majority of cases it is a harbinger of urgent transformations. So it was in the period of the NEP in our country, so it was in the New Deal period in the United States. The newspaper will try to help readers in the search for an answer to the questions of where to go, what to do.

From all sides, particularly among writers, we are picking up with our alert ear the concern that the newspaper will become the organ of some one group, one literary and civic school. It will not. We have our own positions, but we do not have prejudices. Any honest and gifted words will find their place in the paper. We wholly accept the advice that we rise above group passions and ambitions, which appear worthless at this dramatic hour in the history of the motherland.

We will try to express in full all the best of the many voices of our writers' shop and our culture and among our intelligentsia and the reading masses at large. We will, probably, at times also publish articles which are not free of group passions—the pressure is too great, and it is not always possible to resist it. But we declare in advance that the "Partial Notes" (a special column we are inaugurating) will be an expression of the personal opinion of the authors, not the position of the editorial office.

We will try to make it an interesting, really literary paper. One in which the reader will find not only information—people are currently choking on the abundance of that. Not only the presentation of socially important problems—although this is now extremely important—but also talented writing, an impressive character, a trenchant thought. A newspaper that will not only excite tormented hearts, but also afford aesthetic pleasure. It cannot be denied—we fully desire change and fully aspire to assist the free life of each individual among free people.

Commission Issues Report on Gdlyan-Ivanov Case

90UN1536A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1, 6

[Commission report on Gdlyan-Ivanov case: "On Instructions from the Congress"]

[Text] The perestroyka that is taking place in our country is still taking its first steps in imposing law and order, but many of the measures that have been taken regarding this (especially local ones) are not yet very effective and all kinds and forms of crime continue to increase in the country, including various kinds of organizational crime, against which law enforcement organs are waging a still quite unsatisfactory battle, including corruption in the highest echelons of power. Because of glasnost and relative freedom of the press, our people are always seeing examples of blatant injustice and illegality—in both the remote and the extremely recent past. It is not surprising that under these conditions the "Gdlyan phenomenon" has assumed the character not only of a political scandal, but also that of a serious political problem whose solution could not consist merely of a consideration of the devices and methods of investigation used by Gdlyan and Ivanov when investigating the corruption in Uzbekistan.

In the first months of its work our commission experienced certain difficulties in obtaining the materials and documents we needed. But after the autumn of 1989 we were able to obtain any documents we needed. The only aspect of the conflict about which we received no documents or materials were the lives of Gdlyan and Ivanov themselves. For a number of issues the commission enlisted experts who were not on the commission.

One cannot but mention that during a large part of our work we were under pressure from various kinds of committees for the defense of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Insulting resolutions, threats, anonymous telephone calls, and a flow of telegrams with dozens of signatures from people and organizations who had not delved into the essence of the matter, naturally, impeded the calm work of the commission.... At the present time the commission considers its work complete within the limits of the instructions given to us by the First Congress of People's Deputies.

The main mistake in all previous criticism of Gdlyan and Ivanov in the Soviet press, as well as in the decisions and conclusions reached by the USSR Supreme Soviet commission created in May 1989, was that in the legal violations they discovered during their investigative activities concerning cases of corruption in Uzbekistan and Moscow, they concerned themselves only with the work and incorrect actions of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Gdlyan and Ivanov were thus transformed into scapegoats, and the activity of the USSR Procuracy as a whole as well as in other law enforcement organs remained on the sidelines. This circumstance bothered people considerably, offended their natural sense of justice, and caused them to create dozens of new groups for the "defense of Gdlyan and Ivanov." Yet Gdlyan and Ivanov were not alone in this, they were not private detectives, and if certain details of their wrongful actions might not have been known by the highest official of the USSR Procuracy, most of Gdlyan and Ivanov's work as well as the methods of this work could not remain a secret either to the chief of the investigation administration of the USSR Procuracy, G. Karakozov, or to USSR Procurator General A. Rekunkov, or to his deputies.

Both Gdlyan and Ivanov are typical investigators of the "era of stagnation." It is known that Gdlyan began working as an investigator after completing the Saratov Law Institute in 1968. At first he was an investigator for the procuracy in Ulyanov Oblast, then the senior investigator for the oblast procuracy, and from 1981 through 1983 he was an investigator for especially important cases of the Ulyanov Oblast procuracy. Certain letters and statements the commission received from people's deputies which are stored in our archives discuss Gdlyan's violations of legal methods of investigation work as early as the period when he was working in Ulyanov Oblast. We did not verify these letters since they were about violations which were more the rule than the exception for investigators both of the procuracy and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB during the seventies. Not having any work experience in the central apparatus of the USSR Procuracy, T.Kh. Gdlyan was appointed leader of a large group of investigators in Uzbekistan and given extraordinary authority as the senior investigator for especially important cases under the USSR Prosecutor General. Ivanov was not appointed as an investigator for especially important cases under the USSR Prosecutor General until 1984, and he was almost immediately sent to work in Uzbekistan.

It is necessary to create groups of investigators for especially important cases. But it was wrong to create for work in Uzbekistan a group of 200 or more investigators brought together from all regions and oblasts of Russia. This group was practically uncontrollable. A check on the personal affairs of many of the investigators conducted by the commission showed that many oblast prosecutors sent people who were far from their best investigators for many years of work in Uzbekistan. In the personal affairs of these investigators there is frequent mention of punishments, temporary absence from work because of drunkenness, and other violations. All this shows the unsatisfactory work with personnel by the USSR Procuracy.

Gdlyan and Ivanov were accused of numerous unjustified arrests. But, after all, every arrest requires the sanction of the prosecutor. And it was easy for investigators from Gdlyan's group to get these sanctions both from the USSR Procuracy and from the procuracies at various levels in Uzbekistan. Frequently the procuracies at various levels were not familiar with the case before giving the sanction for the arrest, even though it was their direct duty to be familiar with them.... This is what the USSR Procuracy did with the applications from Gdlyan and Ivanov, and with especially long periods of preliminary incarceration the permission to keep people under guard was given by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Materials from the cases do not show that these prolongations of periods of preliminary incarceration were given by the higher levels after careful verification of each case....

Gdlyan and Ivanov were accused of hiding from the USSR Supreme Court many materials regarding General Yakhyayev, who not without justification was called the "hangman of the Uzbek people...." But it should be noted that the criminal case against Yakhyayev was initiated as early as under Brezhnev by the Uzbek Procuracy, and the brigade of investigators was headed by the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Prosecutor who is now the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Prosecutor, A.V. Buturlin. The materials from the case comprised six volumes and revealed many monstrous crimes. But at Rashidov's request, sent to Brezhnev, a decision was made to halt the investigation of the Yakhyayev case. On 30 December 1980 USSR Prosecutor General Rudenko ordered the brigade of the USSR Procuracy to be recalled from Uzbekistan and forbade A.V. Buturlin to continue the investigation. The materials gathered by the brigade concerning the misdeeds of Kh.Kh. Yakhyayev were sent to the archives of the procuracy. Of course not only Gdlyan and Ivanov knew about all this. As a result of all these violations of investigatory practice, Yakhyayev is now free and his crimes have been annulled under the Amnesty Ukase of 1987.

One could give many examples like this of the grossest violations of the law by the USSR Procuracy and its local organs during the seventies and eighties. One should especially note the supervisory work in the USSR Procuracy as a whole and the Gdlyan and Ivanov group in particular.

It is quite obvious that the activity of a group of 200 investigators who had never worked in Uzbekistan before and who had no idea of the nature, customs, or way of life of the Uzbek people but had been given certain authority required special attention, leadership, and supervision on the part of the USSR Procuracy. For they were not investigating ordinary crimes, but criminal actions on the part of the highest officials and workers of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee. Therefore, even with the heavy work load of management workers of the USSR Procuracy whom people blamed in our commissions hearings, it was quite obvious that careful supervision of the work of the Gdlyan group should have been at the top of the list. But when discussing the work of the supervising prosecutor, N. Popova, and the former chief of the investigation section of the USSR Procuracy, G. Karakozov, our commission became convinced that supervision of the work of the investigation group of Gdlyan and Ivanov was poorly organized through and through. This was the case under A. Kekunkov, but USSR General Prosecutor A.Ya. Sukharev who was appointed to this post in May 1988 was also unable to organize proper supervision of the work of Gdlyan and Ivanov....

Yet documents stored in the USSR Procuracy show that the first extremely serious complaints and signals of the grossest violations of the law on the part of workers of the investigation group began to come to Moscow as early as the end of 1983. Their number increased in 1984. But these complaints and signals were actually not verified and were not considered, and in the final analysis, directly or through Karakovov, they were sent back to Gdlyan for a response. On the basis of brief notes or even verbal declarations from Gdlyan leaders of the USSR Procuracy, Rekunkov, Soroka, and Katusev, rejected the complaints as being unfounded....

The report found that notes from certain workers of the USSR Procuracy (for example, R.M. Ovcharova), and even investigators from Gdlyan's group who did not agree with his methods, were also ignored. Thus, for example, USSR Deputy General Prosecutor O.V. Soroka ignored the important materials sent to him in January 1986 from the Gdlyan group from B.I. Severtsev, who accused Gdlyan of exceeding his authority and position along with violence and actions that offended personal dignity. The result of repeated verbal and written communications from B.I. Severtsev was not a serious investigation into all the activity of the Gdlyan group but the removal from the group of the investigator whom Gdlyan found inconvenient and the return of Severtsev to Leningrad.

On the basis of the above the commission of USSR People's Deputies fully agrees with the conclusions of the observing prosecutor, E. Martinson, who helped in our commission's work: "Up until 20 February 1989 there was no proper prosecutor supervision of the preliminary investigation of criminal case No. 18/58115-83. Statements and complaints about the grossest violations of socialist law by investigators of the investigation group of the USSR Procuracy under the leadership of T.Kh. Gdlyan began to come in to the USSR Procuracy and party and soviet organs and social organizations in 1983. With a conscientious attitude toward the investigation of these signals there would have been every opportunity in the first stage of the investigation to reveal violations of criminal-procedural norms and to avoid the grossest violations of the law which are being revealed at the present time."

As our commission established during six years of work in Uzbekistan, there were 10 cases of suicide there, both of witnesses and people under investigation. If one can hide from the USSR Procuracy individual cases in which people under investigation have been insulted, it is impossible to cover up cases of suicide. Moreover with the suicides of Mirzobayev, Gaipov, and Khadzhimuratov there were weighty reasons to assume that these tragedies were directly related to the illegal methods of conducting investigations. But the investigation of these tragic episodes was conducted by the USSR Procuracy in an extremely superficial way. A typical example here is the case of M.N. Mirzobayev who was detained as a witness in the case of his relative, Mirzobayev Gani, on the basis of a decision from Gdlyan of 5 July 1984—"to call Makhmud Mirzobayev in for interrogation and coerce him to give supporting testimony concerning the location of the valuables...."

Having investigated in detail the entire case of the suicide of M. Mirzobayev and the case of his brother, Gani Mirzobayev, the supervising prosecutor of our commission, E. Martinson, comes to the conclusion that in the actions of the investigators Gdlyan, Ivanov, Kartoshyan, and others alone one can see signs of subsequent crimes envisioned by Articles 87, 149, 150, 158, and 159 of the Criminal Code of the Uzbek SSR: provoking suicide, abuse of power or job authority, deliberate illegal detention, and coercion in obtaining evidence. The commission also agrees with the conclusion of E. Martinson: "If G.K. Mazurkevich had had an objective and conscientious attitude toward the investigation of the criminal case related to the suicide of M. Mirzobayev as early as July-August 1984, he would have had to officially raise the question of removing Gdlyan, Ivanov, Kartashyan, Borov, and a number of other investigators from the investigation of the case and hold them criminally liable for the incompleteness and lack of objectivity in the investigation and the adoption of the decision regarding criminal case No. 18/62926-84 in August 1984 primarily by the fault of G. Mazurkevich, G. Karakozov, and O. Soroka."

The investigation of the facts surrounding the suicides of other witnesses and individuals under investigation was equally subjective and incomplete.

One must note the strangely lenient attitude of USSR General Prosecutor A. Rekunkov toward Gdlyan. True, the general prosecutor gave a reprimand to Gdlyan, Ivanov, and several other investigators as early as 1984 for violating the law which ended with Mirzobayev's suicide. And a year and a half later when investigating the case of the accusation of Muzzafarov, Kudratov, and others, A. Rekunkov gave another reprimand to Gdlyan and Ivanov for the fact that they did not hold a number of large bribe takers criminally liable or even raise the question of firing them. During the commission hearing A. Rekunov stated that in that same year of 1986 he had removed T.Kh. Gdlyan from the leadership of the group and appointed G. Karakozov leader of the investigatory group in Uzbekistan. This statement of the former USSR general prosecutor was not confirmed, but it was not registered by any documents in the Gdlyan's personal file. On the contrary, in the autumn of 1986 T.Kh. Gdlyan as the leader of the investigation group was awarded a monetary bonus in the amount of two months salary. He continued to head the investigatory group until the beginning of May 1989.

The commission came to the conclusion that A. Rekunkov clearly protected T.Kh. Gdlyan, leaving many uninvestigated legal violations for which other investigators would have been fired long before and even held criminally liable. A.Ya. Sukharev did not look into the activity of the Gdlyan group with complete competence either. It was on the basis of the reports of Gdlyan and Karakozov that A.Ya. Sukharev petitioned for the arrests of certain individuals who were rehabilitated after being in custody for a year. The basic investigation of all the activity of Gdlyan's investigation group was actually not begun until May 1989.... Without lifting the responsibility from the investigators working in Uzbekistan or the personal responsibility of T.Kh. Gdlyan for the results of this work, the commission thinks that the basic political and legal responsibility for the situation that developed around the affair we were investigating are born primarily by former and current leaders of the USSR Procuracy. We regretfully state that many of the shortcomings we discovered in the investigatory work and supervision are to be found to a significant degree even today both in the USSR Procuracy and in the rest of the law enforcement system as well....

The real situation at the beginning of the eighties in Uzbekistan (and not only there) was such that it is possible to speak without exaggeration about the departure of oblast and republic leaders from the principles of social justice and their trampling upon all norms of law and morality. Corrupt elements in the republic were enriched through merciless exploitation of the Uzbek people. We remind people of this because today there are frequent cases in which, along with complaints about various kinds of abuses and omissions in investigation work, there are attempts to completely discredit the work of investigation groups and to deny even the fact of the existence of a large-scale and ramified corrupt system in Uzbekistan and other regions of the country. In this connection our commission is far from denying the large amount of significant work done by the Gdlyan group under difficult conditions with constantly increasing resistance from corrupt circles. This was the largest group working in Uzbekistan. It was even equipped with combat helicopters, automatic weapons, transportation, video equipment, and so forth. But our commission does not have the right to conceal from the Supreme Soviet those numerous cases of violation of the law in the investigation that were committed both by some of the workers of the investigation group of Gdlyan and Ivanov and especially by the leaders of this group, T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov....

According to the materials of the USSR Procuracy, every second person arrested by the Gdlyan group was later declared to be completely innocent and these people's cases were not taken to court. The cases of 69 individuals were turned over to judicial organs and four of the accused were acquitted. Several people were acquitted after Gdlyan and Ivanov were removed from leadership of the group and certain cases were sent for further investigation. For a group of 200 and more investigators who had been working in the republic for almost six years these are extremely modest results. During the six years investigators of the Gdlyan group confiscated R22.8 million in cash and R15 million worth of jewelry items. But this sum includes R12.9 million worth money and valuables seized by the USSR KGB workers who had begun the investigation. Several other smaller investigation groups in Uzbekistan confiscated another about R100 million worth of money and valuables. These achievements are not very great if one takes into account that padding the books for cotton alone put no less than R2 billion into the "shadow" economy, to which one must add immense additional amounts of money and valuables obtained as a result of other selfish crimes. Among those arrested by the Gdlyan group there were five millionaires. They took R6.8 million from K. Nurumbetov, R5.6 million from Khudaybergenov, R1.84 from Nurumbetov, R1.3 from Usmankhodzhayev, and R1.3 million from A. Primov. But there is reason to think that a much larger number of millionaires who came to the attention of the investigatory group escaped Gdlyan's punishment, and the ones who ended up at the center of the attention of the investigation work were party workers, secretaries of the party obkoms [oblast committees] and the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee, and officials of the CPSU Central Committee staff, the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Uzbekistan. At the same time trade and economic workers were also arrested. But after these people had spent several months in prison and confessed to giving bribes to various highly placed workers they were most frequently released and the criminal cases brought against them were closed. Thus with his decrees N.V. Ivanov closed the criminal cases of 70 people who, according to the evidence, had given bribes totaling R2,358,481. Some of these people gave bribes for sums of R200,000, R215,000 and R240,000.... Gdlyan and Ivanov frequently carried on real business with the accused. Thus, for example, about 50 people who admitted under pressure from Gdlyan and Ivanov to giving bribes to highly placed officials were, at Gdlyan's insistence, left in the positions they had "bought." And party members also remained in the ranks of the CPSU. Is this really the way the fight against corruption should be carried out?

Some of the legal experts and commission members justifiably think that many of the large bribe takers released by Gdlyan and Ivanov were major figures in the mafia and underground business and various kinds of workers of the republic Ministry of Internal Affairs, and even party workers were merely accomplices they had bought. Therefore, the myth created previously by the press and some of the people about Gdlyan and Ivanov as unwavering fighters against the mafia is advantageous only to the mafia itself. Gdlyan and Ivanov presented no threat to the "godfathers" of the domestic mafia, nor could they. The ruckus raised by the press diverts attention and forces and makes it necessary to fight against mafia servants and not the mafia itself....

...Instead of conducting investigatory work which is difficult and requires a good deal of experience and ability, Gdlyan and Ivanov resorted to impermissible pressure methods, the more so since this path was frequently suggested to them by the USSR Procuracy. Thus, for example, during a hearing of our commission for a leading supervisory prosecutor of the USSR Procuracy, N.K. Popova, the latter stated directly that cases of bribe taking "could not be investigated without pressure on the accused." The forms of pressure on the accused were extremely varied and among them one could find almost half of the methods of "investigation" about which A. Solzhenitsyn wrote in "Gulag Archipelago...."

...For Gdlyan and Ivanov the main method for pressuring individuals under investigation was to arrest their relatives. And the investigators did not shrink from arresting people who were elderly, ill, or mothers with many children, without showing any concern for what would happen after several such arrests when children of various ages were left unattended. Thus when the Karimov case was being investigated 21 of his relatives were taken into custody; in the Khudaybergenov case 15, the Usmankhodzhayev nine, and eight relatives each were taken into custody for the cases of Nurusimekov, Radzhabov, and Kamalov. They took into custody Saidova, a mother of 12 children, Dalieva and Matgamova, who have 11 children each, and Alimov, mother of eight children. Many arrests of relatives were made without grounds—in order to locate valuables that were not found during searches of the accused. It was thought that it was better to let 10 innocent people suffer than to let one guilty one get away. More than 100 people were arrested just on suspicion of concealing money and valuables of their relatives. It is typical that not a single one of the cases went to court. The criminal charges for all of them were dropped even though they had been in custody for from three days to seven months. In many cases the criminal charges against these individuals were dropped due to the absence of a crime, or else no decision was made at all. The materials pertaining to these individuals were frequently kept out of the courts, and when the criminal cases were sent to court materials pertaining to these individuals were removed without going through the appropriate legal procedures. Because of the removal of procedural documents from the files, the custody or arrest of certain individuals did not become known until the trial since the people summoned as witnesses discussed the fact that they had been in custody for a certain amount of time. Unfortunately, the courts very rarely made individual determinations regarding these obvious legal violations....

A number of those who were arrested were kept in custody in temporary confinement facilities (PVS) seven, 10, or even 20 days longer than the time allowed by the law without the sanction of the prosecutor. There were arrests of people's deputies, including those of the republic Supreme Soviet, and without the preliminary consent of the corresponding soviets. If the summons, subpoenas, and interrogations of many witnesses were conducted at night, the arrests quite unnecessarily were done during the day and in public. Thus Colonel Kakhramanov, who was later acquitted, was arrested in his office in the school of which he was in charge and paraded through the school in handcuffs. In the case of U.A. Asadov, who had served previously as the chairman of the Navoy Oblast Ispolkom [executive committee], they twisted his arms and handcuffed him right there on the kolkhoz field in front of all the other kolkhoz workers even though on his chest was the badge of a republic people's deputy....

There were gross violations in the confiscation of money and valuables. In the files there are records of large confiscations which give certain names in the beginning and others at the end. There have been cases of replacing the stamp impressions when packing valuables. When valuables are being seized the seals were frequently not examined and the overall sum of cash and bonds was never recorded. There were cases when large amounts of seized valuables were not sealed at all....

There were cases in which the investigators created "evidence" by coercing citizens into giving testimonies they knew to be false concerning participation in the storage of valuables allegedly received as bribes. In these cases individuals who had nothing to do with the criminals turned over their own personal savings, borrowed money from friends and relatives, bought valuable merchandise in stores and, under threat of arrest, turned it over to the investigators as items gained through crime.

The example of D. Bechkanov shows this clearly. He, an invalid of the second category, was repeatedly called in for questioning and told to turn over R500,000. He refused since he was keeping no money earned through crime. Then, under threat of arrest of himself, his relatives, his wife, and children, he agreed to collect R100,000 and turn it over to the investigators. The loan agreements were certified by a notary. He added his own savings and turned more than R97,000 over to the investigators. But this money was documented has having been gained through crime and supposedly kept by Bechkanov at the request of a large bribe taker.

All these and many other facts not mentioned here show the grossest violations of the law and also the complete justification for the decision of the USSR Procuracy to remove Gdlyan and Ivanov from the leadership of the investigation group that worked on criminal case No. 18/581115-83 and to initiate criminal proceedings on cases of abuses and violations of socialist legality in the work of the aforementioned investigation group, which is now being conducted under the leadership of the prosecutor V.I. Ilyukhin under case No. 18/67812-89.

Evaluating all that has been said about the work of the investigation group led by Gdlyan, one must say that a large share of the violations of the law and procedural norms were allowed not by all investigators of the group, but by approximately 15-20 investigators whom Gdlyan personally singled out and became friends with. Another part of the investigators, and they were in the majority, had a conscientious attitude toward the performance of their duties, and they continued to work in Uzbekistan even after Gdlyan was removed from leadership of the group.

When our commission was being created by the Congress of People's Deputies it was also instructed to verify the substantiation of the accusations of theft and corruption made by T.Kh. Gdlyan and N.V. Ivanov both at mass rallies and in certain press organs against individual members of the Politburo and certain high state officials (both current and former). This work was made difficult, however, by the fact that Gdlyan and Ivanov themselves did not submit either to the public or to the commission any documents or other evidence of the guilt of the people they named. Initially they said that this evidence was contained in the materials of the criminal cases they investigated. But an attentive study of these cases both by the group of investigators invited to Moscow by Gdlyan himself (it should be noted that the work of these investigators was impeded by many obstacles raised by the USSR Procuracy) and by the workers of our commission, and also by the independent supervisory prosecutor E. Martinson (whose work was not impeded by any obstacles raised by the procuracy), did not reveal in the materials of investigation No. 85-8115-8 any evidence of guilt of individuals in the high echelons of power whom Gdlyan and Ivanov in their last statements consistently called the "Kremlin" or "Moscow" mafia. There are only individual testimonies, most of which were obviously forced on the individuals being investigated by the investigators, and they quickly recanted....

The commission did not have the opportunity to study the question of the guilt or innocence of other individuals accused by Gdlyan and Ivanov. We think that all these individuals could and even should go to court to defend their honor and dignity. At the same time we consider it necessary to note that not only in the statements of Gdlyan and Ivanov, but also in the Soviet press during the past two years there have been many articles and essays containing serious accusations against many former leaders of the CPSU Central Committee. We have learned, for example, about numerous gifts valued at tens and hundreds of thousands of rubles which L.I. Brezhnev received at various times and which have not yet found their way to the state treasury. We have learned about many unseemly acts of the recent member of the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo G. Aliyev which, however, were not the subject of any party or judicial investigation. Although the former first secretary of the Krasnodar party obkom [oblast party committee], Medunov, was expelled from the party, and the press has published many serious accusations against him (numerous statements about Medunov's illegal activity continue to come in to the law enforcement organs), this influential person who was one of Brezhnev's close friends has not been held criminally accountable. After large mafia formations were revealed in Moscow as early as 1986-1987 and some of their leaders were sentenced to long terms in prison and also to more severe punishment, many Muscovites wondered about the responsibility of V. Grishin, former first secretary of the Moscow CPSU gorkom and a member of the Politburo, the more so since certain of the individuals who were sentenced to severe punishment were considered to be his close friends. But there was no investigation of this. Nor was there an investigation of the case of Kunayev, a former Politburo member and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan.... Many other eminent political and state figures who are more than just politically or morally responsible for the harsh consequences of the "era of stagnation" have gone peacefully to their pensions (personal) and have avoided any judicial investigation or party punishment.

We must state quite responsibly that the support of a considerable proportion of the people in our country for Gdlyan and Ivanov is linked to the firm conviction that it is being ingrained in public opinion, and not without justification, that a large number of people holding high positions surrounding Brezhnev and Chernenko during the seventies and the beginning of the eighties were guilty of corruption and many other abuses of power.... A full answer should be given concerning the activity of individuals who were closely linked to the Brezhnev regime such as Rashidov, Shcherbitskiy, and certain others, for example, many former workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and several other institutions. Unless this work is done it will be difficult to restore the prestige of the law enforcement organs or the high party organs. This is the only way it will be possible to keep Gdlyan and Ivanov from constantly making accusations about people whose investigation files contain no compromising materials but of whose guilt a certain segment of the society is convinced. Naturally, this is the only way it will be possible to separate people who are truly guilty from those who are not. Up to this point this work has been done by the USSR Procuracy only in relation to Ye.K. Ligachev—at his own request.

As we know, the accusations against Politburo member Ye.K. Ligachev attracted special attention from the public. As soon became clear, this was based on a statement which the arrested former first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee, I.V. Usmankhodzhayev, gave in an interrogation on 23 October 1988 to investigators Gdlyan and Moskovtseva and repeated in a statement to the USSR General Prosecutor on 25 October. In this statement he asserts that he, Usmankhodzhayev, gave two bribes of R30,000 for a total of R60,000 to Politburo member Ye.K. Ligachev. Usmankhodzhayev gave no proof of this. Our commission confirms the fact that there is no evidence of any illegal actions on the part of Ye.K. Ligachev in the criminal case file of Usmankhodzhayev or other individuals. At the end of October, in November, and also in December 1988 during interrogations of Usmankhodzhayev both by the USSR general prosecutor and his deputy, A. Vasilyev, Usmankhodzhayev gave extremely contradictory testimonies and arbitrarily changed them, first increasing and then reducing the number of individuals from whom he allegedly received bribes or to whom he gave them. Ligachev's name was never mentioned in these interrogations. On 14 April 1989 Usmankhodzhayev denied in writing that he had given a bribe to Ye.K. Ligachev and stated that he had previously stated the contrary under pressure from Gdlyan and Ivanov.

It is known that at Ye.K. Ligachev's request the USSR Procuracy conducted a separate investigation into this episode and removed all suspicion from Ligachev, which was discussed at the September (1989) CPSU Central Committee Plenum....

The commission came up with a different ruling on the case of V.I. Smirnov. The former sector head of the division for organizational and party work, Smirnov had in the past been responsible for selection and placement of party personnel in Uzbekistan. Later he worked as second secretary of the Communist Party of Moldavia Central Committee and was a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee. Smirnov was arrested and accused of taking bribes from 20 people. Testimonies were received from various individuals convicted by Gdlyan's group but the investigation into the Smirnov case was conducted by KGB Colonel A.S. Dukhanin. Smirnov was arrested in January 1989 but in the first interrogations and investigation work the Dukhanin group discovered many contradictions and disagreements. A repeat interrogation of those who gave evidence against Smirnov showed that these testimonies were fabricated and the accusation that Smirnov took hundreds of thousands of rubles in bribes was not supported by objective evidence. On 22 May 1989 the Smirnov case was closed, and the day before the opening of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies Smirnov was released from custody. The USSR Procuracy gave him its apologies.

After careful study of the "Smirnov case" by N. Strukov and V. Aleksandrin, our committee came to the conclusion that although a good deal of the evidence against Smirnov was indeed fabricated, the closing of his case by the Dukhanin group was premature. The denial by Smirnov and the witnesses of their previous "sincere" testimony did not occur until the period from 3 through

17 May, that is, after Gdlyan was removed from the leadership of the investigation group. As early as 17 May when considering this case the board of the USSR Procuracy ordered that the investigation be continued. But only a couple of days later the same board changed its decision and gave Smirnov its apologies. Far from all episodes in the Smirnov case were fully investigated by the Dukhanin group, which was clearly in a hurry to complete its work by the time of the congress. But those "trivia" that were not investigated again were linked to many gifts whose receipt Smirnov did not deny and whose overall value is up to R20,000. Both the closing of the Smirnov case and its separation for a special investigation were done in serious violation of procedural norms, which also bears witness to unjustifiable haste. Moreover, there is no doubt that Smirnov violated moral norms that are mandatory for a party member, which he himself admitted in statements and letters to the Politburo and the CPSU Central Committee. Therefore, the commission of the congress thinks that the authority of the CPSU was only damaged by keeping Smirnov on the CPSU Central Committee, the more so after his largely tendentious speech at the September Central Committee Plenum. We think that the "Smirnov case" should be reopened without any arrests and brought to a logical conclusion....

[signed] Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, Nikolay Alekseyevich Strukov, Veniamin Aleksandrovich Yarin, Ilmar Olgertovich Bisher, Valeriy Grigoryevich Aleksandrin, Vladimir Tuychiyevich Adylov, Olzhas Omarovich Suleymenov, Konstantin Dmitriyevich Lubenchenko.

Diplomats Meet on Human Rights Acts

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[By TASS corresopndent Georg Mikhailin]

[Text] Moscow May 5 TASS—Representatives of 140 Soviet people's diplomatic organisations and movements arrived at the conclusion to step up their peacemaking and human rights-protecting activity in and outside the country.

This is why they discussed in detail how to organise the people's diplomacy movement better and to finance the implementation of its programmes. Most of the participants favored working out in the near future a concept of unofficial diplomacy and a comprehensive long-term programme of its development. The idea of uniting various people's diplomacy organisation in an all-union association met with little support as participants opposed bureaucratization of the movement at the moment when it was gaining momentum.

Participants in the forum agreed that the time was ripe for the people's diplomatic organisations to begin earning money to finance their socially-important programmes. The Social Initiative Fund in Nakhodka, for instance, earned R3 million during the past three years by performing work and services for the city's individual residents and enterprises, the fund's chairman Sergey Bondarev told the forum. In addition, the fund established a joint Soviet-West German venture "Dalkontrading" and helped the Soviet American dialogue venture to establish a subsidiary in Nakhodka, Bondarev said.

Motivated by the desire to consolidate the legal status of Soviet citizens in the country and abroad, to boost the Soviet Union's international prestige in the field of human rights and to expand international cooperation, particpants in the forum adopted three appeals. One, addressed to the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet, calls for ratifying before the third Moscow meeting for humanitarian cooperation within the framework of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe due to be held in 1991. All optional protocols (supplements) to the international pacts on human rights. The second appeal, addressed to the country's supreme bodies of state authority, points to the need to speed up the consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet of the bills on public organisations and the order of leaving and entering the Soviet Union by Soviet citizens, as well as to the need to adopt these regulatory acts only after a nationwide discussion. The third appeal requests Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov to rescind, for cases applying to public organisations, the government resolution demanding that foreigners pay in currency for Aeroflot domestic flight tickets.

The participation decided to convene fora annually. Preparations will be handled by the working body, to which interested people's diplomacy organisations will delegate relevant power.

Expert Urges Conflict Mediation Service

PM0805140990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 90 Second Edition p 5

[PRAVDA observer A. Lopukhin interview with Candidate of Psychological Sciences M. Lebedeva under the rubric "Our Interview": "Knowing How to Conduct Negotiations Is Not That Simple"]

[Text] Conflicts, a phenomenon which, frankly speaking, was not very common in our country at one time, are now flaring up here, there, and everywhere. And the "fire brigade" is often either simply not close at hand, or at a loss as to how and from which side to tackle the fire. In the past, conflicts in our country were either hushed up or put down by force.... So what is to be done about them now? There is not much choice: Either a "firm hand" can be used, or a nonviolent solution of the conflicts can be found—negotiations, for instance. Alas, specialists who study the mechanism of negotiations professionally are few and far between in our country. What can be done to rectify this situation? Is it possible to use experience accumulated in other countries in resolving various types of conflicts, and how? These and other questions were put by PRAVDA observer A. Lopukhin to Candidate of Psychological Sciences M. Lebedeva, one of the few of our specialists in the sphere of conducting negotiations.

Indeed, M. Lebedeva said, the need itself for an intelligent approach to negotiations to resolve the most diverse conflicts in our society is perfectly obvious. We constantly hear calls appealing for the establishment of dialogue and the settlement of controversial questions at the negotiating table. The problem is however, that dialogue frequently does not ensue, negotiations fail to "get off the ground," and meanwhile conflicts are not just not being resolved, but are getting more acute. Examples of this abound, alas.

[Lopukhin] Is this because we find it difficult to jettison pre-perestroyka thinking which did not even admit the possibility of conflicts arising in a socialist society? Since there were no conflicts, there was no need for any science of negotiations to resolve them, perhaps? PRAVDA reported (14 August 1989) on multifaceted practical experience accumulated in the United States in the settlement of various conflicts. However, the question of making use of this experience is being addressed very slowly.

[Lebedeva] In the past, during the postwar years, anything that did not fit in with the picture of a conflict-free society became part of "classified" statistics and was regarded simply as abnormal and atypical. Conflicts did exist, of course, but every effort was made to sweep them under the carpet, to stop them from surfacing, from coming out into the open. For a historically brief period this proved possible even though it was at variance with logic and common sense. After all, without conflicts, without contradictions which are the source of development there can be no progress in any society. Another matter is how these contradictions should be resolved. Should strong-arm methods be used, or should the problems be ignored, or should efforts be made to resolve them by means of civilized methods.

[Lopukhin] In recent years "unorthodox" situations, as they are referred to, have been increasingly arising in our country. As a result of the reform, relations between people are changing radically, old types of collaboration are disrupted and new ones are formed, various new interests are coming to light and clashing with each other, engendering formerly unknown conflicts. However, each new situation seems to catch us unawares, and no one has any clear idea as yet as to how negotiations on controversial issues should be conducted. Where does the problem lie?

[Lebedeva] I believe that our attitude to negotiations is still not serious enough, we regard them as nothing out of the ordinary, as something that happens of its own accord and does not require any specialist knowledge or skill, not to mention structures to ensure their materialization. Alas, this is wrong, and many sad examples bear witness to the fact that conducting negotiations is far from simple for opposing sides, especially if the conflict has reached the stage of violent actions.

[Lopukhin] However, with every passing day we are having to pay an increasingly high price for our failure to grasp this relatively simple idea....

[Lebedeva] The point is that while recognizing the existence of conflicts in our socialist country, we have failed to take the next important step and fully recognize that a conflict of interests is an entirely normal and natural phenomenon. Provided, of course, that it does not deteriorate into violence. Today our view of conflicts is still based on the principle that, yes, they do exist, but this is bad. And this frequently results in half-hearted measures, be it in connection with ethnic issues, economic accountability, or labor disputes.

[Lopukhin] If we continue to regard conflicts as emergency situations, as something unnatural and negative, the temptation may arise to resolve them by "strong-arm" methods. Furthermore, with the spread of democracy in our society, certain people have begun to view acts of violence as all but an element of freedom.

[Lebedeva] The desire to eliminate all conflicts in one fell swoop and to return to a "conflict-free" society may prove highly dangerous. Such a stance is understandable, however. We are all tired of the flareups of violence, the disorganization in our daily lives, the goods shortages. But there is only one way out—we must recognize the existence of conflicts, discard the judgmental approach to them (dividing them into good and bad ones), and get down to the "technology" of settling them.

[Lopukhin] Yet if one of the parties involved in a conflict, having mastered the science of conducting negotiations, "gains a victory" over the other party, this will hardly result in the settlement of a controversial situation, will it?

[Lebedeva] Quite, it will merely temporarily dampen down the conflict.... The traditional approach to negotiations on the principle of "losing or gaining" cannot be productive. The conflict will only be exhaustively resolved if all those involved in it gain something. If the matter is resolved by a forced compromise, if anyone's interests are infringed, the situation may sooner or later turn acute again.

In the course of negotiations it is very important to skillfully steer the situation to prevent it from assuming extreme, violent forms.

[Lopukhin] It is impossible to disagree with this. But how can effective mechanisms for the solution of contradictions and conflicts by other than "strong-arm" methods be created in practice in our society? How can the lack of the political culture, which is necessary for this, be overcome?

[Lebedeva] It is necessary to create as swiftly as possible a social institute for the solution of conflict situations and controversial questions by nonviolent methods.

Above all it is necessary to create an effective legal mechanism for the solution of conflicts.

[Lopukhin] However, it will hardly be possible to reduce the multiformity of life to legislative acts. Furthermore, lawmaking is considerably lagging behind the rapidly changing reality.

[Lebedeva] This is why in many Western countries nonjuridical forms and methods of resolving conflict situations, above all by means of negotiations, mediation, and dialogue, have been widely developed during the postwar period. The acute social conflicts which shook the West during the sixties served as a powerful impetus for the study and application of the "technology" of the process of negotiations between employers and the working people, between young people and the older generation, and between various social and ethnic groups.

[Lopukhin] Vast experience has undoubtedly been accumulated in this sphere. Naturally, it is impossible to mechanically transfer this experience into our situation. However, the events which are under way in our country dictate a careful study of what has been achieved in the West and the application of what is acceptable in our circumstances.

[Lebedeva] Negotiations and mediation are today part of day-to-day life and have become an inalienable part of the West's political, social, and economic culture. For instance, alone in the U.S. city of Boston and its suburbs there are some 10 scientific research institutes which study conflicts. They do not study theories alone. Science and practice are interconnected and feed each other. Many universities train professionally qualified specialists for settling the most diverse conflicts.

In the United States specialized organizations also exist. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, for instance, deals with the settlement of labor conflicts. Increasingly, Americans becoming involved in conflict situations prefer turning to alternative nonjuridical organizations rather than the courts. This is considerably cheaper, quicker, and often more effective.

[Lopukhin] Where should we begin in our country?

[Lebedeva] First of all it is necessary to create public awareness of the need to establish social mechanisms in our country to ensure dialogue, mediation, and the holding of negotiations. Unquestionably, this is where the mass media have a certain role to play. Simultaneously it is possible to embark on setting up the organizational structure—state and social organizational structure—for holding dialogue and negotiations.

[Lopukhin] It is surprising, for instance, that after the first strikes in our country, the trade unions and ministries in question did not get down to practical work to train professional experts in the sphere of the settlement of labor conflicts.

[Lebedeva] All kind of conflicts are flaring up in our country and here, I believe, we could draw on foreign experience, U.S. experience, for instance, and establish a number of centers whose tasks would include the provision of mediation services on a professional basis. These centers could be consulted in protracted conflicts, and they could provide emergency assistance when situations threaten to assume extreme forms.

[Lopukhin] It would, no doubt, be possible to set up "conflict telephone lines" on the model of the "confidential telephone lines?" For instance, a strike has been called, an ultimatum has been presented, what can be done?

[Lebedeva] If a conflict flares up quickly and is threatening to get out of hand, such telephone lines could be used at the very least to cool the passions that are running high and to transport the situation from the emotional to the rational sphere. The main point is to ensure that centers to resolve conflicts operate on a scientific, professional basis. Amateurs can only damage the idea.

[Lopukhin] Are there specialists in our country who could start working in such centers from tomorrow? Where can people turn?

[Lebedeva] Unfortunately, there are not many such places. For instance, in our problem laboratory of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Moscow State Institute for International Relations research into the process of negotiations is being conducted and a course for students has been organized. I believe that it is very important now to begin extensive training of negotiator cadres. Negotiations are a special type of activity subject to its own set of rules and natural laws. Therefore, what is needed, for instance, are courses to train negotiation participants and the publication of periodical literature about conflicts and methods of settling them.

[Lopukhin] Nonetheless, the mastery of professional knowhow on conducting negotiations can hardly be viewed as a panacea, as a magic wand to overcome all conflicts.

[Lebedeva] Quite right, the main point here is to contribute to finding acceptable solutions to forestall the ultimate manifestation of conflict—violence—through mutual understanding and a joint analysis of matter at issue. Negotiations are a means to ensure the mutual enrichment and mutual development of the sides.

Leaders Cited on PRAVDA Role, Festival

PM0605194990

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 6 May 1990 carries on the front page of its First and Second Editions, as part of a two-page feature on the 5-6 May PRAVDA festival, a reprint of remarks by "Friends of PRAVDA" from a special festival edition of the newspaper on sale at the USSR Exhibition of National Economic Achievements.

Veniamin Yarin, a member of the USSR Presidential Council (not identified as such), is reported as saying:

"PRAVDA's situation today is possibly far more difficult than that of other newspapers. There is an old saying which goes: 'When a faith collapses, its most principled, sincere supporters make themselves known.' Because socialism and communism are now primarily associated in the minds of very many people with their distortions (which, moreover, are professionally and expertly accentuated by some organs of the press), PRAVDA has a special responsibility for restoring the truth. I must say that the newspaper is acquiring features which will help it to fulfill this task."

Another Presidential Council member, Stanislav Shatalin (also not identified as such), is quoted thus:

"I am glad that PRAVDA has shaken off the lethargic sleep in which it was submerged in the first years of perestroyka and is becoming more vital and interesting. I am glad that the militant anti-intellectualism which often dominated its pages is being replaced by respect for scientists, knowledge, and competence. I am confident that, whatever direction the process of the party's development takes, as the central organ of the press PRAVDA must have no closed subjects, forbidden ideas, or undesirable opponents.

"PRAVDA has already succeeded in becoming a mirror for different viewpoints in the party. And when there is much that displeases me, I remind myself that there is no point in blaming the mirror."

The reprint also includes remarks by Viktor Astafyev, Sergey Zalygin, Valentina Tereshkova, and Kirill Lavrov.

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 May 1990 front-pages a similar selection of remarks in its First and Second Edition reporting on the PRAVDA festival.

According to PRAVDA, A.N. Yakovlev, member of the Presidential Council, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said:

"My main impression of this bright spring festival is its warm humanity. I have always—from the very first years of my work in the sociopolitical field—been in favor of this kind of direct contact with people: without any of those presidiums with their 'speakers' and 'listeners.'

"It would be good if politicians and the public, and journalists and their readers were always to meet in this way. Then it would not be a bureaucratic 'measure' but real communication.

"In short, everything has been organized with feeling, in the PRAVDA manner."

V.A. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said:

"The political advisability of this kind of festival is not in any doubt in the general context of the changes taking place in the country, the party, and its main newspaper.

"As far as PRAVDA itself is concerned, I think it must not only be the party newspaper but also the paper of the people. It is very important to stress that.

"With its meaningful discussions and interesting cultural program, the festival will contribute to the newspaper's openness and its continued democratization. Of course, we are not the first to arrange this kind of festival. Similar events are organized by many foreign newspapers. But, from where we stand, this festival looks different, which is natural. I wish you success!"

And A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, said:

"At this difficult, uneasy time, people must be shown that there are not only political passions in life. In my opinion, the PRAVDA festival proves that people have not lost the desire to meet, communicate, and simply relax. We in the Politburo greeted the idea of the newspaper's festival with approval. I was pleased to be able to attend its opening and talk to the newspaper staff and people attending the festival."

This feature also includes remarks by I.A. Ivashkin, a war veteran and retired lieutenant colonel, and A. Strygin, a programmer.

21st Komsomol Congress Resolutions

90US0855A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 3

["Resolutions of the 21st VLKSM Congress" published under the rubric: "Documents of the 21st Congress of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League"]

[Text] **"On the Procedure for the Election of Members of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee and the Bureau and Secretaries of the VLKSM Central Committee"**

Members of the VLKSM Central Committee are elected at congresses and conferences of subjects of the federation, conferences of republic, kray, oblast, and okrug Komsomol [Communist Youth League] organizations and the V.I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization Central Council. The elections of members of the VLKSM Central Committee are conducted in accordance with a decision of the congress or conference both by show of hands and closed (secret) ballot. Candidates for whom more than half the delegates participating in the congress or conference have voted are deemed to have been elected.

Members of the VLKSM Central Committee are elected:

a) on the basis of the following representation:

three members of the Central Committee per subject of the federation;

one member of the Central Committee per oblast, kray, and republic Komsomol organization and also per Komsomol organization of autonomous oblasts and okrugs;

three members of the Central Committee from the V.I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization Central Council.

b) in accordance with a representation quota from the numbers of the subjects of the federation and republic, kray and oblast Komsomol organizations.

The representation quota for the election of VLKSM Central Committee members is determined by a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee.

Upon determination of the number of VLKSM Central Committee members to be elected from subjects of the federation, the numbers of the Komsomol organizations with the right to elect VLKSM Central Committee members directly are excluded from the numbers of the corresponding subjects of the federation.

In the event that a representative of a Komsomol organization delegated in accordance with a quota to the VLKSM Central Committee is elected secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee or chief editor of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, this organization retains the right to elect an additional representative to the VLKSM Central Committee.

The authority of the elected members of the VLKSM Central Committee is confirmed by a congress of the VLKSM. In the period between congresses their authority is confirmed by a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee. A decision is considered adopted if more than half the congress delegates present or members of the VLKSM Central Committee have voted for it.

The authority of a member of the VLKSM Central Committee may not be confirmed in the event of a violation of the established election procedure.

A member of the VLKSM Central Committee may be recalled from the Central Committee on the basis of a decision of the Komsomol organization which delegated him. A decision on the recall and early election of a member of the VLKSM Central Committee is made by show of hands or closed (secret) ballot by a majority vote of the members of the corresponding Komsomol committee present. The VLKSM Central Committee may address to the subject of the federation and the Komsomol organization which delegated the Central Committee member a proposal concerning his recall.

The newly elected member of the VLKSM Central Committee acquires authority following its confirmation by a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee.

The VLKSM Central Committee forms the Central Committee Bureau from the ranks of members of the Central Committee. The quantitative composition of the members of the bureau is determined by a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee. The bureau includes ex officio the first secretary of the VLKSM Central Committee and the chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and one representative per subject of the federation and the V.I. Lenin All-Union Pioneer Organization Central Council, which should constitute no less than two-thirds of the total number of members of the bureau.

The decision on incorporation in the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau is made by delegates to the VLKSM congress from these organizations, and in the period between congresses, at plenums of the appropriate Komsomol committees.

The Central Committee plenum confirms the authority of those incorporated in the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau.

The other members of the bureau are elected at a Central Committee plenum in accordance with the proposals of members of the VLKSM Central Committee.

Secretaries of the VLKSM Central Committee are elected by a plenum of the Central Committee in accordance with a proposal of the first secretary.

The election of members of the bureau and secretaries of the Central Committee of the VLKSM may be conducted in accordance with a decision of a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee both by show of hands and closed (secret) ballot. Candidates for whom more than half the members of the VLKSM Central Committee present have voted are deemed elected.

At the demand of the representatives of one-fourth of the subjects of the federation the election of members of the bureau and secretaries of the Central Committee of the VLKSM may be conducted by separate ballot by representation per subject of the federation. In this case the candidates who have garnered a majority of the vote from the number of representatives of each subject of the federation present at the plenum are deemed elected.

"Functions and Authority of the VLKSM Central Committee and the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau, Secretaries, and Apparatus"

The 21st VLKSM Congress condemns the practice which has existed hitherto of the substitution of apparatuses for elective Komsomol bodies and the confusion of the functions and authority of the elective, administrative, and executive bodies. The congress considers a guarantee of the real democratization of the VLKSM the establishment by the highest bodies of the Komsomol organizations of a precise delineation of the functions and authority of the elective and administrative bodies and their apparatuses. In this connection the congress resolves:

1. For the purpose of coordinating the activity of the subjects of the federation, interaction with state and

public organizations and bodies at the all-Union level and decisions on all-Komsomol issues in the period between congresses, to determine for the VLKSM Central Committee the following functions:

formulation between congresses of the Komsomol's position on most important questions of the life of the state and society;

representation of the interests of the VLKSM in all-Union organs of state power and public organizations;

realization of the right of legislative initiative;

forecasting the development of the VLKSM, information and analysis activity and regulation of relations with state and public bodies and intra-league relations;

the elaboration of all-Komsomol and regional goal-oriented programs, actions, and activities and coordination of the activity of the Komsomol organizations pertaining to their realization;

study and dissemination of the work experience of the Komsomol organizations and practical assistance to them;

training of Komsomol personnel and activists in educational and research institutions under the auspices of the VLKSM Central Committee, assistance to Komsomol organization educational institutions in the form of scientific research and methods;

leadership of the central Komsomol mass media;

elaboration of the paths of development for the economy of the VLKSM, specific financial and economic activity in the VLKSM connected with the centralization of activity of this nature in the state, management of the enterprises and economic subdivisions of the VLKSM Central Committee, and the distribution of resources formed at VLKSM Central Committee level;

monitoring of compliance with the rules and fulfillment of the program documents and resolutions of the VLKSM congress and all-Union Komsomol conferences;

realization on behalf of the VLKSM of relations with foreign organizations.

Within the limits of these functions the VLKSM Central Committee is endowed with authority:

to adopt decisions of a recommendatory nature in development of the decisions of the congress and conferences;

to adopt decisions which are mandatory for the lower bodies on questions of:

a) the dates and procedure of organization of pre-congress reports and elections in the VLKSM and other all-Union actions and activities and the procedure for the election of delegates to a conference or congress of the VLKSM;

b) distribution of the resources formed at VLKSM Central Committee level;

c) normative documents on questions of the procedure of the creation, functioning, reorganization, and liquidation of Komsomol enterprises, accountancy and the storage and issuance of Komsomol document forms;

d) reversal of the decisions of lower bodies if they are in conflict with the rules and program documents of the VLKSM;

to speak on behalf of the VLKSM as a whole in the period between congresses of the VLKSM;

to explain and interpret provisions of the VLKSM Rules.

The representatives of one-fourth of the subjects of the federation in the VLKSM Central Committee may on these issues demand the adoption of decisions through voting by representation. In this case the decision is considered made if a majority of the representatives of each subject of the federation present at the plenum has voted for it.

2. To establish that the following are the functions of the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau:

the accomplishment of the tasks determined in decisions and instructions of VLKSM Central Committee plenums;

representation in the period between VLKSM Central Committee plenums of the interests of the Komsomol in all-Union organs of state power and public organizations;

organization of the work of the VLKSM Central Committee, the convening of Central Committee plenums, preparation of the necessary material for the plenums, coordination of the activity of the standing and temporary commissions and members of the central elective bodies and assistance to them in their work;

exercise of supervision of compliance with the rules and program documents of the VLKSM and fulfillment of the decisions of VLKSM Central Committee plenums;

decisions on specific questions pertaining to the practice of the VLKSM Central Committee's relations with foreign organizations.

Within the limits of these functions the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau is endowed with the authority:

to adopt decisions of a recommendatory nature in development of the decisions of the congress, all-Union conferences and plenums of the Central Committee of the VLKSM;

to adopt decisions which are mandatory for the lower organizations on the following matters:

a) the Komsomol organizations' presentation of information connected with realization of the functions of the VLKSM Central Committee;

b) suspension of the decisions of the lower bodies if they are in conflict with the rules and program documents of the VLKSM.

to speak on behalf of the VLKSM Central Committee in the period between VLKSM Central Committee plenums.

The Central Committee Bureau may not make decisions which are the province of the VLKSM Central Committee. It reports regularly on its activity at plenums of the Central Committee.

3. As instructed by the VLKSM Central Committee and Central Committee Bureau, secretaries of the VLKSM Central Committee perform the following functions: organize the work of the apparatus of the VLKSM Central Committee and the supervision and verification of fulfillment of adopted decisions, maintain relations and represent the Komsomol as instructed by the VLKSM Central Committee Bureau and plenum in the organs of state and public organizations.

4. To determine that the apparatus of the VLKSM Central Committee is created to support the activity of the central Komsomol authorities, current business of an organizational-executive nature and practical assistance to the Komsomol organizations and their elective bodies.

"Komsomol Organization Assistance Funds"

The new VLKSM Rules establish the complete independence of the primary Komsomol organizations in the use of their monetary resources and property. This creates the conditions for the accomplishment of the political and organizational tasks confronting them and the realization of socially significant projects in the interests of members of the VLKSM.

At the same time, however, the different social composition of the organizations and the differences in socioeconomic development of the regions do not allow a number of organizations to support financially their activity, primarily of student and trainee organizations and rayon committees of the agricultural zone and Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Asserting in the VLKSM the principles of comradely mutual assistance and collectivism and uniting for the accomplishment of tasks common to the Komsomol, the 21st VLKSM Congress advocates the creation of funds to assist such Komsomol organizations.

They could be formed under the auspices of the elective bodies from deductions of some of the resources of the primary Komsomol organizations and money from the economic activity of the Komsomol bodies, the VLKSM Central Committee included.

The specific amounts of the deductions would be determined by the Komsomol organizations themselves.

"Registration of VLKSM Members"

In connection with the adoption of the new rules and the need for a change in the principles of organization of the registration of VLKSM members the 21st VLKSM Congress deems it necessary:

1. To instruct the VLKSM Central Committee to prepare and adopt at a Central Committee plenum the regulations "Principles of the Registration of Members of the VLKSM and Procedure of the Issuance of Komsomol Documents," in which to determine common approaches in VLKSM organizations connected with the procedure for the forwarding, storage, completion, and issuance of Komsomol documents and statistical accounts concerning the composition of the Komsomol organizations and in decisions on questions of registration of VLKSM members at the time of the transfer of an organization from one subject of the federation to another and the departure of Komsomol members overseas, membership in the party and their attainment of the age limit for membership in the VLKSM and expulsion from the Komsomol.

In all other respects to accord the subjects of the federation the right to determine the procedure for registration of Komsomol members.

The congress advocates personal registration of the VLKSM members in the main structural component—the primary Komsomol organizations—the abolition of registration cards and the insertion on the Komsomol card of a column for notes on deregistration and registration and the registration of VLKSM members by lists of the established format and the collation of the actual numbers of the VLKSM in the primary organizations by dues payment lists.

2. For the VLKSM Central Committee to render the LKSM [Leninist Communist Youth Leagues] of the union republics and the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, the All-Army Council of Komsomol Organizations and the political directorates of the USSR KGB Border Forces and the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Internal Forces assistance in the elaboration of normative documents determining the procedure for the registration of members of the VLKSM in the corresponding Komsomol organizations.

3. To determine that the date of the transition to the new form of registration of members of the VLKSM will be decided by each subject of the federation independently following the adoption of the VLKSM Central Committee regulations and its normative document on the registration of Komsomol members.

The 21st VLKSM Congress considers it possible, prior to the VLKSM Central Committee's approval of the general provisions and the adoption by the subjects of the federation of normative documents on the registration of members of the VLKSM, to be guided by the VLKSM Central Committee Instructions "Procedure for the Registration of VLKSM Members and the Issuance of Komsomol Documents" approved at the VLKSM Central Committee plenum in December 1987 and the alterations and additions thereto which have been adopted.

Decision of the 21st VLKSM Congress

VLKSM Rules

1. To approve the VLKSM Rules.

2. In connection with the fact that the commissioning of the provisions of the VLKSM Rules will require the creation of a new normative base and the restructuring of the entire organization as a whole and its components to recommend that the union republic LKSM, the VLKSM organization of the USSR Armed Forces and the Komsomol organizations of the border and internal forces organize and perform the necessary work in the course of 1990.

3. For the purpose of coordination of this work to instruct the VLKSM Central Committee to render the necessary practical and methods assistance in the preparation of the draft rules and normative base of the subjects of the federation and the adjustment and removal of contradictions which could arise between provisions of the new VLKSM Rules and the provisions of the draft rules and normative documents of the subjects of the federation.

4. Considering that, following the adoption of the rules and normative documents of the subjects of the federation, the need for changes to be made to the VLKSM Rules could arise, to form for study of the expediency of their insertion and the adoption of decisions on these matters a commission of the 21st VLKSM Congress composed of representatives of the union republic LKSM, the VLKSM organization of the USSR Armed Forces and Komsomol organizations of the border and internal forces. The union republic LKSM, the USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organization, the Komsomol organizations of the border and internal forces and the VLKSM Central Committee to nominate their representatives for the commission.

To instruct the VLKSM Central Committee and the congress commission to convene, in the event of the need arising for changes to be made to the VLKSM Rules which could lead to an appreciable revision of the concept of our league adopted by the VLKSM congress, an all-Union Komsomol conference or VLKSM congress.

5. To determine in connection with the upcoming RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] LKSM Congress that prior to the completion of the organizational structuring of the RSFSR LKSM the interests of the Komsomol organizations of the RSFSR, as a subject of the federation, will be represented in the VLKSM Central Committee by members of the Central Committee elected from these organizations. To instruct a plenum of the VLKSM Central Committee, in accordance with Clause 28 of the VLKSM Rules, following completion of the work of the commission elaborating the procedure for the conferment on the Komsomol organizations of the status of subject of the federation, to determine the ultimate structure of the VLKSM, as a federation, with regard for the autonomous formations of the RSFSR.

6. In connection with the fact that a number of provisions stipulating the detailed procedure for the examination of certain questions of intra-league life are absent from the new VLKSM Rules and inasmuch as its determination pertains to the jurisdiction of the subjects of the federation, the 21st VLKSM Congress deems it possible for the period up to the adoption of rules by the subjects of the federation or their creation of their own normative base to be guided, where necessary, by the corresponding provisions of the VLKSM Rules adopted by the 20th Komsomol Congress.

7. To instruct the VLKSM Central Committee to analyze all the normative documents in force prior to the 21st congress and adopt a decision on their cancellation unless they correspond to the provisions of the new VLKSM Rules. The VLKSM Central Committee to notify the Komsomol organizations of the changes to the normative base through the mass media.

Minority Opinion on Komsomol Declaration

90US0870A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 28 Apr 90 p 3

["Declaration of the 21st VLKSM Congress (Minority Opinion)"]

[Text] For the first time in many years, the 21st VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] Congress has secured the right of the minority to express its opinion and bring this opinion to the attention of broad segments of the Komsomol membership. In accordance with the congress regulations, one-eighth of the delegates taking part in the voting could draw up a minority opinion in the event of disagreement with the document approved by a majority of the votes.

Many documents of the congress were adopted in an atmosphere far from "complete unanimity." Today in fulfilling the will of the congress we publish other points of view formulated as minority opinions of a portion of the congress delegates.

Thus, the following proposals were formulated as minority opinions during adoption of the Declaration of the 21st VLKSM Congress (published in the 24 April 90 issue).

The following alternative wording of the last paragraph of the declaration was submitted by a group of congress delegates: "Preserving unity, the VLKSM is reorganized into the Federation of Leninist Communist Youth Leagues."

An alternative variant of the declaration of the 21st VLKSM Congress was submitted by the Tatar and Moscow City and Oblast delegations.

"On the Development of the VLKSM"

The totalitarian system in which the individual was suppressed over many long years for the good of a pseudocommunistic concept is disintegrating before our very eyes. Society is painfully embarking on the path of transition to a judicious, democratic structure of living.

Rapid qualitative changes in the ideals, interests, and needs of young people are coming more and more into conflict with the opportunities available for their realization. Exacerbation of youth-related problems is moving outside the framework of this particular social group of the population and is becoming a destabilizing influence in the development of the country as a whole.

Congress delegates, not claiming to express the views of every VLKSM member but acknowledging their responsibility for the destiny of our society, believe the chief purpose of the Komsomol to be the creation of conditions for the free development of the personality of the young individual, for protection and expression of the political, economic, social, and spiritual interests and needs of our youth. In this we define our role in building a society of humane and democratic socialism.

In its present state, the Komsomol is unable to realize these aims under its own powers alone.

We see a solution to this in directing the concentration of funds, material resources, and organizational efforts of state organs and social organizations called upon to solve our youth problems.

Proceeding from
- —the vital necessity to solve our youth problems on an urgent basis;
- —the serious economic difficulties of the state;
- —the possible organizational collapse of the VLKSM;
- —the need to preserve for our youth the material, functional, and financial bases established and accumulated by several of its generations within the framework of the Komsomol;

Congress delegates consider it advisable to effect further development of the VLKSM along the following three lines:

1. The creation, based on a portion of the Komsomol's economic structure, of a volunteer-state youth service for the country.

2. Transformation of the present All-Union Komsomol structure into a Forum of Soviet Youth, which will form youth organizations from the organizational-political structure of the VLKSM.

3. The spinning-off of a CPSU youth organization from the present VLKSM.

Moving simultaneously in these three directions, today's Komsomol will be able to extract itself from the complex situation it finds itself in.

In connection with this we consider it necessary:
- —to extend the term of authority of Congress delegates;
- —to establish a commission of the Congress for working on all three directions of VLKSM development;
- —to make final decisions on the results of the 28th CPSU Congress.

Economic

Academician Views Switch to Market Economy

PM0905134590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Academician G. Arbatov under the rubric "Market: Prospect and Reality": "Enough of Using the Reform for Intimidation Purposes"]

[Text] Emotions around the economic reform and in particular the transition to a market economy have reached boiling point. There is probably no other problem now which so perturbs the broadest strata of the population—whether it is a case of workers, peasants, employees or engineers, pensioners, students, or scientific workers. That is understandable—the economy has become the most painful aspect of our life—bearing in mind both the daily concerns of every family and the fate of society, especially the fate of perestroyka.

What was the reason for the new and perhaps unprecedentedly intensive wave of disputes and debates about the economic reform? This time it was not absurd rumors, not overseas "voices," but entirely real things—the USSR Council of Ministers' proposals on the transition to a regulated market economy which have been discussed in the government since March and which were examined in April by the Presidential Council.

These proposals gave grounds for talk about the intention to double or treble prices for many types of food and to lift restrictions on other good, about the expected unemployment, and so forth. People were all the more concerned because this talk seemed to be consonant with the public statements of a number of our eminent economic practical experts and theorists.

And although the Council of Ministers proposals were criticized at the two-day conference with the USSR president and as a result of the debate were rejected and sent to be reworked, people's anxiety and feeling of lack of confidence in the future remained. We should not be surprised that demagogues and political speculators of both the right and the left are trying to play on this anxiety and these fears.

The main elements of the discussion held with the USSR president were described in the concluding speech and in his speeches in the Urals by the president himself and also in the interviews and articles of Presidential Council member S.S. Shatalin and presidential aide N.Ya. Petrakov. One important decision taken at the time was to explain key questions of the economic reform to the public and to consider public opinion when elaborating the program for the transition to a regulated market.

That means expanding discussion on various aspects of reform. I should also like in this connection to express a number of ideas (especially as I was one of several specialists to be invited to this Presidential Council conference).

I want to begin with the obvious—the economic reform has become urgent and more than urgent, we have lost a lot of time to no avail and we simply cannot put off the reform any longer—the difficulties in the national economy are growing at an ever faster pace.

But I have doubts (I have already voiced them publicly) about some aspects of the actual concept of the reform and the transition to the market which has formed among a (very influential) section of our economic practical experts and some scholars.

First. Although the need to balance the supply of money in circulation with the supply of goods is undoubted—there can be no market without that—in my view excessive emphasis is placed on the "fiscal" aspect of the matter. Measures aimed at removing money—raising prices, taxes, and various tariffs and restricting the growth of wages—will not of themselves create a market. The main thing is the all-around encouragement of the growth of the production of the commodities and services necessary to society with the aid of all instruments for incentives, granting the producer freedom irrespective of whether it is a case of a state enterprise, cooperative, or private peasant farm, and developing initiative and enterprise by every means. But it seems to me that this is the least studied of the reform both in our theory and in particular in the government's proposals and the speeches by its representatives. Moreover, some fiscal measures (in particular the tough restriction on the growth of wages) like the ambiguities in some new laws and many of the government's pieces of subordinate legislation clash with and contradict this main line in creating a proper market.

Second. For all the importance of creating a market, the economic reform and the system of measures necessary for the national economy's radical recovery do not come down to the market alone. That is borne out by the example of countries where a market economy has existed for a long time and has never been repealed or encroached upon by anyone. They include poor and rich countries, prosperous and vegetating countries, countries which lag behind and countries which are shooting ahead. In addition to a developed market we also need (somehow we have started to forget this) the skilled management of the economy at the micro-level and in particular at the macro-level.

A management which would make it possible to rid the country of excessive expenditure and would be concerned for the rational structure of the national economy (the correlation between the extracting and processing sectors, between group "A" and group "B," and so forth) and which would promptly rectify structural deformations and make proper use of the opportunities opened up by the international division of labor and so forth. There are in addition public needs which the market and market relations of themselves cannot properly satisfy in any country. I have in mind education and health care, social security, the development of fundamental science, and the creation of an infrastructure (roads, bridges, and to some extent transport, communications, and power in general) and its maintenance at an acceptable level.

But this is all abstract theory, so to speak. And our daily practice is the economy, control over which has essentially been lost or nearly lost. All-encompassing departmentalism which destroys natural resources, the labor of millions of people, and the environment, planning divorced from society's real requirements and potential, and an unprecedented monopolism which safeguards the tough and destructive dictatorship of the producer [sentence without main verb as published]. Of course, these and other similar problems are being discussed and written about. But as far as I can judge we have so far failed to embark on the practical solution of a single one of them. There are not even any general ideas for proposals which go further, still less any finalized programs capable of becoming the subject for businesslike discussion by the public and the Supreme Soviet.

To be honest I do not understand why matters are like that. After all, nothing now prevents us from improving the management of the economy, even with the absence of a market. Moreover, without skilled, harmonious management we will not succeed in preparing and implementing as we should the transition to a regulated market economy. There is no doubt that the need for it will not recede even after the market has been created.

Third. It has turned out that our people are constantly being intimidated with economic reform and the market. In my opinion hopes for an improvement in life have recently been very seriously undermined. On the other hand people are awaiting with alarm new deteriorations—the growth of prices and unemployment and the reduction of consumption. And they link this with the reform and the transition to the market.

To me this seems to be something wrong and irrational in its very basis. I cannot understand why a wealthy country with untold natural resources, vast agricultural lands, and an enormous industry, a country which in addition to everything else has a first-class science and tens of millions of skilled and educated workers should live increasingly badly while its citizens should suffer ever new sacrifices as order is introduced to its neglected economy. Looking at the one great successful reform implemented in our country—the new economic period—and at the reform initiated in the late seventies in China and at the economic breakthroughs in other countries, I cannot see a natural law of this kind.

Our people, our society, have paid and are continuing to pay every day a very high price for the absence of a market—a price in the form of shortages, empty shelves, lines, speculation and crime, and the poverty of a substantial section of the population (after all it is not just prices but also wages and incomes which are low). What grounds are there for persuading people that they will now also have to pay dear for the transition to the market? Why is the question being put like that?

I see two possible reasons.

One is simply the inept, one-sided explanation of the problem. It may be conceded that some of people's interests suffer during the transition to the market—for instance prices will increase. (Although, of course, not to the extent that some people predict and by no means for all goods—if, of course, the reform is conducted sensibly). But if the reform and the transition to the market proceed normally, the bulk of the population will be compensated by the far broader opportunity (of course for better work) to earn well. And by the fact that there will be an increase in the quantity, an expansion of the range, and an improvement in the quality of goods and services. As for other members of society—pensioners, students, the low-paid, those with many children, and so forth—then the state, society, will compensate for their losses. After all everything—the reform, the transition to the market—is being undertaken for the sake of people, to ensure that their lives improve as a result of more effective economic management. The economic transformations simply have no other point, without that it is better not to begin them.

And I am convinced that the reform and the transition to the market at any rate in our country can proceed in this way—by improving and not worsening people's lives, without dangerous "shocks."

But here the reform must not of course be reduced to an increase in taxes, to a rise in prices for some good and the renunciation of control over prices for others, to the reduction of responsibility for finding people work. It also presupposes much else.

In particular the radical reduction of unjustified state expenditure. The sources for such reductions have frequently been mentioned: Excessive capital investments and the now astronomical dimensions of construction time "overruns," the production of enormous quantities of unwanted output, the tying up of hundreds of billions of rubles in the form of above-normative stocks at enterprises, the renunciation of the "construction sites of the century," and the reduction of military expenditure and expenditure on the excessively large bureaucratic apparatus.

The reform presuppose next the skilled conversion and the inclusion in the national economy of a substantial proportion of the most advanced sectors replete with science, modern equipment and technology, and highly qualified cadres. And of course a radical improvement in management in the center and locally, the overcoming of monopolism, the emancipation of the producer so that it is not the bureaucrat but the consumer and the consumer alone who dictates his will to the producer. Finally, the broadest use of international economic and scientific and technical ties and cooperation. Without it we will not shoot forward, we must look the truth in the eye. Actually, today not a single developed country can live normally outside the international division of labor. But that is a special topic meriting special examination.

All these levers must be included not after the market has been created but now, in parallel with other measures for preparing it. Otherwise nothing will come of the market or of the reform as a whole.

And here I move to another reason why one may suspect that the market is being turned into a bogey, a bugbear. It is that some of our theorists and particularly our practical experts either simply have no idea of how it is possible (and in general of whether it is possible) to manage the economy in a new way that is different from before or else do not want to switch to a new type of economic management.

Of course, if with the aid of a few simple methods (like the confiscation of money, freedom for prices, and "freedom" for unemployment) we were to try to introduce the market into the existing sick, disordered, deformed, overbureaucratic economic organism, then people would have to pay for it, all the sacrifices would be theirs. The only thing is I am not sure that the result would be a real market. Rather it would result in a one-off operation to "balance" money against goods in a new orbit of difficulties and deprivations and we would soon find ourselves "back where we were," that is with all our present difficulties, to which new ones could be added. Not to mention the possible social and political consequences.

I still remain an optimist. I believe that the reform which is being undertaken so that the country and people can live better can be carried out in such a way that they do not first start to live worse (although that is virtually impossible!). And I believe that the reform, including the transition to the market, can be elaborated so that the country's population does not fear it but on the contrary awaits it impatiently, takes an active part in it, and supports it. Realizing that the only price which will have to be paid is conscientious, intelligent, enterprising, strenuous work for which each person will be fittingly rewarded.

Of course, all this is possible only with the skilled management of the economy. It will soon be a year since the Supreme Soviet approved the Council of Ministers. Perhaps it is time for it to report and to describe what has been done and to impart its plans? It seems to me that such a discussion would now be both appropriate and useful.

Economist Cited on Entrepreneurship Center

PM0905145590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Interview with Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Ardishvili, by correspondent F. Ivanov; first two paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction; date and place of interview not stated: "Science Studies Business"]

[Text] A center for the study of entrepreneurship problems has been created under the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Your IZVESTIYA correspondent asked a scientific staffer at the center, Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Ardishvili, to describe the tasks facing the new subdepartment.

[Ivanov] Aleksandr Archilovich, how will the work of your center differ from the research which is already being conducted?

[Ardishvili] Our institute and other scientific centers have so far as a rule studied business problems using as their point of departure either managerial or economic factors. But now it has become clear that this is an oversimplified, one-sided approach. It is essential to pool the efforts of scientists of different sectors and specialists in the field of the economy, finance, production organization, sociology, and psychology.

[Ivanov] What can we expect specifically from the center in the immediate future?

[Ardishvili] First of all we must help the development of business schools in the USSR, the majority of which are unable to train world-class specialists.

Then we must create information and consultative networks through which businessmen would be able to learn about the basic business development trends.

One important function of the center is the analysis of the activity of new forms of economic management, and such work can be done to order. Incidentally, we have already received the first such order from a republic's union of cooperatives. It is analytic work to study the influence of the legislative acts which have been adopted and which are in preparation on the development of cooperatives in the USSR.

And, of course, we are beginning actual scientific research which I hope will help our enterprises to adapt to a market economy. Our first monograph on general problems of entrepreneurship has already been prepared for printing. It will be followed by others concerning more specific avenues of business development.

[Ivanov] This work probably requires support at both state and international level?

[Ardishvili] Undoubtedly. Our program has already received government approval, we have formed good contacts with foreign scientists. Our center is the official representative in the USSR for the European business development foundation, a group nongovernment organization created three years ago with the participation of the EEC, the Harvard Business School, the International Institute of Management, Deutschebank, IBM, and Olivetti to pool the efforts of scientists and practical businessmen.

Kuzbass Workers' Movement Organized

904F0147A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 26 Apr 90 p 1

[Interview with A. Malykhin, cochairman of the Novokuznetsk Branch of the Kuzbass Workers Union, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA special correspondent V. Somov; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are newspaper's introduction: "It Is Freedom Rather Than Power We Are After"]

[Text] Recently, one could have met drifter Anatoliy Malykhin from the Kuzbass Mine "Yesaulskaya" in the lobby of the USSR Council of Ministers and in the offices of the Ministry of the Coal Industry. The miner persistently sought meetings with AUCCTU [All- Union Central Council of Trade Unions] and Aeroflot employees. What was the miner after—justice or some benefits for himself and his comrades? No, A. Malykhin's mission was quite different.

On 30 April the first congress of independent workers' movements and organizations of the country will open in Novokuznetsk. Anatoliy is a member of the organizational committee. These concerns brought him to the capital. As a cochairman of the Novokuznetsk Branch of the Kuzbass Workers Union, he had to assume responsibility for a large share of the work needed to prepare this congress.

[Somov] The Kuzbass Workers Union is a highly authoritative organization which is known for being resolute and firm. What are the members of the union doing at present? How many members do you have?

[Malykhin] I have difficulty giving you an exact number because new members are admitted to the workers' movement all the time. By now there are tens of thousands of us in the region. Joining the union is a strictly personal decision. However, the union has not yet assumed a final organizational format. Look at how it was born. Initially, strike committees were in operation, later they were transformed into workers' committees, and only later the Workers Union emerged. The workers' committees also operate at present. Incidentally, they have their own statute and bank accounts.

[Somov] Do the committees and the union duplicate each other? Does this not bring about estrangement in the workers' movement and cause splits?

[Malykhin] The committees are somehow a part of the union. They handle primarily socioeconomic issues; among other things, they monitor the actual execution of the protocol of miners' demands on the government. The union is a public and political organization....

[Somov] Which has a claim to power?

[Malykhin] Do not jump to conclusions. Why were the workers' committees, and subsequently the union, forced on many occasions to assume the functions of the local organs of power? People kept coming to us after losing faith in the official structures of government. They said they had been to the city executive committee and the city party committee, and they had been shown the door everywhere. We were, supposedly, their last resort. The bureaucratic apparatus had itself created conditions for the forced actions of the strike committees in defense of the miners' interests.

[Somov] Still, would you please respond to my direct question? Does the Kuzbass Workers Union have a claim to power?

[Malykhin] We are a genuine political force. However, at present the issue is not like this. Many workers' movement activists have been elected deputies of the local soviets. It is through them that we are going to govern the life of the region and defend our rights. It is not power that we after but rather economic freedom and independence.

[Somov] As far as I know, the worker-deputies acted quite vigorously and at times even provocatively at the recent session of the new oblast soviet, for example they demonstratively left the audience.

[Malykhin] This indeed happened. A workers' bloc has been created in the oblast soviet. This is approximately 60 people. They use various methods to fight routine and attempts by the apparatus to force its will on the delegates. Perhaps not all of the devices are parliamentary in nature. However, people protest as best they can. I believe that all of us need to learn political culture.

[Somov] Frequently our readers ask with alarm in their letters: Do the miners intend to strike again? People are tired of tension and of the economic disarray that is exacerbated by strikes.

[Malykhin] Hardly anyone can say unequivocally at present whether strikes will occur again this summer. The miners have become convinced that this extreme measure of struggle is by far not the most effective one. The impression we've got is that it does not make any difference to the government whether a new strike begins or not. Metallurgical combines and other coal consumers have accumulated considerable stocks of coal. At the same time, the miners are aware that many of their demands have not been met. When Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers L. Ryabev came to the Kuzbass not so long ago, we did not come to any agreement. The situation in the labor collectives is tense. People waited for the spring to come. They even put it this way: "We will plant potatoes, and then we will go for it." However, these are emotions. The Workers Union understands that we cannot overcome the economic crisis by emotions alone. When we became convinced that common ground with the government had not been found we began to draft measures for the development of the region ourselves. We are going to implement these accomplishments.

[Somov] What forms of economic struggle do the miners intend to use?

[Malykhin] This is yet to be determined. As far as a tactic is concerned, it has been developed. We are opting for an extensive rapprochement with economic functionaries in order to fight for economic independence together. We are going to solve the urgent problems of the region through economic accountability and self-management.

[Somov] There are quite a few problems within the workers' movement itself. Conflicts between strike committees and workers' committees have developed....

[Malykhin] Unfortunately this is so. Perhaps, we should not deplore it. In light of pluralism, we need a simpler look at these differences. After all, ours is a unified strategy; the differences are in tactics. Some branches of our union are striving to turn it into a party. Relations between the Novokuznetsk and Kemerovo workers' committees are not smooth. Still, we are of the same mind on the main points. I believe that the differences will not prevent us from acting jointly.

[Somov] Full-time staffers, new functionaries have appeared in the workers' committees and branches of the union. They say that some of them resort to techniques borrowed from the arsenal of "the apparatchiks."

[Malykhin] I have also become "a paid staffer." Some people are also calling me "an apparatchik" or "a toady." However, I am entirely subject to the control of the collective of my mine. I have told the guys many times: "If you believe that I have not justified your hopes call me back to the stope." I am ready at any time. Paperwork is not to my liking. But some people like it. Some become euphoric. Certain people begin to carry on like worker-aristocrats. However, these are isolated cases.

[Somov] What have the miners gained after a year of vigorous struggle? After all, the main problems still have not been solved.

[Malykhin] Indeed, so far we have secured little. They began paying us night bonuses and travel-time (or, as they call them here, legwork) allowances. Northern bonuses are now paid not only to miners but also to drivers and construction workers. We also advocated this vigorously. On the whole, the standard of living remains the same.

However, as we see it, the main result is that we have awakened ourselves. People were sort of having a hangover, and now they are recovering. This is a process that takes many years.

[Somov] Anatoliy Vladimirovich, you have already mentioned differences with the government. In general, what are your relations with the Union ministries? Why are you unable to come to a mutual understanding on many occasions?

[Malykhin] I have encountered many times a slighting, arrogant attitude toward us, the activists of the workers' movement. Some of the superior officials do not want to consider us a pillar of perestroyka. It is advantageous to assign to us the role of supplicants. We have to knock on doors and literally squeeze specific concessions out of "the apparatchiks."

For example, we are seeking the right to sell in foreign markets in order to improve the supply of foodstuffs, clothing, and medicines. Supposedly, we now have control over five percent of planned output. L. Ryabev told us: We will give this right to the miners, but under the supervision of the government and the ministry. We know this kind of supervision—once again, the miners will get nothing out of it. In other countries, producers control the main segment of output themselves. Meanwhile, here we've got five percent, and even that they are in a hurry "to supervise."

[Somov] To your mind, have there been major miscalculations and mistakes in the tactics of the Workers' Union?

[Malykhin] Of course. We are trailblazers. Our credulity is one of our main mistakes. After all, this is how we were brought up: If they say so in the center it will be done, just wait. We proceed from the fact that ranking comrades should keep their word. I remember Minister M. Shchadov coming here last summer, at the height of the strike. He came here "to put out the fire" with laundry detergents, meat, and coffee. He went to all the cities and signed a great deal of papers, petitions, and demands. However, the time has come to pay up on those I.O.U.'s. On one occasion, we gathered these papers and produced them to the minister. Mikhail Ivanovich responded that he signs serious documents on the official letterhead, the rest is, supposedly, trash. I weighed these papers just for the heck of it: 2.3 kilograms. This is how many promises the minister gave the miners.

We have made many mistakes, often due to our inability to fight and lack of knowledge.

[Somov] Perhaps workers cannot do without the help of other strata of the population?

[Malykhin] Definitely! The workers' movement will not accomplish its tasks without the participation of the intelligentsia, office workers. This is why our union, which was initially called the workers' union, now unites all workers. There are many specialists and scientists from all kinds of fields among us.

[Somov] Could you please tell us about the forthcoming congress of the workers' movement.

[Malykhin] The concept of convening it appeared last year. It became necessary to coordinate our actions and generalize our experience. By now, the workers' movement has spread throughout the entire country. Strike committees, workers' clubs, and unions operate in approximately 170 cities. Most of their members are convinced that we will only be able to overcome the economic and political crisis in our country together.

It is no accident that the Kuzbass was selected as venue for the congress, despite there being other suggestions. The delegates are expected to elect a coordination council.

[Somov] Will the workers' movement organize and become a real alternative to the trade unions? Will the coordinating committee rival the AUCCTU?

[Malykhin] I do not want to anticipate events. The delegates will decide the fate of the workers' movement themselves. I may only say on behalf of the organizational committee that we do not intend to form any alternative trade unions or parties—only to coordinate activities and struggle for the state to make the interests of the working people a priority.

I would not venture a guess ahead of time concerning the decisions of the congress. It may only be expected that workers' unions and clubs will hold a worthy position in the future system of political, public organizations.

[Somov] What was the attitude of the trade unions and local party organs toward the idea of convening the congress?

[Malykhin] Guarded. Former AUCCTU leader V. Shalayev refused to help us financially. The AUCCTU does have money for various festivals and foreign trips. However, they did not have money to spare for the first workers' congress. In turn, it appears that the new trade union leadership is otherwise preoccupied at present—they are distributing portfolios. The local party organs do not oppose us but do not actually support us either. The city soviet gave the go-ahead for holding the congress. As they say, we've got to be grateful for that. Be that as it may, I believe that this is not going to be a routine event but rather a conspicuous landmark for the workers' movement.

Sharp Price Increases Reported for April

LD0705121290 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] There was a sharp rise in prices in the state sector of trade in the Soviet Union last month. According to the weekly KOMMERSANT, the prices of consumer goods went up by an average of 3.7 per cent. The weekly points out that there has been no administrative decisions on that score. The stability of prices was lost because trade began to react to a market situation determined by inflation and shortages of goods. Unlike consumers, some economists regard bringing state prices to reality as a feasible factor that will contribute to keeping the supply and demand in balance.

Consumer Price Rise Rumors Refuted

904D0109A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 3

[Report on interview with I.I. Gorbachev, deputy chairman of the USSR State Prices Committee, by TASS correspondent S. Golovchenko: "Higher Prices—What Is True and What Is Not"]

[Text] Recently some leaflets appeared on our streets announcing that the government has decided to change the category of certain goods that are now in short supply. According to this decision coffee, sausage, tea, alcoholic beverages, clothes, etc. will be sold in competitive price stores at prices two or three times higher than the current ones. I guess, people who are displaying their printed or hand-written leaflets are calling upon the population to rush out and buy all kinds of goods for the future so that their wallets do not dry up later. How real is this threat? That question was put by a TASS correspondent to I.I. Gorbachev, deputy chairman of the USSR State Prices Committee.

[Gorbachev] These are just rumors. They aim to create additional tensions in our society and to destabilize the consumers' market. They serve to the advantage of those who want to make people feel a certain distrust for the measures taken by the government to normalize the economy. As for the competitive prices trade, it is true that the Councils of Ministers of Union republics have been asked to open special stores in the first six months of this year. These special stores would sell some types of consumer goods. The USSR Ministry of Trade, the USSR Ministry of Finance, and the USSR State Committee for Prices are supposed to set the competitive pricing procedure as well as suggest means of spending the profits from the sale of those goods.

[Golovchenko] What kind of goods are these?

[Gorbachev] Mainly they are especially fashionable and prestigious articles of foreign and domestic make which will be purchased in small batches exclusively for the special stores. They will also include alcoholic beverages and cigarettes imported from the capitalist countries. The special stores will be not allowed to sell children's things or goods in mass demand. No food will be sold in the special stores at all. I want to remark here that the rumormongers cite long lists of food and clothing items which allegedly will be sold in the special stores only. That means that all these items are no longer available in state-owned stores at state-set prices. They insist that these lists were published in the USSR Council of Ministers decision of 5 February 1990. In reality the government document contains none of this. It only has Item 14 which deals with general organizational principles of competitive prices trade.

[Golovchenko] Ivan Ivanovich, why do we need such stores at all?

[Gorbachev] These stores will help prevent black marketing, which has assumed threatening proportions lately. We also plan to use the profits from the sales at competitive prices to finance social programs. These include: increases in minimum retirement payments, providing financial aid to poor families, salary increases for health care and culture workers, extension of partially paid leave for child care, etc.

[Golovchenko] The government is trying now to make the fastest possible transition to the market economy. Many people understand the word "market" as the following metamorphosis: The idea of "the price is one ruble but the item is not available" should be replaced by the concept "The price is R10 but the item is available." Something similar is happening in Poland now. There are goods in the stores but the people do not have the money to buy them. The standard of living decreased by 35 percent. Given our conditions, what of this experience can we use here?

[Gorbachev] The State Committee for Prices has an unequivocal position on that. We cannot afford any measures leading to a sudden or a sharp increase in prices. The government has compiled a list of first priority goods defining the living standard, and it keeps the list under a permanent control. The prices set by the state for these goods will not change in the current year. However, market relations presuppose changes in wholesale and purchasing prices, which will inevitably result in variations in retail prices. We understand that this will touch on some socially important goods. As there is no alternative to a market at present, we will have to compensate the people for their expenditures. The compensation measures should be complex ones: They would include salary raises and supplements to retirement payments, stipends, and allowances.

[Golovchenko] When is this going to happen?

[Gorbachev] Not tomorrow, in any case. We are talking about a general, country-wide reform in pricing. Such decisions should be taken openly and after good consideration. I think that the people will be able to see all the discussion clashes on the screens of their TV sets, because the last word will be that of the USSR Supreme Soviet whose sessions are broadcast over the entire country. Everybody would be able to see then whether the leaflet prophecies are true or false.

Exhibition Shows 'Dual Effect' of Conversion

PM1005104590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 May 90 p 1

[S. Bobrovskiy report: "Civilian Goods From Military Plants"]

[Text] The Soviet "Conversion 90" exhibition has ended in Munich. A total of 300 defense enterprises demonstrated 1,200 types of output at the exhibition.

In the world market you cannot be a buyer without being a seller. Are we forced to trade in raw materials, resources, and ecology (with dirty factories in our country), or can we put goods on the counter that are more worthy of a civilized power? The results of "Conversion 90" give grounds for optimism.

Fragments of destroyed Soviet missiles were popular souvenirs at the exhibition. For us, they symbolize not only the long-awaited reduction of the nuclear threat but also, unfortunately, the skilled and valuable work of military equipment designers now destroyed and thrown to the winds.

The Munich exhibition demonstrated the dual positive effect of conversion: the political and the economic effect. Western businessmen showed great interest in our military department's civilian output. The focus of attention was the truck tractor based on the T-55 tank, which is intended for work in extreme conditions, a submarine for... tourism, and the SS-20 nuclear launch vehicle, which has the capability of studying the atmosphere.

With understandable curiosity, potential buyers familiarized themselves with state-of-the-art technologies that the defense industry is offering for export.

There were surprises even for the exhibition organizers. The interest with which Bavarian housewives (and businessmen!) examined models of household equipment, from coffee grinders and bicycles to televisions, was a pleasant surprise for them. It meant that we can do it!

A large number of exhibits were sold right at the exhibition. Contracts worth millions were concluded. The "conversion" reached such a point that the "top-secret" defense industry reached an agreement with Western partners to create joint enterprises. Mars has moved aside, leaving a little space for Mercury.

Today, many specialists are expressing alarm that conversion and the switch to civilian production could deprive the defense industry of its main asset—the high technical standard of its production. In the end, meat grinders instead of missiles is as foolhardy as missiles instead of butter.

Answering our question on the future of conversion, Igor Sergeyevich Maksimov, chief of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry Main Scientific and Technical Administration, stressed that it was the complex, advanced technologies that attracted the people's attention most in Munich. In his opinion, the defense industry could be earning most of the country's foreign currency in the near future.

Agricultural

Decision Adopted To Stimulate State Grain Buying

LD0705200890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1820 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a decision on measures to stimulate state purchases of grain in 1990. It is necessary to move up the period for the introduction of the envisioned reforms in the price formation of new state purchase prices for grain crops and to establish them from this year's harvest. On average, their level will grow more than 1.5 times in comparison with practical payments, including all extra charges in force up until the present time.

The new state purchase prices significantly enhance the economic commitment of farms and increase the production and sale of high quality industrial grain to the state. The document is being published in full in the press.

Revised Grain Prices for 1990 Announced

PM0905152190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "New Purchase Prices for Grain"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers has adopted a resolution "On Measures To Stimulate State Grain Purchases in 1990." It is recognized that it is essential to bring forward the deadline for introducing the new state purchase prices for grain crops stipulated by the pricing reform, and to set them for the current year's harvest. Their level will increase on average by over 50 percent in comparison with actual payments, including all forms of additional charges hitherto in operation.

The new state purchase prices substantially increase farms' economic interest in increasing the production and sale to the state of high-quality bread grain. Specifically, grain prices for certain of types of grain are being altered as follows:

[In the following table, column headed "A" shows "Average actual payments including supplements" and column "B" shows "New purchase price"; all figures denote "rubles per tonne"]

	A	B
Soft wheat, Grade 1	260	500
Grade 2	205	400
Grade 3	181	300
Rye	194	300

Grain of the Most Valuable Varieties:		
Rice	423	700
Buckwheat	730	950
Oats	292	340
Brewing barley	162	380

The prices of bread grain crops grown without the use of pesticides and destined for the manufacture of children's and dietetic food products are rising considerably. Prices of forage grain from barley, oats, corn, and other crops are also rising.

In order to avoid dearer livestock products it is deemed essential to maintain for 1990 the existing wholesale prices for mixed fodder produce sold from state resources to kolkhozes [collective farms], sovkhozes [state farms], and other agricultural consumers.

The new purchase prices for wheat, corn, barley, oats, groats, pulses, and other crops have been conveyed to soviet and economic organs.

The USSR Council of Ministers appeals to the labor collectives of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises to make use of the favorable economic conditions for increasing grain production and, on this basis, ensure an increase in grain sales to the state in 1990.

Scientific

Further Details of 'Cosmos-2077' Reported

PM0905101190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Morning Edition p 6

[TASS report: "'Cosmos-2077'"]

[Text] The "Cosmos-2077" satellite, the latest in the series, was launched in the Soviet Union 7 May 1990 aboard a "Soyuz" booster rocket.

The satellite is fitted with scientific apparatus intended for the further study of space.

The satellite's orbital parameters are:

—initial period of rotation—89.6 minutes;
—maximum distance from earth (apogee)—346 km;
—minimum distance from earth (perigee)—195 km;
—incline of orbit—62.9 degrees.

In addition to scientific apparatus, the satellite is also carrying a radio system for the precise measurement of the elements of the orbit and a radiotelemetry system for transmitting to earth data on the work of the instruments and scientific apparatus.

The apparatus installed on the satellite is working normally.

The coordinating computer center is processing the incoming information.

Military

Yazov Remembers Victory 45 Years Ago

PM0805104790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 Second Edition p 2

["For the Sake of Life on Earth. Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR Defense Minister, Replies to Questions by PRAVDA's Military Department"—PRAVDA headline; no place or date of interview given]

[Text] [PRAVDA] It is 45 years since our victory in the Great Patriotic War. A long time. How do you, as a frontline officer, remember 9 May 1945, and how have the past decades altered the perception of this event?

[Yazov] That day remains in my memory as bright, sunny, and fair. This is how many frontline soldiers remember it. This is understandable. Our jubilation knew no bounds when we learned that the act of fascist Germany's capitulation had been signed in Karlshorst. And even though battles were still being fought to eliminate the enemy's Kurland grouping, to deliver Golden Prague, and to extinguish the remaining hotbeds of enemy resistance, all this was overshadowed by the bright joy of victory.

Years pass, but the feelings experienced at that time remain as vivid as ever. Evidently, time is impotent before the heart's memory. Generally speaking, as 9 May 1945 recedes further into the past, the majesty of our victory in all its parameters becomes that much more graphic.

[PRAVDA] What do you mean?

[Yazov] First, the fact that our victory is of universal human value. After all, the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe meant liberation from fascist slavery for the peoples of this continent and of the whole world. The victory offered mankind an opportunity to live and labor beneath clear and peaceful skies, and inspired the hope of final deliverance from wars.

Second, the victory in the Great Patriotic War is a holiday of the Soviet people, our national pride. It was the Soviet Union that made a decisive contribution toward the elimination of the aggressor's war machine, the liberation of Europe from the Nazi yoke, and the joint victory. It really was joint, because it was gained through the joint efforts by many states and peoples. Cooperation within the anti-Hitler coalition became an important factor in routing the fascist-militarist bloc.

The experience of successful cooperation between states with different social systems has been integrated within the ideas of new political thinking and is being extended into today's perestroyka of international relations.

And the final point. The victory in the Great Patriotic War also has a strictly personal aspect. I mean the special pride and the special pain felt by Soviet people who, back in 1941-1945, had to fight a hard struggle on the front and to selflessly labor in the rear.

[PRAVDA] It was already after the war that the frontline soldiers and toilers of the rear, who bore the brunt of the war, became known as the generation of victors. How accurate is this description? After all, we are talking about people of different ages—of people who, as the saying goes, accomplished the October Revolution and of people who were born after it?

[Yazov] I think that this description is accurate and fair. Belonging to the generation of victors is certainly not a matter of age groups, it depends strictly on participation in the battle for the freedom and independence of our multinational socialist fatherland, the USSR, a battle which lasted 1,418 endless days and nights. It was a battle which, to use the poet's words, was not fought for glory's sake, it was fought for the sake of life on earth. And it was the generation brought up on the ideas and principles of socialism that won this battle.

[PRAVDA] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, you also belong to the Great Patriotic War generation....

[Yazov] I set store by this, and I feel proud of it. If truth be said, however, recently we have seen people using exclusively black hues when reflecting on the Great Patriotic War and our victory. Some people have no aversion to falsification of facts, arbitrary interpretation of past events, or the dissemination of their own versions which are far removed from historical truth. Matters at times reach what are essentially cynical speculations about the extent of our losses.

According to preliminary data available at present, the total losses suffered by our country during the Great Patriotic War amount to approximately 27 million persons. There were 8,668,000 persons who either were killed directly at the battlefields, or were captured and failed to return from captivity, or died as a result of wounds and disease. A large proportion of these losses was incurred during the initial period of the war, which was the hardest and most unfavorable for us.

[PRAVDA] You say that the initial period of the war was the hardest and most unfavorable for us. Why was this, seeing that the country was preparing to repulse aggression?

[Yazov] Even today, almost half a century later, it is painful to think and talk about this. The military-economic potential created by fascist Germany, which was augmented after it had launched World War II and captured 12 European countries, was double that of our country by the time the USSR was attacked. The invasion army—mobilized in good time, comprehensively equipped, and organized in powerful offensive groupings—comprised 190 divisions, about 5.5 million men, almost 4,500 tanks, 47,000 guns and mortars, 4,500 combat aircraft, and 192 warships.

This war machine, smoothly functioning and with almost 2 years of experience in combat operations, was opposed by 170 divisions deployed in the western border region military districts and comprising a total of about 3 million men, almost 14,000 tanks, and more than 10,000 aircraft, including the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleet aviations. Quantitatively speaking, the forces would appear adequate. Qualitatively, however, they were substantially inferior to the enemy.

[PRAVDA] It seems as if the causes of our misfortunes at the start of the war cannot be reduced to just limited potential and miscalculations in the sphere of material and technical supplies, the country's defense capability, and the Armed Forces' combat readiness. There were also other causes like, for example, military-strategic ones?

[Yazov] Unfortunately, this is true. In the first place, the banking on immediate transfer of combat operations onto the aggressor's territory was detached from political realities. The redeployment of troops to new regions just before the war had a negative effect on their combat readiness, primarily in the western military districts. Advance preparations in the theater of combat operations had not been completed, the new mobilization plans had not been assimilated. Gross miscalculations in the appraisal of the situation and disregard of the fact that the enemy's groupings, fully prepared for aggression, had actually arrived at our borders resulted in our combined units and units not being deployed and not being in a state of combat readiness when the Hitlerites invaded. In actual fact, they were on peacetime footing. In essence, even the defense was not properly organized.

Of course, the inadequate training of a sizeable proportion of military cadres also had a grave effect. The Army's command and political staff, and primarily its leadership staff, had been bled dry by Stalin's repressions.

[PRAVDA] Today it is impossible to imagine the entire complexity of the conditions prevailing at the time when our country and our Army joined battle with the aggressor. Many major political, military, and public figures, scientists, and current affairs writers abroad—both during World War II and even nowadays—have expressed amazement that the Soviet Union managed to withstand such a cruel blow.

[Yazov] Yes, people in the West often speak of this as a miracle. I think, however, that this is not so much of a "miracle." It is a question of the staunchness of the patriotic and international spirit of our people who rose to defend their fatherland and the socialist choice they made—once and for all times—back in October 1917. All of our country's nations and ethnic groups fought shoulder to shoulder for victory. The war proved that we can cope with any difficulties and any tasks not when we are at odds with each other but only in a close alliance. It also convincingly confirmed the advantages of socialist military organization, of our Army which relies on support from the whole people.

The ideas of Lenin and the Communist Party, which had captivated the masses in their millions, provided a mighty material force which determined the logic and results of the struggle for victory. The party organized the repulse of the enemy and cemented the front and the rear. Four out of every five communists were either in the forces or in defense industry enterprises. There were 3 million party members killed in battle. And 5 million new fighters joined the party's ranks during the turbulent war years. This is the truth of life, which some critics of the party find unpalatable nowadays.

Our path to victory was by no means an easy one. We were forced to drink the bitter cup of defeats and losses, of retreats to Moscow and Leningrad, to the Volga and the Caucasus. We also found it especially difficult because the Soviet Union was, in essence, fighting a powerful enemy alone. But we did not flinch or break, we withstood, we switched the economy onto a war footing and consolidated the Armed Forces. It was just a few months after the beginning of the war, during the battle for Moscow, that the myth about the Wehrmacht's invincibility was dispelled and the strategy of "blitzkrieg" collapsed. The battle for Moscow was the central event during the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.

[PRAVDA] Since you have already spoken about the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, it may be appropriate to straight away move on to its other periods?

[Yazov] The second period of the war began in the late fall of 1942 with the rout of fascist German forces in the battle for Stalingrad. It lasted 14 months and ended with the battle on the Dnieper River. Despite the lack of a second front, it produced radical and irreversible changes in the overall military-political situation and resulted in a fundamental turnabout in the course of the Great Patriotic War and the entire World War II. During the third and final period, the Red Army chased the invaders out of the Baltic region, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Moldavia. Jointly with the armies of the allies in the anti-Hitler coalition, who opened the second front in Europe in the summer of 1944, it brought liberation from fascism to the peoples of European countries.

[PRAVDA] The rout of the German fascist invaders was ensured thanks to joint and selfless efforts by the entire Soviet people. Nonetheless, the course and outcome of the war were ultimately decided at the front where the Soviet Armed Forces clashed with the enemy in direct face-to-face combat. Could you, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, give a most general operational-strategic appraisal of their actions during the war?

[Yazov] During the war, our Armed Forces conducted 55 strategic operations and hundreds of front and army offensive and defensive operations. There were some unsuccessful ones, especially during the initial period. But, as the war progressed, we acquired experience and learned to gain victory. Incidentally, this experience—critically interpreted, of course—it still used today to boost the professional training of our military cadres and the combat skills of troops and naval forces.

[PRAVDA] And how would you describe our soldiers who, in this cruel clash, managed to overcome a strong, comprehensively supplied, trained, and experienced enemy?

[Yazov] Indeed, we came up against a strong enemy, skilled in military matters. Let me put it this way: Our soldiers were in no way inferior to the Wehrmacht soldiers when it came to skills in using weapons and equipment. As for combat ingenuity, mutual assistance, initiative, endurance, staunchness in defense, and combat fervor in attack, our fighters had no equals.

And the officers? They have a key role to play at the front. They are the organizers of combat. The soldiers' lives and future are in their hands. I know from my own experience how rapidly officers matured on the frontline and mastered the difficult science of gaining victory.

Soviet military chiefs and troop leaders of the Great Patriotic War are quite eloquently described by their deeds in organizing the crushing rout of the war machine of fascism and militarism, which was unprecedented in history, and our victory. The names of G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilevskiy, K.K. Rokossovskiy, N.F. Vatutin, L.A. Govorov, I.S. Konev, R.Ya. Malinovskiy, K.A. Meretskov, F.I. Tolbukhin, I.D. Chernyakhovskiy, N.G. Kuznetsov, V.F. Tributs, and other Soviet troop and fleet leaders aare associated with brilliant operations which have gone down for ever in the golden treasury of the military art.

Briefly speaking, the Soviet people are rightfully proud of the Great Patriotic War soldiers, namely all frontline soldiers from private to marshal.

[PRAVDA] How is loyalty to traditions reconciled with the radical transformations now being implemented in defense building and the Armed Forces? After all, the assertion of the new always occurs through rejection of the old, through a break with accepted standards and stereotypes?

[Yazov] Yes, breaks and rejections are inevitable in the process of renewal. They accompany the transformations now under way which, in their totality, comprise a far-reaching military reform. Changes are being implemented in the composition, structure, equipment, training, and management system of the Armed Forces.

There are, however, things which are not subject to either break or tradition, things whose immutability, in my view, comprises the supreme dialectics of life. I treat as such the best traditions of our Armed Forces—the traditions of devotion to patriotic and international duty, to our people, to the Soviet motherland. This profoundly conscious and selfless devotion materialized in the mass heroism by Soviet people at the front and in the rear, it became the most important factor of our victory in the last war. And I am convinced that this selfsame devotion is now the main driving force of perestroyka, a guarantee of the implementation of socialism's mighty potential, the prosperity of our multinational fatherland, and its reliable defense....

Yazov Congratulates Soviet People on Anniversary

LD0905145490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1047 GMT 9 May 90

[Interview with USSR Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov, by correspondent Valeriy Voloshin; date and place not given—live or recorded]

[Text] [Valeriy Voloshin] Today is the Victory Day holiday. Permit me to cordially congratulate you on this joyous holiday, and to wish you happiness, health, and great success in your military work. This holiday is especially dear to you as a frontliner, as indeed it is to all participants of the Great Patriotic War.

[Yazov] Thank you very much. I would like to congratulate all veterans of the Great Patriotic War, veterans of work, and the whole of the Soviet people on this major nationwide holiday of the great victory of the Soviet people in that war. As a frontliner, as a person, and as one who has seen war with his own eyes and sensed it with his entire being, so to speak, the holiday is really special to me.

During the parade I saw people who were directly scarred by the war. Marching there were Heroes of the Soviet Union, partisans, those who marched in the Victory Parade in 1945, and workers in the rear. You know, you somehow look at them in a special way, and somehow they express their attitude to the holiday in a special way, to the dearest, most joyous day in May.

[Voloshin] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, a reassessment of many aspects of our life, including the past, is taking place today in a watershed phase of perestroyka. As a participant in the Great Patriotic War, you are probably not indifferent, either, to the fact that a reassessment of the significance, even of our victory, in the Great Patriotic War is taking place, too. So, what is your attitude to this?

[Yazov] In my view, the truth can be the only basis for interpreting the events of the last war and everything connected with it.

You know, in pursuit of some kind of sensation, a great many people invent a great many figures by themselves. Well, let us say that I take the census for 1939, say, and then compare it with a postwar census, and work out the why and wherefore of it and so on. I have accurate data at my disposal. Total net losses in the Armed Forces came to 8,668,400 people. A colossal figure, of course.

[Voloshin] Colossal.

[Yazov] But some people say that the Army lost 20 million, while the Germans supposedly lost 1.5 million. Nothing of the kind. The Germans, and the satellite countries which fought alongside the Germans against our Armed Forces, lost more than 7.5 million people.

How many losses the Soviet people suffered as a whole is a different matter. A great many were driven—driven in the fullest sense of the word—away to Germany, and were incinerated in the ovens of Oswiecim [Auschwitz] and other camps. Counting all this up is not so easy. It is difficult. It seems to me, however, that it is nevertheless possible. This clearly includes those who died and those who did not return from among those driven away. We know that of these people, 1,783,000 people did not return. It is clearly dangerous to play with these figures, and some people attempt to manipulate these figures in order to diminish the greatness of our victory to some degree. We were not victorious, but piled up the bodies, they say. That is not true.

[Voloshin] Well, Dmitriy Timofeyevich, in fact attacks on our social system and on the party are now being heard. To be specific, the second part of the 1 May demonstration in Red Square provides evidence of this. Yet at the same time, in that war it was in fact our socialist system which was victorious, over an international reaction of tremendous strength. What then are the roots of our victory?

[Yazov] I would like to answer that question in this way: Above all, it was the immense potential and the decisive socioeconomic and political superiorities of socialism. And in the five-year plan preceding the war we really did lay the kind of foundations for industry which allowed us to produce more military output, meaning weapons, than fascist Germany, even though the whole of Europe was working for fascist Germany.

Look. The Germans got to Moscow, and then to the Volga in 1942. Almost all industry was evacuated from the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Leningrad to the Urals, and beyond the Urals to Siberia. Out of the just over 8 million tonnes of steel which we produced in 1942, we made more military products than the whole of fascist Germany.

So our social system, our state system, and the people led by the Communist Party were able to stand their ground. But to do this, people had to be patriots, they really had to be patriots.

We are not saying that everything was fine before the war. There were repressions, the Armed Forces were decapitated—over 40,000 command personnel were either exterminated or were in prison as a result of repressions. A certain proportion then returned during the war years. Recently we were discussing the outline for the first volume of the 10-volume work: "The Great Patriotic War." So many people proposed that this, that, and the other should be shown. All right then, let us show it. But at the same time that we are showing the bad things—the truth—we must show the other truth, too:

how patriotic the people were, how devoted the people were. If we do not put this into the first volume, how will we show the roots of our victory in volume 10? After all, we did win. So how did we win? Through what did we win, and bear our banner through the countries of East and southeastern Europe?

Above all, we won because we were really able both to create the material basis for warfare, and to create the moral basis for warfare. Of course there was all that in the war years, and there was Stalin's command: not one step backwards. There were cases where cowards and panic-mongers were shot. How could it be otherwise?

But the main thing is that we did finish the war in Berlin. Those days in May came and our flag of victory was hoisted. Germany capitulated, and the act of unconditional—unconditional—surrender was signed. No one had to start talks with us, the victors.

[Voloshin] Dmitriy Timofeyevich, you were talking about those who were killed, about how millions of Soviet servicemen laid down their lives for the liberation of our peoples. But now in a number of regions of our country, in particular in the Baltic region, one hears our servicemen cynically being called occupiers. Attempts are being made to stop the spring call-up. How can you comment on these points?

[Yazov] You are right to raise this question. You understand the situation that came about. In 1939 troops were brought in. In 1940 the Baltic Republics—by the will of the people incidentally—joined the composition of the Soviet Union. The war started in 1941. Many of the inhabitants of the Baltic Republics fought on the side of the Germans. When the Baltic Republics—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—were being liberated, we lost 257,000 men. And now, when nationalists and extremists—and there are such forces in the Baltic Republics—try to assert that we occupied the Baltic region, this does not fit the facts. We were greeted with flowers. They were waiting for us.

But at the same time, divisions and regiments had been formed by the Germans from people living in the Baltics, Estonians fought against the Estonian Corps, Latvians fought against the Latvian Division, Lithuanians fought against the Lithuanian Division. They were finally captured in the area of Melnik, which is near Prague, together with Vlasov's men at the end of the war.

And now they are trying to pass off these people, who made war against the Soviet people, including the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peoples, as heroes. They want to open memorials to them, and they are opening them in some places. They are rehabilitating them. History will put everything in its place. And here the truth, when all is said and done, is on the side of the Soviet people—our Army there is not an army of occupation.

[Voloshin] Today mankind does not want a repetition of that war, which was a terrible one, to put it plainly, or for our children and our children's children to experience war, and this depends upon our defense potential. Today the reality is that allocations to our country's defense are being reduced. A unilateral reduction of the Armed Forces is in progress. Troops are being withdrawn from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. And there are a number of other problems: a deterioration in interethnic relations and anti-army propaganda which now exists in our country. All this has an effect on the state of the Armed Forces.

[Yazov] Undoubtedly it has an effect. Everything that happens in the country, everything that happens among the common people, everything that happens to the people, is immediately reflected in the state of affairs in the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces are a fragment of the people. They are an attribute of the state apparatus which the people assign for their defense. Today he is a machine tool operator, a mechanic, a student. Tomorrow he is a soldier. He brings his previous training to army service.

Now regarding defense capability. We have changed—I consider it quite normal—to a defense doctrine. Indeed, we are not planning to attack anyone. We are not planning to conquer any territory. So why should we want any other doctrine? So, it is one of defense. Who can threaten us today?

Well, the NATO block can to some extent threaten us today, in view of the fact that we are withdrawing our troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary. We are reaching agreement on the withdrawal of some of our troops from the German Democratic Republic. Well, some leaders may form the illusion that the Soviet Union is losing its position, is losing forces. That is not the case. War is never waged only with the Armed Forces which exist in peacetime. In peacetime the Armed Forces are needed for the direct defense of the borders and, mainly, to teach the people. If there is a war it is the people together who will fight. That is our task, to train all the people to defend their fatherland.

Regarding the withdrawal of our troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 45 years have gone by. Well, we trust those people, don't we. They know how to organize their own lives. Therefore we are leaving, we are leaving voluntarily, of our own free will. We have reached an agreement on withdrawal. Our troops are now stationed on GDR territory but we are coming to an agreement on the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops alike.

In the end, we support the unification of Germany. Let the German people unite; that is their right. It is another matter as to where a united Germany will go—onto which side, so to speak. Our position is that it should be a neutral Germany. A treaty should be concluded and the i's should be dotted on the end of World War II. Proceeding from this, certain levels should be determined for both the number of people in the Armed Forces and the quantities of equipment and so on. But if a unified Germany becomes part of the NATO bloc, then this will, naturally, strengthen the NATO bloc, although representatives of the Western powers are inclined to think that a unified Germany should become part of the NATO bloc and then, so they say, the NATO bloc will maintain things and settle things, and so on. But the NATO bloc was created against the Warsaw Pact, against the Soviet Union.

But, having modern-day Armed Forces does not at all mean that they need to be boundlessly immense. We have made the decision to reduce our Armed Forces by 500,000 men and we are carrying out our obligation. We are participating in the Vienna talks and, evidently, will sign a treaty on the significant reduction of armed forces in the European area in the very near future. I think that there is no threat for our state today. And most importantly, we hold, in the final analysis, such strategic nuclear weapons that it is unlikely that anyone will dare or attempt to unleash any kind of conflict. Just imagine starting a war with modern-day weapons? In Europe alone there are 250 nuclear power stations.

[Voloshin] Yes.

[Yazov] And now conventional weapons can do all kinds of things as well. There are thousands of chemical factories, hundreds of atomic power stations. And the destruction of a power station with conventional weapons would result in a repeat of Chernobyl.

[Voloshin] On television we receive many letters from servicemen about getting set up for jobs, housing problems, and so on. Of course, the Ministry of Defense is not able to tackle all these tasks?

[Yazov] In accordance with instructions from President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, we have for three months been working on a social security program for servicemen. This program has been completed in all respects and has been coordinated with the Ministry of Finance and Gosplan and with all other ministries on which the implementation of the program depends. Now it is being examined by the Soviet Government. In order for the social security program to be implemented—and above all this means housing—R3.5 billion will be allocated, specially assigned for the construction of housing for servicemen. But in the main, we will be building it ourselves. Local bodies will help, but we will be doing much of it ourselves.

The Soviet Government is taking all measures to ensure that, as you say, the life of veterans is really made easier. Pensions will be increased. Pension support will be, so to speak, constantly regulated depending on possible inflation. I have signed a command lifting restrictions from a large number of servicemen, who were demobilized at one time and for various reasons did not receive a pension, a full pension. Today and in subsequent months they will receive full pension support.

I would like to wish everyone good health, personal and family happiness, prosperity, success in carrying out those tasks which they have been given by society, the party and government. I would like this celebration of the 45th anniversary to be a celebration for the whole Soviet people, and a day for the particular consolidation of all members of our society, including all nationalities. We must all live in peace and friendship. Only a united family can ensure both the security of the country and success in tackling any task. And I mean the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a united family. We cannot allow disintegration today. We do not have the right. And every Soviet person must be responsible for this.

I also hope that those veterans who have celebrated the 45th anniversary of Victory Day can also meet at the 50th anniversary. And I am certain that many will go on to live until the 50th anniversary of Victory Day. And I would like, by the 50th anniversary, to see our Soviet Union solid, united, and even stronger and more authoritative amidst all the states and peoples of the world.

Yazov Letter of Thanks for Congratulations

*PM0905140190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
9 May 90 Second Edition p 7*

[D. Yazov message: "To the PRAVDA Editorial Office"]

[Text] I ask you to express through your newspaper my cordial gratitude to troop and labor collectives, public organizations, creative unions, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, labor, and the Soviet Armed Forces, working people, and servicemen—everyone who has sent me their congratulations on my being awarded the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union.
D. Yazov.

International War Veterans' Rally Opens in Moscow

*LD1005101490 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT
10 May 90*

[Text] Moscow May 10 TASS—A two-day international rally of veterans of the Second World War and members of the antifascist liberation movements, devoted to the 45th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, opened in Moscow today.

War veterans, guerrillas, resistance fighters, former prisoners of war and inmates of Nazi concentration camps are attending the rally from 35 countries at the invitation of the USSR War and Labour Veterans Council and the Soviet War Veterans Committee. They represent four international organisations of war veterans and resistance fighters, five international committees of former inmates of Nazi concentration camps and 52 national war and labour veterans organisations.

The rally will hear reports about international efforts for peace and disarmament, for mutual understanding and cooperation.

Lushev Outlines World War II Losses

LD0705131990 Moscow TASS International Service in German 1115 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 May (TASS)—The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union against fascist Germany contained eight campaigns—two defensive, and six offensive—as well as hundreds of operations of various scales, said Army General Petr Lushev, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member-states, in an interview with a TASS correspondent.

By the end of the war, the growing might of the socialist economy enabled the Soviet Union to produce twice as many arms and combat equipment and of a much better quality than fascist Germany. Overall during the war, our industry produced 102,800 tanks, 825,200 guns and mortars, and 134,100 aircraft. More than 10 million tonnes of ammunition and 16 million tonnes of fuel were produced, almost three times as much as Germany produced together with the countries it occupied.

It must be stated openly that the combat activities of the U.S., French, and British troops considerably accelerated the total rout of fascist Germany. During these days of our all-national holiday, we give what is due to the heroic efforts of the allies. However, the decisive contribution to the victorious conclusion not just of the Great Patriotic War, but also of all World War II was made by the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces, the general stated. More than 70 percent of all the forces of the fascist bloc were annihilated on the Soviet-German front.

The true extent of our losses was concealed or distorted for a long time, Petr Lushev stated. In 1946, Stalin stated our losses to be 7 million. Some time later, Voznesenskiy doubled that figure and added another million. Then Khrushchev published the figure as 20 million. However, all these figures were based on highly dubious assessments.

Only today, as a result of serious analysis, can we affirm that the overall losses by the USSR during the war were 27-28 million people. Of these, combat losses—the Far East campaign included—(killed, died as a result of wounds, or failed to return from captivity) amounted to 8.666 million. Eighteen million people were lost as a result of injuries, shell shock, and disease.

The enemies' losses were as follows: Germany—5.5 million people, its allies—1.2 million people. However, it must be taken into consideration here that a large proportion of our losses were incurred during the first period of the war, when we were fighting in exceptionally complex and unfavorable conditions, face-to-face against a superior enemy. In subsequent periods and particularly in the concluding battles of the war, Germany and its satellites incurred even greater losses than we did.

However, the losses we incurred in no way diminish our victory. On the contrary, the indicate the unparalleled courage and heroism of the Soviet people and their Army. In conditions of a most cruel war, the like of which mankind had never known throughout history, they secured the complete routing of a strong and cruel enemy.

Military Commander Rejects Critics of WWII Losses

LD0905104890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 9 May 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Today is Victory Day. Our correspondent Tatyana Chemodanova has invited to the microphone Army General Ivan Moiseyevich Tretyak, commander in chief of the air Defense forces, USSR deputy defense minister and Hero of the Soviet Union.

[Begin recording] [passage omitted: Chemodanova asks Tretyak how he remembers 9 May 1945, Tretyak reminisces]

[Chemodanova] Ivan Moiseyevich, how do you regard the fact that a reevaluation of the contributions toward victory by various historical personalities is now underway?

[Tretyak] I regard this as right. It is a natural process, but I would like this reevaluation to be objective and the final one. Naturally there were times when we, frontline soldiers, did not ourselves even understand why, suddenly Malaya Zemlya became the decisive section where we achieved victory. The remarkable commander Marshal Zhukov—suddenly after the war we ceased to remember his name—I would like us to evaluate this period correctly, objectively, and allow individual people, whatever posts or positions they occupied, to evaluate those events as they please.

[Chemodanova] these days the opinion is current that the Great Patriotic War could have been won with fewer losses and less blood.

[Tretyak] The proverb says, and not in vain: Everyone thinks himself to be a strategist when viewing the battle from the sidelines. I will say more. One or another battle was won, but the units which bore significant losses were seen by the higher chiefs in a completely different manner. It seems that these commanders should be recommended for decorations for carrying out their combat tasks. Alas, there was a harsh investigation into combat operations and things went as far as the dismissal of individual commanders from their duties for large and senseless losses. For this reason, those comrades who evaluate things in this way.... [changes thought] I think this is a big mistake. In 1943, 1944 when we had few people, we were very careful with each soldier and looked after them as well as we could. For this reason we tried to attack more at night when there were fewer losses. And so this is how it turned out: We took care of people, we were punished for losses, and now some people are accusing us of excessive losses. [passage omitted on Tretyak saying he likes this to be a victory day to remember]

Marshal Ogarkov Comments on Victory Ideals

PM0905131190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 6 May 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union N.V. Ogarkov, by N. Ananchenko; date and place not given: "True to the Ideals of Victory"]

[Text] [Ananchenko] First, Nikolay Vasilyevich, allow me to congratulate you and all veterans on your coming Victory Day holiday.

[Ogarkov] Thank you. But I think this holiday is not just for people of my generation—the war left its mark on virtually every family, and the memory of it is alive among old people and their children and grandchildren alike. Although, unfortunately, some people have become indifferent through forgetfulness—that too is a reality to which we must not be blind.

[Ananchenko] The attitude toward holidays and jubilees has been markedly changing of late. This May Day holiday was celebrated in a new way. Do you sense such changes in the preparation for Victory Day?

[Ogarkov] Yes, of course. Let me make it clear straightaway that false pomp and circumstance is being done away with—that is only to the good, and we veterans welcome this. And the feelings, words, and attitude toward this sacred holiday should be sincere rather than mere duty. However, when speaking about the different sociopolitical situation in which we mark the 45th anniversary, one cannot really ignore the fact that while, on the one hand, people are better informed about the last war, on the other hand there are quite a few instances of forgetfulness, cynical disdain for the history of the Great Patriotic War, and distorted interpretation of it. There are well-known examples when former SS troopers and fascist stooges have been extolled while liberators have been called "occupiers," museums closed down, and frontline veterans disparaged.

Some historians and writers today—in this age of glasnost—prefer to specialize merely in describing the negative facets of our prewar and wartime history, and even of our victory, and seek every opportunity to demean and denigrate it. Yes, our history has had its defects, but should we repeatedly dig up just the defects and mistakes? Stalinist distortions cannot be identified with the essence of socialism, they cannot nullify the genuine achievements of that historic time and everything that was won and achieved through suffering. The scale of the sheer courage, self-sacrifice, and heroism displayed by Soviet people in those years is incomparably greater than the Stalinist distortions. However, this is stubbornly ignored for some reason, and those who speak honestly about it are dubbed Stalinists.

All this is naturally a cause of worry and alarm to veterans. They cannot be impartial observers of the events and the negative phenomena taking place in our country and in neighboring countries. Veterans have stayed loyal through many years of severe trials to the Leninist ideas of October, the ideas of socialism, and the Soviet people's revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions, and cannot remain impassive when these values and ideals are subject to unwarranted attack and deliberate denigration. They steadfastly uphold and defend our socialist choice in supporting perestroyka.

[Ananchenko] May 9 is a national holiday. But, for each of those who fought and those who forged victory in the rear, it is a deeply personal one. You, I know, were in the war from the very first to the very last day. How did you feel on that first and last day of the war?

[Ogarkov] At dawn on 22 June 1941 I was awoken by the roar of aircraft and the explosion of shells. That was on our western border, in the region of Belostok, in a fortified area under construction, where I was posted as a young tyro officer after graduation from the Military Engineering Academy. War was already ablaze in the world at that time, and we had in general terms foreseen the possibility of aggression. That is precisely why we were creating new fortified areas on our western borders. However, the treacherous attack by the fascists on the USSR did come as a surprise for my comrades and me, who were stationed 3-5 km from the state border that day, seeing that just a week before the attack TASS had publicly issued that ignominious statement to the world on the commitment of the USSR and Germany to the treaties they had concluded. Even on the night of 21-22 June trains had crossed the border carrying grain to Germany.

That is how the war started for me, a military engineer. And I saw 9 May 1945 in a military hospital in Hungary, where I was recovering from wounds. I was already divisional engineer in a rifle division and had taken part in defensive and offensive engagements in the polar regions and in the Budapest, Balaton, and Vienna operations.

[Ananchenko] Nikolay Vasilyevich, I should like to know your opinion on certain contentious issues which, no matter how much is written about them, continue to agitate our readers. There are, for example, quite a few articles, including some by academic historians, claiming that the factor of surprise was fabricated to justify our miscalculations and mistakes in preparing the troops.

[Ogarkov] I am aware of such articles and consider them unscrupulous. Yes, it has been established that Stalin and his entourage did have at their disposal information concerning the possibility of an attack upon the USSR by fascist Germany, actual times were even given. But it was, after all, the troops who had to repel the invasion, not Stalin, and they did not know about this and were essentially disoriented. Moreover, commanders were even accused of panicking when they displayed initiative and brought frontline troops into combat readiness.

You do not have to be a military specialist to appreciate the utter tragedy of the state of the troops in our western border districts caught out by the surprise Hitlerite attack. I felt this on my own account. So we should not abuse our troops and their commanders, who, despite heavy losses, offered fierce resistance to the enemy from the very first days and thwarted Hitler's Blitzkrieg plan in 1941; we should not be ashamed of that period but should rather pay humble tribute to them and their radiant memory. I do not know about others, but academic historians should understand this well. However, some of them do not want this, they clearly have a different objective. But it is futile to falsify history.

[Ananchenko] One hears it said that the taking of Berlin and the end of the war with Germany could have been achieved earlier, roughly in February 1945, and that the conduct of the special Berlin operation by three fronts in April could have been avoided. How do you regard such an opinion?

[Ogarkov] It is not new, and was first heard shortly after the victory. Already at that time these claims were described as erroneous and the result of a superficial, shalow assessment of the situation prevailing in the Berlin area. After all, at the beginning of February the troops of the First Belorussian Front carried out the Vistula-Oder operation jointly with the Ukrainian Front and, during three weeks of continuous fighting, drove a sharp wedge into the enemy's defense to a depth of 500 km. Several enemy groupings remained in their rear, surrounded but as yet uncrushed. Moreover, the amount of arms and equipment available to the troops had fallen sharply—the effects of losses sustained were felt, supplies of material resources were coming to an end, communications were stretched, and the rear had begun to falter. The dirt airstrips seized from the enemy were in a state of disrepair, and air support for troops had fallen off. The flanks were exposed. Had our troops rushed to Berlin in this difficult situation, there could have been a worse catastrophe than in Kharkov (1942). Marshal Zhukov should not therefore be reproached, he does not deserve it. Although I do think that the impugning of his good name is no accident. All this forms part of a single campaign aimed at denigrating our military history and belittling the role of the great victory.

[Ananchenko] When speaking about remembrance today, one cannot avoid another closely related problem, that of memorials. There are cases where they have simply been removed like, for example, the tanks which first burst into cities to liberate them from the fascists. The fate of certain memorials which were erected by nationwide decision is unknown. How do you regard this situation?

[Ogarkov] I regard it as abnormal. A monument is a symbol, it enshrines a moral value and, if you wish, serves as a memorial to the fallen and a mark of the people's respect to heroes still living. First a hand is raised against a memorial, then against the graves of servicemen.... All this stems from deafness of the spirit, forgetfulness, and people beginning to worship other gods, imported frippery, for example. This is done deliberately in a number of cases.

We veterans feel bitter and very aggrieved that the resolution adopted on erecting a memorial to Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov has been held up for years in the corridors of departmental bureaucracy. Although, why the delay, one might well ask. And the situation regarding the erection of the Victory Monument on Moscow's Poklonnaya Hill is quite incomprehensible. I personally was unable to contain my indignation when I read the latest decision by the competion jury and the interview with its chairman. What impotence and lack of principle. You get the impression that this is clearly no accident and that there are certain forces which seek to prevent the erection of such a memorial, limiting themselves just to the building of a museum on Poklonnaya Hill. That would be, I think, insulting to war veterans and Soviet people who have freely donated millions of rubles to the Victory Monument's construction.

The posture of noninterference adopted by the country's leadership in this question is also surprising. Or will we show our traditional tardiness here too?

[Ananchenko] Our newspaper recently carried an article from Chita about a veteran who had died without ever getting his own well-appointed apartment. Unfortunately, cases of callous disregard of frontline veterans are numerous....

[Ogarkov] That is true. And yet the attitude toward veterans is one indicator of the level of a society's civilization, of its moral health and strength if you wish.

The country is showing concern for them, and the latest example is the USSR Council of Ministers 45th victory anniversary resolution which provides for an increase in pensions and other benefits as of 1 October, with some benefits available as early as 1 July. Moreover, republic and local soviets are required to make greater use of their opportunities to improve the lives of war veterans and workers in the rear services. What is more, the new Law on Pensions, which will improve the material position of essentially all pensioners, has appeared; despite this, however, quite a few veterans will still remain below the poverty line.

Much is being done at local level too, for example in Belorussia and Kazakhstan. It is envisaged that there be mandatory representation of veterans in those republics' supreme soviets. N.A. Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], issued a decree this April on extra benefits for disabled veterans and other veterans of the Great Partiotic War, internationalist servicemen, and the families of dead servicemen. Minsk recently opened an excellently equipped republic House of Veterans. I should like to note the good attitude toward veterans at Moscow's Likhachev Motor Vehicles Plant, the Minsk auto plant, and a number of other industrial enterprises, on kolhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms], and in other organizations in Kiev, Tbilisi, and Cheboksary, in Penza, Vinnitsa, Ulyanovsk, and Kirov Oblasts, in Khabarovsk Kray, the Tatar ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], and elsewhere.

At the same time I am far from having a cheerful assessment of the state of affairs. Yes, a number of quite good decisions on care for pensioners, particularly former frontline soldiers, have been adopted recently. But, unfortunately, they are often not implemented. More than half a million frontline veterans, including 130,000 war invalids, are waiting for improved housing conditions. Medical services for veterans, including disabled veterans, are extremely unsatisfactory. There are 1.2 million people in the country who sacrificed their health defending the homeland. There are too few hospitals for them, and the bulk of those that do exist are located in old, converted buildings. There is also a great need for residential homes. But only 40-50 percent of the hospital and residential home construction plans are fulfilled each year. The position of veterans has become increasing difficult of late because of the uncontrolled increase in prices and disappearance of inexpensive goods. It is a good thing that at last, starting 1 October 1990, the wages ceiling for working frontline veterans is being abolished. But it is clearly time to abolish these ceilings for all working pensioners.

I think therefore that there is now a crying need to have a comprehensive state program to deal with the problems of veterans and elderly people and their social welfare. It would also be expedient to set up committees to look after the affairs of veterans and invalids in republic supreme soviets, as has been done in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Veterans are not spongers. They have earned the right to a comfortable life and to be regarded normally by society. And those who triumphed over fascism have earned this right twice over—by virtue of their military and civilian labor.

I would like to conclude by saying this. There is a need today, perhaps greater than ever before, to tap to the full the ideological and moral potential of our victory in order to further perestroyka and unite our society. A need to regard our great victory not simply as an historical fact but as the repository of priceless traditions and lofty human qualities which made us strong during the travails of the war years and helped us conquer the enemy. We do possess such wealth, after all, and it is necessary to manage it with wisdom, care, and solicitude.

Defense Minister Stresses Role of Veterans

90UM0561A Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 19 7-13 May 90 pp 2-3

[Report on interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union D.T. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense and candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by the editorial staff of the weekly journal VETERAN; date and place not specified: "To Serve the People with Honor"]

[Text][VETERAN] Dmitryy Timofeyevich, you took part in the Great Patriotic War and commanded infantry subunits at the battle front. Naturally, a lot of things have touched your heart, and you have experienced and endured a lot. One must assume that impressions of the battle front, ideas, assessments, and conclusions have fixed themselves firmly in your memory. Which of them are especially significant and dear to you and have retained their meaning for our difficult days of perestroyka and for the renewal processes in the army and navy?

[Yazov] Everything is especially memorable to me that is associated with combat comrades—officers and soldiers—with whom I had occasion to perform battle front duty and to share sorrow and happiness. One and the other were in the frontline area. Can I really forget my first bitter loss, the death of Kostya Solovyev, a countryman from my native area and a classmate in the Moscow Infantry School imeni RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Soviet Republic] Supreme Soviet? I remember vividly that we arrived together as still rather "green" lieutenants in 1942 at the 483d Rifle Regiment on the Volkhov front, but he soon died.... And my first subordinates, a majority of whom were twice and even three times older than I, an 18-year-old. To this day I am grateful to them with all of my heart for the help they gave me in mastering the science of command. They were in my first platoon, and afterwards in the company and in the hospital where I ended up after being wounded—inhabitants of Siberia and the Urals, Leningrad and Moscow, and representatives of the Ukraine, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus and the Baltics. Good soldiers, loyal comrades, and reliable friends.

[VETERAN] At the front, hundreds and thousands of combat soldiers, commanders, and political officers passed before your eyes. You saw them under various, and at times dramatic, conditions of combat and campaign life. What did you as a commander value the most in people and what did you disapprove of?

[Yazov] You know, the frontline very quickly set people apart, showing who is who. Everything that was superficial and showy was stripped off, like a husk, and a person's substance was revealed. And if you are talking about what was especially valued in people, I would name reliability. This is a kind of synthesis of combat and professional skill and moral cleanliness and orderliness. You will agree that there is nothing worse than a windbag, even a highly trained one. As Lenin once very accurately observed, a person whose convictions are not deeper than the end of his tongue cannot be reliable.

I think that the frontline criterion of the value of a person—reliability—is completely applicable and, moreover, vitally essential today. Perestroyka with its worsening problems and difficult practical tasks inevitably will expose those with large gaps between words and deeds and who change their views like gloves. Such turncoats may deceive the people for some time with the help of loud phrases, "bold" denunciations, and demagogic appeals; life, nonetheless, will bare their true essence.

[VETERAN] Much has been said and written about the nature of our mass heroism and its sources. But the thesis of heroism is a subject of active discussion as previously. In this, many points of view are expressed. It is sometimes asserted that those who became heroes at the front were of a reckless nature and had difficult pasts. They took risks fearlessly, without which real combat success is impossible. However, people with a humble, quiet, and calm character rarely became heroes. What is your view on this question, which has important significance for the educational work of veterans with young people?

[Yazov] Heroism is multifaceted. It is most frequently identified with deeds performed in emergency situations. And this is true. But it is also true that heroism exists in daily selfless work. Of course, a desperate or even-tempered character and a difficult or a happy past have some kind of meaning, but it is by no means definitive. During the war, I had occasion to see a lot of real heroes who were not noticeable in everyday life, but, as the saying goes, "still waters run deep." And, on the contrary, sharp, young soldiers who proved themselves in every way in skirmishes with the enemy and had a devil-may-care attitude at times lost their heads in battle. I had Sergeant Semeykin, a sniper, in my company: He was sluggish, silent, and seemingly even indecisive. But he was literally transformed in combat—self-disciplined, composed, and skilled, and he fought the enemy according to all of the rules of the soldier's art. Last year, on the eve of Victory Day, Vladimir Nikolayevich Semeykin, together with other regimental colleagues from our company—former sergeants A.S. Smirnov, S.G. Galikeyev, and A.S. Perepechayev—were my guests. All of them are straightforward, modest workers of the last war, real heroes.

The experience of the Great Patriotic War convincingly confirmed that the sources of heroism are devotion to military duty and to combat mastery, combined with a deep realization of one's personal responsibility for the fate of the motherland. It is this that is the "secret" of the mass heroism of the Soviet soldiers—a phenomenon that was born in Great October and which became one of the most remarkable traditions of our armed forces.

[VETERAN] Our armed forces have a glorious combat past. Their achievement in the last war was great. Then, in May of 1945, it seemed to everyone that our gratitude to the army and navy for the defeat of fascism would be eternal and unsurpassing. But after several decades have passed, there are people—not just a few—who are trying to cast a shadow on the armed forces and their achievement in the war. This is the kind of reasoning that is the vogue among them: We achieved victory at too dear a price; the military cadres, especially in the beginning period of the war, displayed their incompetence in organization and combat leadership, operations, and battle; our military equipment was in many ways inferior in its tactical and technical characteristics to that of the enemy, etc. How do you assess these judgments?

[Yazov] From time immemorial, love of the army and a solicitous respect for its combat traditions served as a mark of the health of the nation. By its heroic feat in the Great Patriotic War, as in all of its history, the Soviet Armed Forces earned the gratitude of the people not only of our country, but of all mankind. I think that this gratitude, contrary to the attempts to denigrate our army and its contribution to victory, will live in the hearts of generations forever.

Yes, there is no shortage today of critical barbs directed apparently at the exposure of negative phenomena and vices of our past, including military ones, but, in actual fact, they frequently have as their purpose to present this past in an exclusively black light, to shatter and damage the patriotic consciousness of the Soviet people, and to deprive them of their totally legitimate pride for the post-October achievements, which, unquestionably, are of a historical world scale. Such is also the scale of our victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Of course, no special prowess is needed to exaggerate the errors of leadership at various ranks, extrapolating from the situation of that time, accusing military cadres of "not making the right" decisions, finding fault after the fact with those who not only for the first time from the start of the Second World War stopped and turned back an enemy that possessed hitherto unknown power, but afterwards also defeated it utterly. One wonders at times what there is more of in such statements—incompetence, pseudo-scientific ambitions, or cynicism. When you listen to them it is as if there were no battles of unparalleled scale at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Kursk, on the Dnieper, and in Belorussia, and during the liberation of Prague and the assault on Berlin—battles in which the Soviet troops conducted brilliant operations that became outstanding achievements of military art. As if there were no "katyushas" [rocket launchers], 34's [tanks], and "Il's" [aircraft] that were made entirely by the labor and talent of Soviet designers, engineers, and workers on native weapons and equipment, whose superiority even the enemy was forced to admit. With irresponsible thoughtlessness, they are manipulating millions of figures on losses, substituting solid evidence with speculative and, nonetheless, categorical conclusions. For what reason? Judging by everything, in order to belittle and to debunk our victory by offending those out of hand who fought and gave their life for it.

Naturally, judgments like this that are mixed up with half-truths or are intended to focus attention exclusively on negative phenomena and facts must be given a fundamental political evaluation and, of course, an aggressive and reasoned rebuff.

[VETERAN] The participants in the war know—and not from stories—about the spiritual closeness and mutual understanding between combat soldiers and commanders at the frontline. This was as straightforward and natural a matter as life itself. Why was such a thing possible in the most difficult and complicated situations? And why do we today encounter cases of alienation of some commanders and chiefs from their own subordinates, from the personnel?

[Yazov] Yes, spiritual closeness and mutual understanding between commanders and subordinates, officers and soldiers, is, if you will, at the heart of military service in general, but in combat it is the decisive guarantee of success. The officer is a key figure in the army. To the soldiers and sergeants he is the teacher and the senior comrade, a person to whom they entrust their fate and life itself. It is a feeling—a sense of responsibility for one's subordinates—I learned this with piercing sharpness in my very first battle. I think that a similar feeling can only be that of a father for his sons. That is why, in my opinion, there is no exaggeration in the formula: The commander is the father to the soldier. This is so even if the officer could be young enough to be the son of a subordinate, which happened frequently at the front. It is a case of being responsible for the soldier, being concerned about him as a duty, and making correct decisions and putting them into practice.

In my opinion, the spiritual closeness of officers and soldiers is one of the decisive sources of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. It is the distinguishing feature of the Soviet Armed Forces as a socialist army. Today's isolation of some commanders from subordinates, and officers from soldiers, is an unnatural phenomenon. And that it has become a fact in some places, in my opinion, is a consequence of serious dereliction first of all in our military schools, and in the education and training of personnel. But, on a broader scale, it is a consequence of the serious distortions that occurred during the stagnation in the system of attitudes and values in society and the Armed Forces as its integral part. As a result of such distortions, it has frequently turned out that service promotions and the personal welfare of an officer depended not on his professional skills, the most important component of which was precisely the ability to gain the absolute confidence and respect of subordinates, and complete understanding with them, but on readiness and ability "to please" the command. From this comes the orientation toward window-dressing, and a statistical approach to evaluating the training and discipline of personnel. This is also the source of complacency and even neglect toward the requests, needs, and interests of subordinates.

The perestroyka of the armed forces, the democratization of military life, and the broadening of glasnost place a reliable barrier against negative phenomena. The important reference points for us are quality in the construction and training of the army and navy, the renewal and development of the best traditions of the officer corps, and the firm establishment of the social protection of servicemen. And this is the way to a qualitatively new status of the armed forces.

[VETERAN] Frontline soldiers unanimously remark that they previously never encountered manifestations of non-regulation treatment, the so-called "dedovshchina" [mistreatment and abuse of conscripts], in units and on ships. On the contrary, they emphasize with what attention and warmth battle-hardened and experienced soldiers brought the young soldiers into the ranks. Unfortunately, now the situation has changed. How do you explain the existence of non-regulation treatment and the tenacity of this evil, and the difficulties in the fight against it?

[Yazov] It is really an evil. It, like rust, corrodes the moral pillars of military service and permanent values tested in combat—collectivism, comradeship, and mutual help. "Dedovshchina" offends and oppresses the personality of a soldier, and it sharply constrains opportunities for the realization of the spiritual and professional potential of the soldier or sailor, and for the development of their capabilities, talents, creativity, and initiative. Do you recall Lenin's remarks that success in modern war is impossible without the resourceful and conscientious soldier and sailor? This is even truer in our day.

We regard the uprooting of "dedovshchina" as an urgent and top priority task. And it was possible to make definite progress—in comparison with 1987, for example, the number of cases of "dedovshchina" was cut by more than half. There are no gross occurrences of non-regulation treatment in the majority of subunits and units.

But you are right that this evil has proven to be tenacious. In order to eliminate this evil entirely, it is necessary to do away with the causes that engender it. And they are by no means always rooted in the army, but they are connected with negative phenomena and processes in society and with serious problems in the education of the rising generation in the family, the school, and in work collectives. Unfortunately, recently a greater and greater proportion of the young generation coming into the army and the navy, frankly, is not only poorly prepared in a moral-psychological and physical sense, but is "marked" by the corrupting influence of rally demagogy and extremist nationalist forces in informal organizations. It is not accidental that "dedovshchina" today frequently takes on a national coloration. The fight against it is also substantially complicated by the profiteering of a number of informal organizations of the Baltic republics (including anticonstitutional legislative acts by local authorities), and also of the Transcaucasus and Moldavia, that are striving to conceal their far-ranging plans for establishing national formations and even armies with references to the necessity "to defend" conscripts against "dedovshchina" and to ensure that they perform their active military service within the boundaries "of their own republics." Unfortunately, the matter is also not helped by the statements of a number of organs of the mass media which circulate frequently unverified and even false pictures of "dedovshchina." They are aggressively exploited by certain forces in anti-army propaganda and in the formation of distorted impressions about military service among draft-age youth. In this way, "the effect of repeated" nonregulation treatment is created.

[VETERAN] Our armed forces always enjoyed the great love of the people, and the youth went into service with the army and navy with a sense of pride and responsibility. Now we hear about "refuseniks" and about those who under various pretexts try to evade military service. Why has such a negative phenomenon emerged, causing bitterness and concern among our reader-veterans? What must be done, and what kind of work has to be conducted with youth in order to do away with this phenomenon in our life?

[Yazov] We just talked about some of the reasons for this unprecedented and previously unthinkable phenomenon in our country. Why is it that just several years back cases of draft-dodging were isolated occurrences, but last year there were more than 6,000 draft-age youth who took such an illegal step, which is a dishonor both for a citizen and a patriot?

I would add the following to what we have talked about. Evasion of military service, as analysis shows, is imposed on draft-age youth in a majority of cases with the help of incessant purposeful moral pressure and also coercion by extremist, nationalist, and separatist forces that take more and more open anti-Soviet positions. They persistently propagate a new "image of the enemy"—the image of the Soviet soldier and of the armed forces—as an army of "occupiers." An aspiration is concealed behind these attempts at any price to achieve their shady aims, which are blocked by the army as the bulwark of the socialist gains of the people and social stability, and the guarantor of the power and authority of our multinational motherland—the USSR.

Great damage to the defense consciousness of the people is caused at least by irresponsible statements to the effect that now the military threat to our country allegedly is absent. And at worst, it is said, the Soviet Union does not need the armed forces altogether and they can be cut "painlessly" at least by half.

It is absolutely obvious that this destructive stream cannot be countered successfully by silent disapproval or "private" conversations. This is a struggle, a struggle for the hearts and minds of our people, of our youth, and success can be achieved in it only through our active and aggressive efforts and through statements of principle in organs of the mass media, and only through tenacious and really militant work in labor collectives and with draft-age youth. In truth, an invaluable role here belongs to veterans of the Great Patriotic War and to the armed forces—the living bearers of Soviet military glory and traditions of devoted service to the socialist homeland.

[VETERAN] Do you keep in contact with the soviet of veterans of your own regiment and with your division? What do you see as the role of veterans' organizations and of the public in the heroic-patriotic and international education of youth?

[Yazov] Certainly, I keep in contact and visit my own regiment and division as often as possible. Unfortunately, this does not happen as often as I would like. I am able to meet sometimes with regimental and divisional colleagues in Moscow. I have very warm relations with many of them. I remember them all and am glad that the 45th victory anniversary will be celebrated in a ceremony by veterans V.K. Basov, O.N. Demishkan, I.Ya. Lyapunov, M.S. Naumov, Yu.K. Palagin, I.N. Pavleykov, B.S. Starantsov, A.F. Shorokhov, and others who are comrades and regimental and divisional colleagues.

The role of veterans' organizations is determined by the fact that a vital link of generations materializes in their work. The maintenance and strengthening of this link serves as a guarantee that the revolutionary, work, and combat traditions of our people and the armed forces will live in the affairs of all new generations of patriots and internationalists.

On this occasion, I cordially greet all veterans with the holiday.

Marshal Zhukov's Daughter on 1957 CPSU Decisions

LD0705094990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 7 May 90

[Interview with Ella G. Zhukova, Moscow Radio correspondent and daughter of Marshal Georgiy K. Zhukov, by unidentified correspondent; date and place of interview not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] On the eve of the 45th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War victory, the history of that war is being augmented by new documents and memoirs of eyewitnesses of those historic events. There is, of course, undoubted interest in the views of people who knew the heroes intimately. Listen to an interview with Ella Georgiyevna Zhukova, the daughter of Marshal Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov. She is one of our colleagues in fact, a radio correspondent.

[Zhukova] On the eve of the 45th anniversary of the victory, there is a lot of talk now about ways of perpetuating his memory and establishing a memorial and a museum. But in my personal view, before talking about memorials, we need to review the October 1957 CPSU Central Committee decision. I regard this as an unjust and insulting document. It contains a mass of groundless charges and insulting epithets, accusing him of Bonapartism, adventurism, and so on. He was removed by the leadership in power at the time, Khrushchev's leadership, from all his posts, and quite simply left in a kind of vacuum. He wrote several letters and appeals. He appealed personally to Khrushchev to be allocated new work. But he was always told: It is not expedient at the moment.

He was an unusually forthright and strong-willed person. I think this was the only reason why he managed to endure all these difficult trials and tribulations which befell him. He was a very capable and energetic person. He could not live without work, which he loved and devoted his life to. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] What is your attitude to those people who have written about their recollections of him?

[Zhukova] On the whole, I greatly appreciate these reminiscences because I was not by my father's side at that time. They have personally given me a very great deal. They have filled out my knowledge of his feats as a military commander, in other words the things about which I could not be expected to know. I have endless respect for these people who have tried to write down and preserve a good record of his life.

Nevertheless, from time to time completely fabricated things are written about him. I have something quite specific in mind—the first part of Karpov's book about Marshal Zhukov. Without checking his facts properly, Karpov published a denunciation of Marshal Yegorov which he blamed on my father. Expert analysis showed that it was in fact a forgery.

There are fewer and fewer people alive who knew my father intimately and who can go on writing about him. I should know. But these inventions still appear. When you read them, you think to yourself: Goodness, it was never like that.

[Correspondent] Well, thank you very much for your interesting account.

[Zhukova] Don't mention it.

Baltic Republics

Baltic Presidents Likely To Meet 12 May

AU1005135890 Paris AFP in English 1337 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Moscow, May 10 (AFP)—The presidents of the three Soviet Baltic republics are likely to meet in Tallinn, capital of Estonia, on Saturday, Baltic sources said on Thursday.

The three republics are Lithuania led by Vytautas Landsbergis, Latvia led by Anatolijs Gorbunov, and Estonia led by Arnold Ryuytel.

The meeting, called "on the initiative of the president of Estonia, will probably be held in Tallinn on Saturday, but it is not 100 per cent certain", the secretariat of the Lithuanian president in Vilnius said.

"The final decision will be taken on Friday evening," a source at the Latvian parliament told AFP by telephone.

When Latvia voted for independence on Friday, members of the Latvian parliament insisted on the need for political coordination between the three republics.

Baltics Establish Direct Agricultural Ties

LD1005101290 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT 10 May 90

[Text] Vilnius May 10 TASS—The agriculture ministries of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have reached agreement on direct mutual supplies of farm produce, raw and other materials for agriculture, bypassing federal organisations.

The agreement, which entered into effect today, provides that each of the three ministries must have permanent representatives in the other Baltic republics, who will perform the functions of "coordinators and assistants in joint efforts to resolve agricultural issues."

Latest Baltic Independence Moves Discussed

LD0805094290 Moscow World Service in English 0710 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] [Announcer] We start out with some of the latest developments in the Baltics. The almost two month long standoff between Moscow and Vilnius, capital of the breakaway republic of Lithuania, has now become further complicated. On Friday the parliament of Latvia endorsed a declaration of independence with an intermediate transition period, simultaneously abolishing some provisions of the USSR's Constitution on its territory. Dmitriy Linnik of our staff has been watching the developments.

[Linnik] Latvia has thus become the third and last Baltic republic to have unilaterally proclaimed independence as its goal. Lithuania's parliament declared immediate independence on 11th March and, having failed to convince the republic's legislature to rescind the declaration, Moscow, a month later, sharply curtailed subsidized supplies of certain goods to the republic. Estonia on 30th March took a more cautious course—its parliament voted for independence but qualified it by a transitional period and preserved the basic laws of the USSR in the republic. Moscow confined itself to a statement saying the declaration should be rescinded. Now Latvia's parliament with a two-thirds majority approved its declaration of independence, going farther than Estonia but stopping short of Lithuania's breakaway with Moscow.

[Announcer] So far as one can gather all republics want to gain their independence.

[Linnik] Yes, but I believe it's unrealistic to just discard the past 50 years during which the three republics have grown into the economic, political, and demographic texture of the USSR, and severing all those ties just like that would to my mind be clearly unwise.

[Announcer] Before and after taking the vote on its declaration, Latvia's parliamentarians said they wanted to avoid any confrontation with Moscow and intend to make the transition to independence gradual.

[Linnik] As a general rule, I don't see much logic in first taking a decision and then setting out to begin negotiations about it. Furthermore in the case of Lithuania we hear both President Landsbergis and Prime Minister Prunskiene soliciting support in the West.

[Announcer] But the West has not seemed very eager to throw its support behind the Lithuanian parliament's hasty decision.

[Linnik] In fact a number of Western leaders have advised Lithuania to hold its horses and also called on Moscow to enter into a dialogue.

[Announcer] Moscow's cuts in supplies to Lithuania have now been in effect for almost a month and the republic has stocks of gas and oil to last it until about the middle of the month.

[Linnik] Recently Moscow increased the supplies of gas to Lithuania from under 20 to 80 percent of the normal supplies, that's for May. It seems that even though several thousand workers in Lithuania have been laid off because of the measures, their effects have been more of a political nature rather than economic. There's a growing rift not only between pro-independence forces and those favoring membership in the USSR, but also between so-called diehard secessionists and those favoring a more realistic and balanced way of handling the problem.

[Announcer] Meanwhile news reports in some countries are bowed in phrases like this one: Lithuania is suffering through an economic embargo imposed by the Kremlin.

[Linnik] Well, the measures are certainly tough, and I personaly believe they should not have been, but on the other hand they shouldn't have been provoked by the over-zealous Lithuanian legislators.

Landsbergis Reports on Prunskiene Tour

LD1005120990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1039 GMT on 10 May, during its relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius, carries a 28-minute speech on the current political situation delivered by Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis. Discussing Premier Prunskiene's visit to Western capitals, he says that we will expect her return on Saturday evening, although on Saturday she intends to hold a press conference in Germany.

"This is a diplomatic journey of very great importance which, it seems, is very successful," he says. He goes on to mention the Western attitude that Gorbachev should be supported, and praises Prunskiene for her efforts in rebuffing Soviet propaganda.

Moscow TV on Vilnius Victory Day Celebrations

LD0905220190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 9 May 90

[A. Paulyus video report on Vilnius Victory Day celebrations; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Vilnius greeted today's victory celebrations in a difficult situation. [video shows an orderly crowd with banners walking along a street]

While those taking part in the military parade and the many-thousands-strong demonstration of the working people were gathering at one end of Gediminas Avenue, at the other, groups from the Freedom League and Geneva-47 had fixed a rendezvous for those taking part in actions directed, as leaflets distributed the day before put it, against the show of force by the occupiers. [video shows a young woman giving a flower to a soldier in an APC; a wall bearing the inscription "Red Army go home!" in English; men gathering in a square; troops in parade uniform with automatic rifles]

People in differing moods filled the sidewalks along the city's main thoroughfare. Never before, perhaps, during a victory celebration had servicemen and veterans here been presented with so many flowers or had them thrown beneath their feet; or had so many delighted cries and congratulations resounded in their honor as they did today. [video shows soldiers and veterans being given flowers]

But, on the other hand, they also heard offensive words and shouts. [video shows troops and civilians in a square; jeers and whistles can be heard]

Those taking part in the procession laid flowers at the grave of Army General Chernyakhovskiy [Soviet army commander, killed in the East Prussian operation in 1945—video shows flowers being laid at the foot of a statue]

At the Antakalnis memorial, not one of the hundreds of graves of men who fell in the battle for Vilnius was left, on this day, undecorated with flowers. [video shows guard on duty; crowd in a memorial complex; flowers being laid on a grave]

The people of Vilnius, both old and young, streamed endlessly toward the Eternal Flame. Poems and exhortations could be heard in Lithuanian, Russian and Polish: Be worthy of the memory of the fallen. [video shows graves, some with soldiers standing beside each one]

More on Celebrations

PM1005091190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 May 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Remembrance Day"]

[Text] Vilnius, 9 May—On the eve of the holiday an appeal to Lithuanian residents adopted by the Lithuanian parliament was read out on republic television. It stated that the victory in May 1945 brought neither peace nor victory to Lithuania, that there were long years ahead of the struggle against the Stalin regime. That is why the Supreme Soviet called on the republic's residents to remain home 9 May, relax at their dachas, and go on trips out of town so as not to prevent the soldiers from marching.

Despite this appeal from the republic's Supreme Soviet, thousands of Vilnius people and visitors to the Lithuanian capital bearing bouquets of flowers filled the city center streets before the parade of troops from the Vilnius Garrison began. After a minute or so, motorized riflemen, assault troops, and students at the military college marched sharply down Vilnius' central avenue to the accompaniment of a military band. People threw flowers at them and shouts of "glory to the Soviet Army!" and "glory to Soviet servicemen!" were heard.

Great Patriotic War veterans then marched down the avenue. Their scarlet ribbons and combat awards gave them a particularly ceremonial feel.

Once the parade was over Vilnius' citizens and visitors moved to the monument to Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Army General I.D. Chernyakhovskiy to lay wreaths.

A wreath-laying ceremony was then held at the Antakalnskiy Cemetery, where Soviet servicemen who fell in the battles to free Lithuania from the German fascist invaders are buried.

Television Editor on Biased Lithuanian Reporting

LD0905131490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1825 GMT 9 May 90

[Studio question and answer session with Yegor Yakovlev, editor in chief of MOSCOW NEWS; Aleksandr Bovin, IZVESTIYA political observer; and Eduard Sagalayev, editor-in-chief of Central Television's Main Information Department—from the "View" program]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Unidentified member of audience] Eduard Mikhailovich Sagalayev, in your opinion, is the biased showing of information on Lithuania, among other of our country's hot spots, due to your position or pressure from the leadership, or are there other reasons connected with this?

[Sagalayev] You know, the situation here is like this. A struggle is going on with varying degrees of success between tendentious points of view of the events in Lithuania and attempts to show the situation as it is. And, it seems to me that if you look closely at the "Vremya" program, then it is evident that, so to speak, today there is one point of view, tomorrow another; today, so to speak, a point of view corresponding with Moscow's, tomorrow it fluctuates in favor of Vilnius. And, in order to find some kind of landmark in this struggle, we are now sending two people to Lithuania and are trying to obtain various points of view on the events which are taking place there. Although, of course, the "Vremya" program—we should not make any secret of this—is the official information program of the Soviet Government... and the party, yes, yes, yes. Let us say of the leadership. But I would like this to be an information program which objectively reflects, so to speak, those events which are taking place in the country, for it to be the people's television. [video shows boy in the audience asking his question, Sagalayev facing the audience] [passage omitted]

Moscow Jewish Leader Meets With Landsbergis

LD0905131690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] The chairman, historian Michael Chlenov, of the Soviet Union's Jewish Organization, which has been recently set up in Moscow, has visited Vilnius. He has acquainted himself with the institutions of Lithuanian Jews and their problems.

Michael Chlenov was received by the chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, Vytautas Landsbergis; Vice Premier Romualdas Ozolas; and the chairman of the Vilnius city local administration board, Arunas Grumadas. Their meetings were attended by Emanuelis Zingeris, chairman of the Jewish Cultural Society in Lithuania and chairman of the foreign affairs commission of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

Yesterday Emanuelis Zingeris took part in the World Jewish Congress in West Berlin devoted to the anniversary of the victory of antifascist forces against Nazi Germany and to the problems of Germany's reunification. On his way Emanuelis Zingeris, together with other deputies of the Supreme Council, discussed in Warsaw measures to ease Lithuania's blockade. The delegation of the Supreme Council met Polish senators and members of the committees to assist Lithuania set up in Warsaw and Brussels.

Lithuania Seeking Contacts With Union Enterprises

LD0805141290 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 7 May 90

[Excerpts] As you've already heard in the news, the economic blockade of Lithuania is not easing. With no more hope that Moscow might be gracious enough to lift the blockade, direct or horizontal economic links between Lithuanian industrial enterprises and industrial centers in the Soviet Union are being sought. In the south Siberian city of Novokuznetsk a labor confederation was founded at the congress of the Soviet Union's independent workers movement early in May.

[Passage omitted]

Meanwhile, the biggest problem that might have stopped the intended horizontal links between Lithuania and the Soviet Union is the railways which are also blocked by Moscow. Each day only half the freight cars (?meant for) Lithuania reach it. For that reason, lorries are going to be used to deliver shipments to and from Lithuania.

[Passage omitted]

Supreme Council Issues Declaration on Holocaust

LD0805093390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0705 GMT 8 May 90

[Declaration submitted to the Lithuanian Supreme Council on the occasion of the capitulation of German fascism and the end of World War II in Europe—from the live relay]

[Text] On the genocide of the Jewish people in Lithuania during the Hitlerite occupation.

The Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania states on behalf of the Lithuanian people that it condemns the genocide against the Jewish people carried out in Lithuania during the Hitlerite occupation and sincerely regrets that there were also citizens of Lithuania among the henchmen serving the invaders. There can be no justification of crimes committed against the Jewish people in Lithuania and beyond its borders.

The deputies of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania appeal to all government bodies, public organizations, and citizens to create the most favorable conditions for Lithuania's Jews and other national communities to restore and develop cultural, educational, scientific, and other institutions. The Lithuanian state will build a monument to the memory of the victims of genocide of the Jewish nationality.

Prunskiene Sends Letter to Gorbachev on Strikes

90UN1567A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
6 Apr 90 p 1

[Letter to Moscow: "To Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] Dear Mikhail Sergeyevich.

As we have learned, on 3 April 1990 the leaders of the city's largest industrial enterprises were invited to the Vilnius gorkom [city committee] of the Lithuanian Communist Party (loyal to the platform of the CPSU) provisional Central Committee, where they were told about a warning strike organized by that gorkom for 6 April 1990 from 1000-1100 as a sign of protest against the rulings of the republic of Lithuania Supreme Council. It was proposed that the leaders of the enterprises assist in the execution of this action. The republic of Lithuania Council of Ministers expresses its concern at such actions by the party organizations of the CPSU in Lithuania. In our opinion they undermine the stability of the work of the enterprises, they hamper fulfillment of contractual obligations, and they incite interethnic hostility in the labor collectives. We ask you to take measures to stop the activities of the organizers of the strike.

With respect,
[Signed] K. Prunskiene, prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania.

Estonian Supreme Soviet Adopts Law on Symbols

PM0905115090 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 9 May 90 p 3

[Own correspondent S. Tarakanov report under the rubric "Stop Press!": "Estonia: Under a New Flag"]

[Text] Tallinn—The Estonian national tricolor was raised at noon over the Toompea Palace, where the Fifth Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Session is in progress. This symbolizes the recognition of the blue, black, and white flag as the state flag.

But this was not the only event to mark 8 May, a date which will presumably henceforth be an official holiday in the repbulic. The significance of the Supreme Soviet's adoption of the Law "On Estonia's Symbols" goes far beyond the bounds of that long-awaited event. It forms the legislative precondition for subsequent steps by parliament which will have far-reaching consequences.

In particular, Article 1 of the law renames the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic as the Estonian republic. This means that a precedent is set for the restoration of the former state formation and the holding of talks with the Soviet Union as an equal partner.

In support of this, a number of articles of the "1938 Fundamental Law of the Estonian repbulic" are brought into force. The most important of them states that Estonia is an autonomous, independent republic.

The deputies' groups "For Equal Rights" and "Communist Faction" have submitted a protest on the substance of the new law and the procedure for its adoption. And a group of deputies representing mainly the Russian-speaking population made a statement. It says that the adoption of such laws exacerbates contradictions between the leadership of the Soviet Union and the Estonian SSR, whips up the domestic political situation, and deepens interethnic discord. The deputies called on the local self-government organs and labor collectives where they ran to unite to defend their rights as USSR citizens. They announced the convocation of a congress of deputies at all levels who advocate the unity of the Soviet Federation, at which questions of the formation of legislative and executive organs to defend voters' rights and interests and the definition of a procedure for holding a referendum on the republic's secession from the USSR will be examined. The statement contains a request to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the country's president to receive a group of deputies to discuss measures to protect the constitutional right of USSR citizens living in Estonia.

The protest describes the actions of T. Anton, chairman of the legal commission, and Yu. Nugis, speaker of the Supreme Soviet, as a gross violation of the procedure for the adoption of laws and as deliberate deception of deputies.

So parliament has had its say. What the response will be, the next few days will reveal.

Estonia Appoints Finance, Agriculture Ministers

LD0805093890 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 7 May 90

[Summary] The Supreme Soviet this afternoon endorsed the following ministerial appointments: Rein Miller to be minister of finance; and Vello Lind to be minister of agriculture. Both were previously holding posts of deputies.

Report on Attack on Tartu Military Commissariat

PM0805102590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
8 May 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Dispatch by Leonid Levitskiy under the rubric "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Correspondents Report": "Incident at Military Commissariat"]

[Text] Tallinn—The "equal rights" group has come out with a deputies' query about the incident at the military commissariat in Tartu city.

Your correspondent asked N Redko, the republic's deputy military commissar, to describe the incident.

"Late on the evening of 23 April a group of youths attacked the Tartu military commissariat. None of the attackers was apprehended. The Estonian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that a criminal investigation has been started into the case of the hooligan attack on the military commissariat. The next evening, in Rapla this time, a group of youths tore off the military commissariat signboard and destroyed it. Again the militia arrested no one.

"The workers of military commissariats are often threatened with reprisals. We sent a letter to A. Ryuytel, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and E. Savisaar, chairman of the government, requesting that the military commissariat workers be protected against such incidents and that measures be taken against those who are disrupting the draft into the Armed Forces...."

"Do you see a connection between the campaign to disrupt the spring draft and these incidents?"

"Of themselves they are undoubtedly extremes. But the overall situation in the republic is promoting them. For about a year now there has been a strenuous attempt to implant the conviction that the Soviet Army is an Army of occupiers and that service in it is illegal. The Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet recently adopted a law stipulating this. The articles of the Criminal Code providing for penalties for refusing to serve in the Army and for deserting have been repealed...."

The USSR Council of Ministers resolution on the latest draft into the ranks of the Armed Forces has not been published in newspapers published in Estonian. The republic's government has not taken its decision on the draft. The local organs refuse to fulfill the Union resolution. The so-called "Geneva-49" committees are operating strenuously. They call for the rejection of military service and desertion and are collecting documents from potential draftees.

A strange situation. The republic is adopting its own laws as though there were no all-Union legal norms. And the center seems not to notice the anticonstitutional acts which have been adopted.

'More Than 20,000' Protest Latvian Independence

AU0905172890 Paris AFP in English 1657 GMT 9 May 90

[By Pierre Glachant]

[Text] Riga, Latvia, May 9 (AFP)—More than 20,000 people, mostly ethnic Russians, staged a peaceful demonstration here Wednesday against the Latvian parliament's declaration of independence from the Soviet Union.

The protest followed a military parade, closely watched by security forces, to mark the 45th anniversary of the end of World War II for the Soviet Union, with the general public kept well away.

After the parade, which was matched in Vilnius and Tallinn, capitals of the neighbouring breakaway Baltic republics of Lithuania and Estonia, paratroopers and police let demonstrators who had waited in sidestreets gather in central Victory Square.

In brilliant sunshine, a crowd of between 20,000 and 25,000 people listened for more than an hour to speakers berating parliament for its declaration of independence last Friday.

"We'll back any leader who will restore order," read one banner, while protesters raised their hands at the end of the rally in support of a call for the repeal of the independence declaration, presented as a "coup d"etat", and demands for a referendum.

Soviet Latvian flags were much in evidence. Russians, Belorussians and Poles are a large minority in a population which is only some 53 per cent ethnic Latvian.

Only people with special permits were allowed to watch the military parade, including soldiers and their families, bemedalled veterans, and young couples like Rodion, a Latvian; and Irina, a Russian.

People questioned by AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE were prudent, even evasive, on the declaration of independence, which parliament linked to an unspecified period of transition, calling for negotiations with Moscow.

Janis Berzins, a member of the minority independent Latvian Communist Party which has broken with Moscow, said he was at the parade by virtue of the fact that Soviet troops "saved the Latvians from pure and simple annihilation by the Nazis".

He added that there was no rush for independence "Two years, three years, it makes little odds."

The first secretary of the pro-Moscow Latvian communist majority, Alfreds Rubiks, told the crowd in Victory Square that secessionists wanted to restore the 1920-40 "bourgeois republic of Latvia", where there would be "unemployment and second-class citizens, like the Turks in West Germany".

In Vilnius, a group of youths hissed at troops as "occupation" forces, but the military parade there otherwise passed off without incident, witnesses in the Lithuanian capital reported.

More on Rally

PM0905203590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 May 90 Second Edition p 4

[Correspondent O. Meshkov report: "Rally by the Obelisk"]

[Text] Riga—In the Latvian capital the holiday was sunny and summery. The city is decorated with USSR state flags. A military parade by troops of the Riga garrison was held on the Daugava embankment in the morning.

Meanwhile tens of thousands of Riga inhabitants set off in columns from the Lenin monument to march through the whole city to Victory Square, to the obelisk erected in honor of the liberators of Riga—Soviet soldiers.

The participants in the thousands-strong rally unanimously adopted a resolution containing a demand that the USSR president ensure strict observance of Soviet laws and the USSR Constitution in the Baltic republics, and also an appeal by the republic's United Council of Labor Collectives to hold a political strike 15 May to protest the declaration on Latvia's independence adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet.

Latvian Declaration Sparks Run on Stores, Banks

PM0905182590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 May 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Correspondent Irina Litvinova report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Economics and Politics"]

[Text] Riga—What is the situation in Latvia during the first days since the declaration of independence was adopted?

It has been officially announced that I. Godmanis, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, and USSR People's Deputy D. Ivans, first deputy chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, will visit Stockholm in about 10 days.

Replying to a question about how he now sees the status of USSR people's deputies, D. Ivans said:

"The People's Front has different views on this. Some people believe that we should surrender our mandates. But I adhere to the viewpoint that they can open a door for us to enter into talks with the Kremlin. We must retain the mandates of USSR people's deputies until we acquire full independence."

Other deputies in the People's Front faction are also preparing for a foreign trip. On 8 May, when the standing commissions were formed, they reaffirmed that, since they have a majority, they will be able to control the situation in parliament without difficulty. They condemned the report carried in the press that the republic's United Council of Labor Collectives is preparing for a political strike. Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Gorbunov even proposed involving the prosecutor's office in resolving this question.

Let us come down to earth. Stores are emptying before our very eyes. People are buying up salt, matches, pasta, groats.... The scale of the buying spree is such that in Daugavpils, the republic's second largest city, 18 tonnes of salt, instead of the usual one tonne, were sold the very next day after the adoption of the independence declaration.

Only the lines for the savings banks are comparable now with the store lines. The chairman of the Latvian Savings Bank Board has warned of the possible undesirable consequences of the increased demand for money: The amounts being paid out of accounts may have to be limited.

It has been announced that food quotas are being introduced in May, while "rationing"—the new name for the card system—will come into force in the summer.

More on Latvian Supreme Soviet Proceedings

PM0905112590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 May 90 Single Edition p 4

[Dispatch by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "Latvia: Change of Signs"]

[Text] Riga—When the republic's Supreme Soviet session resumed its work after a two-day break, it was impossible not to notice that the sign on the parliament building facade had been changed. The gray marble plaque now reads "Supreme Soviet of the Latvian republic" instead of "Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR" [Soviet Socialist Republic] as before. A sign which primarily testifies to the fact that the parliamentarians intend to follow, from their very first steps, the course of the recently adopted declaration "On the Restoration of the Latvian Republic's Independence."

The attention of deputies and the press alike is nowadays focused also on the speech delivered by A. Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, on Latvian Television 5 May, in which he claimed that USSR President M.S. Gorbachev had responded negatively to the Supreme Soviet declaration. People's Front Chairman D. Ivans, who is now first deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, declared in the same context: "Even if someone among the Latvian party leaders has personal contacts with M. Gorbachev, his paraphrase of the president's words cannot be accepted by the Latvian republic's Supreme Soviet as the Kremlin's official attitude toward the declaration."

Meanwhile, sharp debates on the formation of the new government are being held in parliament. The future of 17 ministerial portfolios has to be decided.

The prime minister's name is already known. He is Ivars Godmanis, 49-years old physicist at the Latvian University, who holds the position of Latvian People's Front deputy chairman and has hitherto been considered leader of the majority faction in the new parliament. The votes cast for his candidacy were 131 for, 48 against, with six abstentions.

When outlining his action program, I. Godmanis certainly did not overlook military issues. In his opinion, units of the USSR Armed Forces now in Latvia ought to be given the "status of military bases, and they should be quantitatively reduced with the passage of time." A. Gorbunov, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, spoke on the same issue a little earlier. In his opinion, "the question of military bases ought to be resolved on the basis of the 1939 treaty between the USSR and Latvia."

Colonel V. Prishchepov, a Supreme Soviet deputy, was among the speakers in the debates on this question. Specifically, he read out an address from Riga Garrison officers, ensigns, and warrant officers to the Latvian Supreme Soviet chairman and deputies.

"Today," the address says, "the image of the Soviet Army as an 'occupation army' hostile to the Lettish people is being implanted more intensely than ever before. Unfortunately, these ideas materialize and find expression in actions by extremists. Insulting slogans, disrespectful attitude toward Great Patriotic War veterans and the memory of those who died for the liberation of the Baltic peoples, and other actions pursue the goal of erasing the memory of the Soviet Army's great liberation mission during the last war. Certain forces are taking the liberty of denigrating the civic dignity and insulting the honor of Soviet soldiers and officers."

It seemed as if the text of the address made many deputies take a fresh look at the situation prevailing in the region as regards the Army. It is assumed that a special commission will be set up to investigate the facts stated in the address.

The session's evening sitting elected the first deputy chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers. He is jurist I. Biser, presently deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities.

New Latvian People's Deputies Registered

90UN1613A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 7 Apr 90 p 4

["Report of the Central Electoral Commission of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] The following people were registered as Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies on 5 April 1990:

Arnitis, Martinsh Arturovich; chairman of the board at the agricultural firm—kolkhoz [collective farm] "Stalgene"; CPSU member; Elgavskiy Rayon, Stalgene, Ozolniyeki Electoral District No. 134.

Blumberg, Oyar Karlovich; chief economist of the Riga TETs-1 [Heat and Electric Power Plant]; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 43.

Brinke, Ilma Arturovna; LU [Latvian University] docent; member of the Latvian Green party; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 46.

Buylov, Nikolay Mikhaylovich; assistant general manager of the industrial association "Latrybprom" [Latvian Fish Industry]; CPSU member; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 50.

Zhuk, Albert Georgiyevich; general manager of the scientific- agricultural-industrial firm "Pardaugava", CPSU member; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 15.

Mikhaylov, Vladimir Ivanovich; head of a department in the Riga CPSU Gorkom [city party committee]; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 42.

Morozli, Grigoriy Grigoryevich; lawyer of the cooperative legal consultants' firm; CPSU member; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 22.

Safonov, Anatoliy Victorovich; design engineer of the industrial association "Kommutator"; CPSU member; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 47.

Stepichev, Mikhail Mikhaylovich; radio technician at the VEF industrial association; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 63.

Shapovalov, Pavel Petrovich; head of the "Plyavniyeki" militia department of the Internal Affairs Administration of the Riga Moskovskiy Rayon Executive Committee; CPSU member; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 41.

Shlyakota, Kazimir Victorovich; manager of the interdivisional timber-processing combine based in the "Berzkalne" kolkhoz; CPSU member; Balvskiy Rayon, village of Zhiguri, Vilyaka Electoral District No. 108.

Shchiptsov, Oleg Vladimirovich; docent of the Riga Institute of Civil Aviation Engineers; CPSU member; city of Riga, Riga Electoral District No. 29.

Stroganov Registered

90UN1613B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 12 Apr 90 p 3

["Report of the Electoral Commission of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] On 10 April 1990 the following person was registered as a Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy:

Stroganov, Filipp Feoktistovich; first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Ludzenskiy Rayon Committee; CPSU member; city of Ludza, Zilupe Electoral District No. 150.

RSFSR

'Democratic Russia' Platform Avoids Ideology

PM0905123190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[IZVESTIYA Correspondent Valeriy Zaykin report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "The Democratic Party of Russia—A Party Without an Apparatus"]

[Text] Moscow—The organizing committee of the Democratic Party of Russia [DPR] held a press conference at the capital's Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee 7 May.

USSR People's Deputy N. Travkin, chairman of the organizing committee, set out the principles of the new organization's activity and the aims it sets itself. The DPR is a parliamentary party. It renounces the primacy of ideology over the economy and is oriented toward the people's real needs. It regards the platform of the "Democratic Russia" bloc as a program. The party considers its main aims to be struggling against the remnants of totalitarianism in society, promoting the establishment of the real sovereignty of the people in Russia, and creating a sovereign, democratic, and economically strong Russian Federation.

The DPR will not have a permanent apparatus. It also rejects the principle of democratic centralism. The organizational mechanism which it plans to develop should guarantee the protection of minority rights.

Talks have already been held with the organizing committee of the Peasant Party. As a result it has been decided that it will join the DPR as a party group [fraktsiya]. Talks are being held with the organizing committee of "Free Labor," the cooperative members' party, on similar conditions of membership.

Support for the new party has been expressed by the country's independent workers' associations, which recently held a congress in Novokuznetsk. The writers' association "April" has coopted three of its members onto the DPR organizing committee. The new party will hold its constituent congress at the end of May.

Official Interviewed on Forming Russian Party

PM0805155590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 5 May 90 Second Edition pp 1,2

[Interview with Yu.A. Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by Yu. Makhrin, date and place of interview not stated; under the "Mirror of the Day" rubric: "Russia Needs a Communist Party"]

[Text] [Makhrin] Yuriy Alekseyevich, PRAVDA's mailbag contains more and more letters whose authors reflect on Russia's future. They are unanimous in asserting that Russia is now being treated unfairly. And therefore it is necessary to strengthen its political status and firmly establish state sovereignty and economic autonomy, and to create or restore a republic communist party.

[Manayenkov] The same opinions prevail in letters sent to the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau, of which I am a member. In my view, people are right to ask the question about strengthening the state sovereignty of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]—with all the ensuing consequences. Yes, state structures, which other Union republics have long had, are needed. And they are gradually being created. Independent trade unions and a Russian Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] have appeared. Central Television and all-Union radio now broadcast regular Russian programs, although admittedly these are very short. Alas, for the time being, there are no new republic publications, which Russian social thought needs so much.

But the Russians are right, there is a need for our republic's economic independence to be radically and basically strengthened. Perhaps no other Union republic has diktat from the center such as Russia has today. An end must now be put to the dominant influence of central state and economic departments. They have become adept at fleecing rich Russia and they do this unashamedly as a result of which the living standard of part of the population is falling.

[Makhrin] The majority of readers believe that it is impossible to strengthen our republic's political status and establish its state sovereignty and economic autonomy more firmly without creating a Russian Communist Party. In a past interview, published in PRAVDA 6 November 1989, in answer to the question "Is a Russian Communist Party necessary, in your opinion?" you said that it is necessary to create a Russian political structure and that this is an imperious command of the times, but a CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau must be created first. Has your viewpoint changed on this score?

[Manayenkov] It stands to reason that it has changed, since during that time so many significant changes have taken place in the life of the country. I will refer to some of them, the most important ones. Amendments have been introduced into the USSR Constitution, which used to enshrine the leading role of the CPSU. The multiparty system has become a fait accompli. In the face of this, creating a Russian Communist Party is, to my mind, not just desirable, but essential. Russia needs to have its own party. Within the CPSU and acknowledging its Statutes and program aims.

[Makhrin] Can it be asserted that the birth or rebirth of the Russian Communist Party is already taking place?

[Manayenko] The question of creating or recreating the Russian Communist Party has often arisen in the past, at party congresses, as a rule. Now it is the focus of the general public's attention. The relevant proposals are being discussed in party organizations in many Russian Federation oblasts. The Russian Communists' Initiating Congress was held 21-22 April in Leningrad, and, after sharp discussion, it adopted a decision to the effect that a Russian Communist Party organization should be formed before the 28th CPSU Congress.

As is well known, the March Central Committee Plenum deemed it advisable to convene a Russian party conference before the 28th CPSU Congress. The CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau was given the task of preparing it and holding it. To this end, a Preparatory

Committee was formed from representatives of kray, oblast, okrug, and Moscow city party organizations, which were elected at the corresponding party committee plenums. It will include future Russian delegates to the congress.

[Makhrin] Is there to be a Russian Communist Party or not? Communists' opinions are being studied, by conducting special sociological research, and during the elections of delegates for the 28th Congress, party members are also putting into the ballot box papers containing answers to questions about their attitude to the restoration of the Russian Communist Party. Judging by PRAVDA's mailbag, the opinions are varied, reasons "for" or "against" are weighty and well argued.

[Manayenkov] Yes, there is food for thought. What is the essence of the proposals on the creation of a Russian Communist Party? What are the political aspects and the political roots of the question? The point is that before Great October and afterward, the Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party (Bolsheviks) and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were the center for gathering together revolutionary forces in the country and it was the indisputable authority whose ideological-political attraction was the basis for the organization of national Bolshevik formations into a single party, and the building and strengthening of the socialist federation not just within the framework of Russia, but also the whole of the Union. That is why opinions are now being expressed that advocate the rebirth of the Russian Communist Party as an integrating force capable of consolidating the party's healthy forces on the platform of perestroyka, and promoting the laying down of qualitatively new economic and sociopolitical mutual relations between republics.

People who support the idea of creating a Russian Communist Party, as can be seen from their speeches at meetings in primary party organizations, at party committee plenums, and in the press, believe that the Russian Communist Party will become a kind of pivot, or a framework that will make it possible to strengthen the CPSU's ideological and organizational unity; it will help in devising concerted actions in the parliaments of Russia and the USSR; it will promote the strengthening of interethnic ties between the peoples of the Soviet Union. The following opinion prevails: Without a Russian Communist Party within a multiparty system, a political mechanism for the Union republics' mutual interaction will be difficult to create.

Insistent demands for the creation of a Russian Communist Party are stimulated by the intensifying centrifugal tendencies in the country's political life. The factors that are bringing about the promotion of the idea of creating a Russian Communist Party, can be said to include the dynamic politicization of social awareness and the galvanization of communists independent action.

We must also bear in mind the fact that the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau is operating only feebly. It does not have authoritative powers. In addition, three-tenths of the workers on the bureau staff have dual functions and a sizable proportion of them do not have the opportunity to become involved in Russian affairs. The bureau does not have its own mass media either.

[Makhrin] At the same time, some of party members are opposed to the creation of a Russian Communist Party. Muscovite Yu. Tikhov, for example, is worried that this will lead to a split in the CPSU and that a dual center or dual power will be formed within it. V. Ilgov from Voronezh suggests that the formation of Russian Communist Party leading organs will inevitably lead to the "collapse" of CPSU central structures. And communists from the communist parties of Union republics are worried that the Russian Communist Party, which will have over 10 million members, "will infringe upon other communist parties' rights when decisions are being adopted."

[Manayenkov] There really is a broad spectrum of opinions here and it cannot be ignored. Every point of view must not just be heard, but also studied, and compared with others. For instance, a number of comrades affirm: If a Russian Federation Communist Party Central Committee is formed, it will always be able to find a way of imposing its will on the CPSU Central Committee and of putting it into the minority. A majority is a majority! That is how I would answer them. No self-respecting party will renounce the principle of centralism. Of course, what I have in mind is not barrack-style bureaucratic centralism, but democratic centralism, when the right of the minority is acknowledged and the majority is treated respectfully. And so a "shock absorber" has been envisaged in the draft of the new CPSU Statutes—a presidium, that is, in essence, a council of republic communist party Central Committee secretaries under a party chairman. Other methods for the protection of the minority opinion will evidently have to be thought up too.

Finally, one cannot fail to take into consideration the argument that the formation of a Russian Communist Party may serve as an additional reason for all kinds of new accusations against Russia, alleging that it lays claim to some kind of exclusive role in the country's life. In a word, a reason to kindle anti-Russian moods.

[Makhrin] Nevertheless, present arguments are most often about the time limits, ways, and resources connected with putting into practice the idea of forming a Russian Communist Party. Thus in Leningrad, it was decided to hold a second stage of the congress in June, when the question of the creation of a Russian Communist Party can be brought up.

[Manayenkov] Yes, voices can be heard saying that such a decision should be adopted before the 28th CPSU congress. Should there be a Russian Communist Party? This must be decided by Russian communists. The all-Russian party conference. It is not democratic to seek other paths. Decisions concerning the future not just of RSFSR communists, but also the whole CPSU and the whole country, can only be adopted jointly, collectively and in a sober manner, without excessive emotions or personal ambitions. Improvisation cannot be tolerated here.

Moscow Deputies Oppose Formation of 'Blocs'

90UN1682A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 p 1

["Appeal of a Group of Deputies of Moscow City Soviet Independent People's Deputies": "Moscow Means We Muscovites"]

[Text] "Moscow Means We Muscovites" will remain a slogan unless the Moscow City Soviet becomes a sovereign, effective organ of Soviet power working in the interests of Muscovites.

We people's deputies of the Moscow City Soviet have consciously and voluntarily united in an independent group of deputies under conditions of the actual division of the Moscow City Soviet into two blocs adhering at times to opposite positions—"Democratic Russia" and "Moscow".

As distinct from these blocs, we have no internal organizational structure and particular mechanism of voting within the group for ascertaining the positions of its participants. We recognize one organizational structure of the Moscow City Soviet common for all and a common, concertedly established voting procedure. There is one democracy for all, not for each bloc individually.

We are opposed to any imposition of the opinions of the majority on the minority in whatever outwardly democratic forms this is garbed, and support the right of the minority not only to be heard, but also to realize its substantiated proposals.

We are convinced that an efficient Moscow City Soviet in which there is no monopoly of any bloc and not a quantity of deputies but the quality of their proposals and the free competition of ideas are the determining factor. Currently, however, judging by the situation which has taken shape in the Moscow City Soviet, we have once again arrived at a situation against which we had for so long struggled—an overwhelming majority. And in this connection the mere formation of an independent group of deputies—independent of blocs and the decisions of this leadership or the other and public and political organization—is a constructive, healthy principle in the activity of the Moscow City Soviet and an indispensable condition for transition from confrontation to constructive work in the name of Muscovites.

There is no need for us to go back and to struggle for old ideals and notions of the past. We independent deputies are today even building our policy by proceeding from the actual multiparty system, not democratization but democracy, not glasnost but freedom of speech, and from a recognition of the diversity of forms of ownership and the need for the formation of an economic market and national revival. Our common goal is restoration of the power of the soviets, for which it is not obligatory that groups of deputies confront one another.

We are not an opposition in the Moscow City Soviet but the voluntary union of deputies which—this we believe—reflects the interests and opinions of the bulk of Muscovites, for whom the main thing is not which bloc advances which slogans, but how we organize joint practical work and what real results it produces. Our minority in the Moscow City Soviet is not necessarily a minority among Muscovites. A constructive policy and good will enable us to understand and respect the positions of all sides in the Moscow City Soviet and to harmonize contentious issues.

Being an independent deputy in the Moscow City Soviet does not mean being independent of the wishes of the electorate, of Muscovites. We are accountable in our activity not to blocs and their leaders, but only to the electorate, strictly in accordance with the law on the status of people's deputies in the USSR. We will speak and vote as each of us deems necessary, proceeding from the existing instructions and proposals of our electorate.

Tasks of the adoption of measures, urgent for Moscow, pertaining to the solution of most acute socioeconomic problems are currently moving to the forefront. All deputy groups agree on this, and this is encouraging. We independent deputies, well aware of the city's actual problems and Muscovites' needs and requirements, propose inclusion on the list of urgent measures the following questions: on bread, bread for Muscovites, and its quality and quantity; on the sanitary-epidemiological state of the city and its cleanliness; on morale and morality in the city, which are a consequence of both the stagnation and restructuring period of national history; on the state of the roads, streets, and entrance ways.

It is possible and necessary to consistently accomplish many of these urgent measures by balanced, comprehensive means, starting today. Others will take longer and require preparatory work. But there is common consent on the part of all deputies, without distinction as to social and political orientation, concerning the need for their realization.

On the threshold of the first session of the Moscow City Soviet we independent deputies consider a principal task the creation at the session of conditions permitting the harmonious adoption of fundamental decisions. To this end we address to all deputies the following proposals:

1. Renunciation of the bloc approach to the solution of key questions for the first session of the Moscow City Soviet: agenda, organizational structure, procedural issues.

2. Adoption of a decision on two-thirds majority voting on such main issues as election of the chairman and

deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet and chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee.

3. Creation in the Moscow City Soviet of a conciliation commission for the solution of contentious questions, imparting to it standing commission status.

Moscow Official on Necessity for 'Unity'

90UN1767A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 4 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom and delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress, by special correspondent Yu. Kurbatov; date and place not specified; "Dissociate or Unite?"]

[Text] [Kurbatov] Yuriy Anatolyevich, of all the tumultuous political events of recent weeks, I would distinguish the elections to the local and republic organs of people's power. Like many Muscovites, I believe, I am disturbed by the crushing defeat of worker candidates in Moscow. Let us not engage in casuistry: The capital's working class has virtually been removed from power. The vast majority having voted for representatives of scientific establishments, Muscovites essentially expressed no confidence in the workers. Yet we initiated perestroyka under the slogan of equality of rights and opportunities.

[Prokofyev] Without counterposing the workers to other strata of the population, I would say, nonetheless, that their low representation in the soviets is regrettable. In terms of its intellectual and political development today's working class is far from what it was at the start of perestroyka even. It is a powerful potential force of society which has as yet to be fully engaged.

Indeed, of the 64 RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies from Moscow, just one is a worker. There are just 12 workers among the 463 people's deputies in the Moscow Soviet. Workers constitute little more than 11 percent of the rayon soviets. This is undoubtedly fewer than in the past elections. These figures may be viewed variously, but I would not talk about no confidence in the workers. The reasons here, it seems to me, go deeper. People frequently voted not for this candidate or the other but against the previous system of the distribution of deputies' seats instead of real elections, when it was determined in advance how many seats in the Moscow City Soviet would be assigned, say, to representatives of the working class. The same with the elections to the party bodies. Thus a certain "elitism" was established in the working class.

Understand me correctly: This is not to reproach those who were elected to the soviets in the recent past even. The system itself failed to afford sufficient opportunities for the political personality to show his worth. He was suppressed, what is more.

And one further point. In the election struggle the candidates nominated by worker outfits were left to their own devices, as a rule, and were not properly supported by the outfits, and the party organizations remained aloof in the majority of cases.

I believe it is necessary to find in the worker milieu leaders in terms of stamp of character and maturity of civic position. Demands on the personality have now increased more than ever. Whoever has his own beliefs and knows how to defend them and transmit his conviction to others will be the winner in elections.

Unfortunately, many party organizations were, in my opinion, unprepared for such a turn of events. Primarily in the sense that illusions persisted that everything could be handled, as before, according to the customary plan. But there was a misfire—to lose the elections it was sufficient in many cases merely to declare one's affiliation to the party or, even more, support for the gorkom [city party committee] election platform. And, furthermore, the electorate was less interested in the substantive aspect of a candidate's position, and formal characteristics gained the ascendancy. I emphasize once again that the last elections also were more "against" than "for."

The political knowhow for changing this mood was insufficient. Although, I must say, the results of the elections to the Moscow City Soviet and the rayon soviets were not, on the whole, that discomforting.

Out of 33 raykom [rayon party committee] first secretaries, 22 have become deputies of their rayon soviets. Seven, deputies of the Moscow City Soviet. There are in the City Soviet two gorkom secretaries, myself included. There are many party members in the corps of deputies.

[Kurbatov] But they do not all adhere to uniform positions. It cannot even be said that they are united by the gorkom's election platform.

[Prokofyev] True. Not all of the communist deputies of the Moscow City Soviet have joined the "Moskva" group of deputies formed on the basis of the Moscow Gorkom platform. There are party members who support other blocs. But, after all, given the polarization of political beliefs in society as a whole and given the specification of positions within the party itself this is perfectly normal.

A struggle of ideas is under way. Delineation in the CPSU also is inevitable. Naturally, it will also affect the communists elected to the soviets. Everyone will be required in the very near future to clearly determine whose side he is on. There is no other way.

The party needs to consolidate its ranks on the basis of principle. Without this it has no future. However paradoxical this may sound, given the development of political pluralism in society any party must preserve primarily its own internal ideological unity. Otherwise the party's precise outlines will be eroded to the point of amorphousness. Concern for this dictated the recent open letter of the party Central Committee to the country's communists.

[Kurbatov] There have recently been so many important events in the life of the party and the state that each of them could be discussed separately. Central Committee plenums, the draft platform and rules, mass meetings, marches, and the resignation of the top leaders of certain oblasts. Even recently we were intoxicated with democracy and glasnost. But anxiety, it seems to me, has gradually been growing in the people, and a sense of uncertainty is emerging.

[Prokofyev] Contradictions in all spheres of the life of society and the political struggle are continuing to intensify and acquire, I would say, an explosive nature. The socioeconomic situation is being made worse by the imperfect legal base. Interethnic conflict, which is already affecting a considerable part of the country, has assumed tragic proportions. Strikes are, unfortunately, becoming habitual. Separatist sentiment in the state is growing. So the sense of anxiety about which you speak is, I believe, perfectly warranted. And although on the one hand it has to be understood that the major renovation of economic and political structures cannot occur painlessly, on the other hand, it should be recognized that these processes have been accompanied by mistakes made by the leadership of the party and the state in the very course of perestroyka.

The main one, it seems to me, is that at the very outset we linked perestroyka with acceleration. But it was clear even at that time that there could be no question of acceleration and that it would be necessary to "cut deep," as the medical people say. People are now asking: Perestroyka is into its fifth year, but where are the changes, where are if only some changes for the better? And they are right to ask. With some ill-considered slogans we cheated many people's expectations.

And one further difficulty. In order to consolidate society a tempting, striking, but realistic idea is needed. We now have practically nothing to our name, as they say, except the "humane socialism" concept. This is also where the acute lack of trust in the party and its personnel and the steps which the government is taking comes from.

I am convinced that unless the party is able very quickly to shape and determine a precise, clear outlook for the people for the period which lies ahead, it will have to give way to another political force. But I have to say that the last Central Committee plenum gave me hope in this respect, on the whole.

[Kurbatov] No offense meant, Yuriy Anatolyevich, but in recent decades the speeches of the leaders of the Moscow party organization at all party forums have sounded particularly servile and loyal. Moscow's "approval" would set the tone, as it were, for all subsequent speakers. The speeches at the Central Committee February and March plenums struck a somewhat discordant note with the past....

[Prokofyev] I will say frankly that it is simply impermissible today for any politician to be merely an optimist (as it is to go to the other extreme also, incidentally). It is necessary to be a realist and have one's feet firmly on the ground. I expressed from the plenum platform not only my own thoughts. Five meetings with the secretaries of the city's primary party organizations were held in the gorkom, in which approximately 2,500 persons participated. More than 100 of them expressed their views. I therefore tried in my speech in February to bring together all their thoughts and convey their concern at the state of affairs in the party and the country. Of course, these plenums should have been held a year or two earlier. We lost time, which is now simply priceless. Under those conditions, when society was rapidly becoming politicized, the party remained essentially the backbone of the command-administrative system. It gradually fell behind, losing both its authority and influence on the masses. As a result we got what we have today.

[Kurbatov] Judging even by the published material of the plenums, the discussion there was far from straightforward. We have become used to believing that there is in the politburo, for example, complete unanimity on all questions. We have now seen for ourselves that this is far from the case. The former "show" unanimity in the Central Committee was absent also. You are not a member of the Central Committee. How do you evaluate the plenums and the discussion at it?

[Prokofyev] It would appear, you see, that we all have to rid ourselves of stereotypes. There was not absolute unanimity in the politburo when the decision was made on the question of the commitment of troops to Czechoslovakia in 1968 or on the Afghanistan issue. We had simply been trained to believe that in the highest echelons of the party leadership complete unanimity always reigned.

But it is not this which is, I would say, our common problem. When unanimity in a collegial body is born by the normal democratic path, this is a good thing. It is bad when it is the result of a simple arithmetical computation of how the chief thinks. This more often than not conceals, incidentally, a total absence of any individual thoughts. Such "unanimity" was predominant in the leadership of the party and the country for many years and decades. Now, however, the readers also will have to agree with this, the situation is changing. How one decision or another is born we may see for ourselves—in the direct and metaphorical meaning of the word.

This applies to the party also. Reports from the plenums are published, and one can judge the position of any member of the Central Committee or its politburo. As far, however, as disagreements are concerned, let us, finally, accept normal debate in the party as a normal phenomenon inherent in a civilized society.

One thing I may say firmly: The recent plenums were an important step forward in the development of intraparty democracy. They, finally, determined the Central Committee's position on Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and adopted the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and Rules—the party's most important political pre-congress documents. I would note that many party committee secretaries who were not members of the Central Committee took part in the work of these plenums.

[Kurbatov] I do not know whether you will agree with me or not but the speeches of many party chiefs of this young wave stood out to advantage compared with those of persons who have invariably been in the Central Committee for more than a decade (such constitute approximately half). It was in the speeches of the latter that some nostalgia for the past was heard most often.

[Prokofyev] The speeches varied, of course. But this, I emphasize once more, is natural. The "young wave," as you put it, reflects the entire poignancy, the entire contradictoriness of our time. And affiliation to it is determined not by age and not by the road traveled but by an ability to think in nondogmatic fashion and acceptance, finally, of perestroyka.

[Kurbatov] Speaking as "leader," you promised the party activists and all Muscovites at the Moscow Gorkom Plenum much and difficult work and many hard days in the future. How far has this forecast been borne out?

[Prokofyev] There is no need to talk about the forecast here, I believe. You can see the situation for yourself: empty shelves, inflation, the decline in the subsistence level of the bulk of the working people, profiteering, the rise in crime, the decline in morality. We are hearing over and over about the impasse at which we find ourselves. But it is obvious that a way out of the crisis may be found only if the ruling party restructures, renews, and reforms itself.

Appropriate, decisive political actions are needed under these conditions. The Communists had a right to expect them of the recent CPSU Central Committee plenums. And although the overall balance of their assessments is positive, it has to be confessed that expectations were not met in full, for all that.

[Kurbatov] In what is this manifested specifically?

[Prokofyev] It seems to me that the authors of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform approached the work in haste and permitted imprecision and vagueness on a number of most important positions. Communists are expressing serious complaints in connection with the fact that the document was not published ahead of time and that the version submitted for discussion by the Central Committee plenum failed to reflect a number of fundamental proposals which had the support of many party members and party organizations. I judge this from the results of the Moscow party discussion and numerous meetings with primary party organization secretaries and with communists.

I have to mention that the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform and the draft rules are closely interconnected documents. They have both common virtues and common shortcomings. The main thing, perhaps, is the fact that they have not gone beyond a reflection of the current situation in social and political life and are insufficiently addressed to the future, when developed political forces will be operating in the country. I spoke about this in greater detail, incidentally, at the Central Committee March Plenum also.

[Kurbatov] Yuriy Anatolyevich, I know that you were among those who sorted out, as they say, the draft platform at the plenum even. Which specific proposals were taken into consideration by the editorial commission?

[Prokofyev] The proposition concerning the party's attitude toward various types of property was reworded, for example. Another important proposition: If the party does not claim a monopoly of power, an opportunity for the creation of other parties and for cooperation with those which adhere to a socialist platform should be afforded. A proposition concerning the fact that the CPSU itself would present proposals concerning a change in the USSR Constitution was inserted. As a result, the published draft platform was acceptable for its discussion in the party organizations. Although, I stress, it still leaves many questions. This, among other things, was a topic of discussion at the Moscow Gorkom Plenum.

[Kurbatov] To judge by the report, the discussion at the Moscow Gorkom Plenum was quite keen and high-minded. Which most important problems would you highlight here?

[Prokofyev] The communists, for example, evaluate positively the position on Article 6 of the USSR Constitution and the statement on the renunciation of the monopoly of power and a readiness to operate under conditions of a real multistate system. But this is only the start. After all, in practically all civilized countries the emergence of parties is regulated by legislation determining their sources of financing and minimum strength necessary for registration. For this reason political logic demands, following the change in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the elaboration and enactment of a law on parties and other social and political organizations. Our position is that the legislative enactments reserve for both the CPSU and any other party the right to pursue their policy through party organizations, the mass media, and party members elected to the soviets and working in state establishments.

It is obvious that the transition to a multiparty system is a complex process. We must not allow the country to be engulfed in political chaos or the renunciation of monopoly by one party to result for society in a monopoly of other political forces. No party diktat is, I believe, permissible.

[Kurbatov] You, Yuriy Anatolyevich, have touched on a problem, debate on which is not abating even today. I refer not only to questions of a multiparty system but also the independence of the republic communist parties. Specifically, the question of the creation of a Russian Communist Party is being put sharply and insistently into focus. This proposal has many supporters, but, it would seem, that it also has no fewer opponents. What is your view?

[Prokofyev] Against the background of the separatist mood in the republic party organizations the question of creating a Russian Communist Party has assumed sharp focus, of course. But Russia's communists should decide the fate of their political organization themselves, at their republic conference. I believe it correct also that the delegates elected to the party congress should be its delegates. We need to go to the party forum with a common opinion.

This is essential primarily for the political defense of Russia's economic and social interests. Is it not on account of the absence of them, say, that the question of our republic being granted real economic independence and of the establishment of its just relations with other republics has been so protracted? And, in addition, it has to be considered that Russian Republic structures have already been created in the unions, the Komsomol [Communist Youth League], the Academy of Sciences and other public organizations.

Now, true, the question of preserving a united CPSU comes into even sharper focus. The danger of it being torn into national apartments is serious, and we will not hold on to the Union without a united party.

[Kurbatov] But in this case there will have to be a change in the functions of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Secretariat and Politburo.

[Prokofyev] Undoubtedly, there has to be. Life itself is bringing us to this. The CPSU Central Committee will have to coordinate the work of all the communist parties and elaborate common strategy and tactics, not engage in petty tutelage, as has been the case to date. The party apparatus will have to change also.

Of what kind will it be? Opinions on this score could be the most varied. At the last Moscow Gorkom Plenum we, for example, discussed the question of the future structure of the gorkom and its apparatus. We believe that work needs to be organized on the basis of standing commissions for the main areas of party activity. The gorkom apparatus will be oriented here toward supporting the work of these commissions. We are also thinking about the possibility of releasing some members of the Moscow Gorkom from their main activity for work on the commissions with remuneration for their work from party funds thanks to a reduction in the size of the apparatus.

Such functional centers as a personnel training and retraining center and social and political, sociological, and information-methods centers, party clubs included, should, in our opinion, be created in the new structure of the gorkom on the basis of the current subdivisions.

As a whole, however, I believe that the gorkom apparatus should consist, in the main, of qualified experts, consultants, and methods specialists in various fields of party work.

[Kurbatov] I believe, Yuriy Anatolyevich, regardless of the rate of renewal of the Moscow party organization, people will judge it on the cleanness of the streets and on the store counters and on the atmosphere in the city as a whole.

[Prokofyev] I would like to immediately dot all the "i's," as they say, on this question. Full responsibility for the city's problems which you have enumerated should be borne by the recently elected Moscow City Soviet and its executive bodies. The gorkom, on the other hand, has its own action program. We will both offer it and defend it in the new soviet. But the current situation needs to be viewed realistically. Our proposals might turn out not to be supported by the majority of deputies. It will evidently be necessary to share responsibility in accordance with participation in constructive work on bringing order to bear in our life. And Muscovites will judge. For our part, we promise them full information on both the position of the gorkom and its actual activity in the soviets.

The Moscow City Soviet should, we are convinced, be the real master of the city. This should be enshrined in the draft law on the status of Moscow as the capital city which is being prepared on the gorkom's initiative. Only on this basis can we practically shut off the automatic influx of out-of-town manpower and take in hand socioeconomic programs geared to an enhancement of the Muscovites' living standard.

Summing up the discussion, I would say, without fear of contradiction, that we are all awaiting the upcoming congress, linking our hopes for the future with it. We will work for the future also in the organs of people's power, which are now getting down to business. Muscovites expect a constructive policy and its fruitful results. We are well aware of our responsibility to them.

Moscow Executive Committee Chairman Interviewed

90UN1766A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 18, 5 May-11 May 90 p 1

[Report on answers by Yu. Luzhkov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet Ispolkom, to question from Moscow deputies, prepared by L. Novikova: "Several Questions for the Chairman"]

[Text]**The entire country today is following the work of the new deputy corps intently. The democrats won in elections to local soviets in Moscow, Leningrad, and Sverdlovsk. For example, well-known economist G. Popov became chairman of the Moscow Soviet.**

However, the soviets are a legislative authority, but what about the executive authority? Real passions raged for several days around this problem in the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies. And, nonetheless, after long and heated discussions, a staff representative—Yu. Luzhkov, former deputy representative of the Moscow City Soviet Ispolkom [executive committee]—was elected chairman of the ispolkom. The deputies liked both his rather bold constructive program and his direct answers to direct questions. Yu. Luzhkov was asked more than 50 questions. Here are some of them.

[Question] Your evaluation of the ispolkom staff? Is it capable of interacting with the new Moscow City Soviet?

[Luzhkov] The body of ispolkom workers is made up of people who are competent to a significant degree and who are capable of working. The task is to implement a depoliticization of the work of the ispolkom after its economic activity is intensified and to orient it toward cooperation with the deputy corps. I think that an overwhelming majority of the staff workers will be able to fulfill this function to one degree or another.

[Question] What do you think of the organization of concerns and joint stock companies in the field of Moscow construction?

[Luzhkov] Moscow builders are engaged in construction that amounts to more than R4 billion. Personally, I approach the idea of establishing concerns, joint stock companies, or associations with interest and understanding. The main thing is that we should not release them from direct and unconditional subordination, including planning subordination, to the soviet and to the ispolkom.

[Question] You were nominated as a candidate to the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies from Khoroshevskiy Election District No. 55 of the City of Moscow. Why did you refuse to register and to participate in the election campaign?

[Luzhkov] I was nominated in three places in Moscow, and I refused to take part in the election campaign for two reasons. First: a realistic evaluation of the situation. I would not have been elected in the same way as all of the representatives of the staff. Second, no less important was a desire to concentrate on economic work.

[Question] What, in your opinion, should the structure be for managing the Moscow economy under conditions of regional economic autonomy and the adoption of the texts of the laws proposed by the Council of Ministers? What should the process of transition to the new managerial structure be like?

[Luzhkov] It is the market, demonopolization, decentralization, and competition. This is the only thing that will save us in this plan. Also important is the stabilization of the local industry of the city. This branch, like no other in the city economy, employs the labor of invalids, pensioners, and people who cannot work in the regular system of production. It should receive constant support. We have already planned an increase in investment in this branch.

[Question] Tell us about the ispolkom's transfer of personal computers to the balance sheet of the CPSU Gorkom [city party committee].

[Luzhkov] Actually, the system ARM-9-370 with 15 personal machines was transferred to the gorkom, but this equipment belongs to the ispolkom: I approach this and other questions from these simple and clear positions: Everything should belong only to the manager who paid the money for the machines, for the basic stocks, and for other things.

[Question] How do you protect the residents of the city from ecologically contaminated food products?

[Luzhkov] In a year we were able to establish a system of control over nitrates in every fruit and vegetable association. I myself am a specialist in automation and chemistry, I am very familiar with this problem, and I followed it with interest. Inspection must be introduced into the market, and food commodities that are brought into the city must be analyzed.

[Question] Why is the stream of restrictive ceilings not lessening in all ministries and departments?

[Luzhkov] I am against any kind of a restrictive ceiling that somebody tries to latch onto the city under any guise. The fact is that ceilings gave us nothing but problems, especially housing problems.

[Question] How will you, as ispolkom chairman, handle the elimination of trade-purchase cooperatives?

[Luzhkov] In contrast to many Muscovites who believe that this is actual profiteering, I do not think so. Actually, in the organization of cooperatives we are encountering ugly phenomena, the phenomena of the shadow economy and profiteering, but we began to fight against trade-purchase cooperatives with idiotic methods. They started to ban them, although it would have been correct to work with them with economic methods, by setting the level of maximum prices, which would protect the population from an unrestrained desire of the cooperatives to make a profit.

[Question] Yuriy Mikhaylovich, let us suppose that we elect you today, you come home and you get a telephone call from the front office of the CPSU Central Committee: Well, we here discussed it and decided: Transfer, please, the building of the Central Committee and everything related to it from the books of the Moscow City Soviet to the books of the CPSU Central Committee. What would you do?

[Luzhkov] These questions must be regulated now and for an indefinite period in the future by the soviets only.

Muscovite Elected Sakhalin Oblast Chairman

LD0305145290

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1130 GMT on 3 May carries a video report by correspondent S.V. Feoktistov from the Sakhalin Oblast Soviet session.

Feoktistov says: "Literally from the first minutes of its work, it found itself in a procedural impasse. The executive committee of the previous convocation had invited to the session some 70 people, newly-elected chairmen of town and rayon soviets, leading officials of oblast organizations, and department and party officials. But a group of deputies demanded that those invited be removed from the hall because their presence, the statement published said, represented psychological pressure on the deputies and their undisguised surveillance by rayon and oblast chiefs. Now the executive committee went over to the attack: it threatened to resign."

Feoktistov continues: "By a secret vote, on a contested basis, Anatoliy Petrovich Aksenov, first secretary of the Kholmsk Town Party Committee, was elected chairman of the Sakhalin Oblast Soviet. An Oblast Soviet Presidium was formed. The new executive committee is, for the time being, not at its full strength, but it can already start work. Professor Federov, a resident of Sakhalin, but a Muscovite, prorector of the Plekhanov Institute of the National Economy in Moscow, was elected chairman of the Sakhalin Oblast Executive Committee, which is also an unprecedented event, at any rate in the Far East."

In an interview, V.P. Fedorov says: "We want to change the economy over to market relations. What is now being prepared for the entire country, we want to test here. We want to turn Sakhalin into the center of perestroyka, the center of the birth of a new economy, which is not a planned market, not a regulated economy—as is being said in Moscow now—but the center of a market economy, a social economy.

Environmentalists Take Local Council Posts

LD3004134190 Moscow TASS in English 1326 GMT 30 Apr 90

[By TASS Correspondent Yekaterina Yakosh]

[Text] Vladivostok April 30 TASS—Representatives of the Greens were recently elected for the first time to councils of all levels in maritime territory (south of Soviet Far East).

Yuriy Sergeyev, a geologist at a prospecting expedition and a founder and leader of the ecological movement in the territory, has become a people's deputy of Russia.

He believes that the success scored by the Greens illustrates the population's mounting concern about the disastrous condition of the region's natural resources—air and river pollution and depletion of forests. Environmentalists are in need of real power in order to stop the ruinous process, Sergeyev maintains.

"In that case we will not be limited to just stating the existence of projects that are fraught with unpredictable damage to people and nature. We will be able to avert ecological ventures," Sergeyev told TASS. "Deputy's mandates and the parliamentary rostrum will help us attain this goal."

This is the first time Sergeyev tried to stand for a position in the government. He is gratified by trust placed in him by almost 130,000 residents of the territory.

This trust consolidated his position in the environmentalist campaign. Now the campaign must prevent the construction of a hydropower station and a nuclear power plant in Krasnoarmeisky District of maritime territory, he believes.

Sergeyev was among the initiators of a public group that proved the hazardous nature of the construction plans.

Geologists from his geological party, upon studying the structure of rocks in the region, proved the instability of the natural foundations at the site of the contemplated power projects: It turned out that a tectonic fissure runs across the area.

"We do not deny the need to construct power projects," Sergeyev explained. "We are only against the power sector's gigantomania, which is ruinous to the environment, the country and people. It is unethical to simply state—the Taiga or a power station.

"The Ussurian Taiga has no analogues by its flora and fauna. It has already been seriously depleted by logging operations, agricultural pesticides and mining. Therefore the maritime territory does not simply need new power projects. First of all it needs a scientifically-substantiated power programme."

The majority of residents of the territory welcome the election of members of the ecological movement to local government bodies.

At present not only local residents in the Far East but also those who arrived there from the European part of the Soviet Union are convinced that errors that were made in other places should not be allowed to be repeated in maritime territory, on the Amur and other areas of the Soviet Far East. The Far Eastern Greens, who are members of local councils, intend to pursue this goal.

Leningrad Party Position on Delegate Selection

90UN1721A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 3

["Regulations for the Elections of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Leningrad Party Organization" adopted by a joint plenum of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom and Gorkom Committees]

[Text] A joint plenum of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom [oblast committee] and Gorkom [city committee] has adopted "Regulations for the Elections of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from the Leningrad Party Organization" and has set the deadlines for preparing and conducting the election campaign: Nomination of candidate delegates to the congress—until 8 May; meetings of the candidates with the communists of party organizations belonging to electoral districts—until 19 May; runoffs—until 31 May 1990.

General procedures for electing delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and the rate of representation—one delegate for every 4,000 CPSU members—were set forth in the resolution of the March (1990) CPSU Central Committee Plenum (published in the press on 17 March 1990). The present regulations are compiled taking into account the procedures for electing delegates to the congress adopted by the CPSU Central Committee.

General Provisions

1.1. Delegates to the congress are elected by a secret vote directly in primary party organizations, in single-seat electoral districts, with the nomination and discussion of candidates being competitive.

1.2 The elections of delegates to the congress are prepared and carried out by the electoral commissions of the oblast, city, and rayon party organizations, as well as the electoral commissions of party districts, with the assistance of CPSU city and rayon committees.

1.3. The organizers of the elections perform their activities openly and publicly.

The raykoms [rayon committees] and gorkoms of the party ensure the publication of a list and biographical particulars of the candidates nominated in the local party press, distribute it to all party organizations of a rayon, city, or district, and provide to the mass media other materials associated with preparing and holding the elections of delegates to the congress. They organize the meetings of communists with the candidate delegates and ensure that the party organizations are informed more completely about the political, moral, and business ethics of the candidates.

Authorized representatives of the primary and shop party organizations with the status of primary organizations belonging to a given district may be present at the meetings of district electoral and vote counting commissions, during the sealing of the ballot boxes, counting of the votes, and determining the results of elections.

2. Formation of Electoral Commissions and Their Functions

2.1. All issues associated with holding the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress are resolved by the oblast electoral commission for holding the elections of delegates to the joint 19th Oblast and 27th City Conference of the Leningrad CPSU Organization, delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, and members of the leading organs of the Leningrad party organizations confirmed by a joint plenum of the Leningrad Obkom and Gorkom of the party on 21 March 1990.

2.2. The oblast electoral commission:

—monitors compliance with the present regulations for the elections of delegates to the congress;

—determines the number of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress from every city and rayon party organization proceeding from the rate of representation and the present regulations, and, in keeping with the proposals of the CPSU gorkoms and raykoms or their bureaus, forms party electoral districts. The CPSU gorkoms and obkoms take into account the opinion of primary party organizations in this matter;

—receives protocols on the results of delegate elections to the 28th CPSU Congress from the electoral commissions of the rayon and city party organizations;

—reports to a conference of the Leningrad CPSU organization on the results of the elections of congress delegates;

—reviews petitions from party organizations and communists on the issues of preparing and holding the elections of delegates to the congress;

—sends its representatives to party meetings for nominating candidate delegates and to take part in the work of the electoral commissions of the city and rayon party organizations, district electoral commissions, as well as the vote counting commissions of primary organizations set up at party meetings.

—performs other functions in keeping with the present regulations.

2.3. Elections of delegates to the 28th Congress in the city and rayon party organizations are prepared and held by the electoral commissions of the city and rayon CPSU organizations confirmed at the plenums of relevant party committees.

Representatives of the primary party organizations recommended by the latter belong to the commissions. The CPSU gorkoms and raykoms hold conferences of the secretaries of primary party organizations in order to determine the primary organizations which delegate their representatives to the electoral commissions.

2.4. The electoral commission of a city or rayon party organization:

—operates under the guidance of the oblast electoral commission;

—monitors compliance with the present regulations for the elections of delegates to the congress in the proper city or rayon party organization;

—receives from the district electoral commissions protocols on the results of the elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, reviews them, and forwards them to the oblast electoral commission;

—resolves issues related to the holding of runoffs;

—reviews petitions from party organizations and communists on the issues of preparing and holding the elections of delegates to the conference;

—sends its representatives to party meetings nominating candidate delegates and to participate in the work of the district electoral commissions, as well as vote counting commissions elected at party meetings.

2.5. The electoral commission of a city or rayon party organization also performs the functions of a district electoral commission if one delegate to the 28th congress is elected from the city or rayon party organization.

2.6 District electoral commissions in party electoral districts consist of between 17 and 25 members.

Representatives are nominated to the district electoral commission by primary party organizations. Its composition is confirmed at a (joint) meeting of the relevant party committees, bureaus, or secretaries of the party organizations, and are brought to the attention of all communists in a given electoral district.

2.7. A district electoral commission:

—compiles a list of communists in the district;

—organizes meetings with nominated candidate delegates in the party organizations belonging to a given district in cooperation with the party committees and bureaus;

—notifies all communists of the procedures, location, and time of voting;

—ensures the preparation of voting rooms and ballot boxes;

—establishes the format of a ballot;

—manufactures the ballots and furnishes them to the vote counting commissions of the primary party organizations;

—in cooperation with the primary party organizations, organizes voting in the electoral district on the election day (days) and establishes its results in the district;

—organizes runoffs if necessary;

—forwards a protocol on the results of voting in the party electoral district to the electoral commission of a city or rayon CPSU organization;

—sends its representatives to party meetings for nominating candidate deputies and take part in the work of the vote counting commissions;

—performs other functions in keeping with the present regulations.

2.8. The electoral commissions elect their chairmen and secretaries at their first meetings.

Communists who are nominated candidate deputies and are members of the electoral commissions are considered relieved from the commissions from the moment of their nomination.

3. Formation of Party Electoral Districts

3.1. Party electoral districts are formed on the basis of the confirmed rate of representation at the congress, taking into account territorial, structural, and other peculiarities, as well as the branch affiliation of primary party organizations, and taking their opinion into account.

On the suggestion of city and rayon CPSU committees, the electoral commission of the oblast party organization has a right to set the number of communists in an electoral district somewhat higher or lower than the rate of representation to the congress.

As an exception, the oblast electoral commission may form an electoral district in individual city and rayon party organizations in which the number of communists is below the rate of representation but exceeds one-half of it.

4. Procedures for Nominating Candidate Deputies

4.1. The meetings of primary party organizations, and in organizations that have party committees the meetings of shop party organizations with the status of primary party organizations, have a right to nominate candidate delegates to the congress.

Any meeting of communists has a right to nominate just one candidate. The form of voting (open or secret) for the candidates nominated is chosen by the meeting.

Every communist participates in nominating just one candidate delegate to the congress.

4.2. At the meeting, any communist has a right to nominate and reject candidacies, including his own. In the process party members may be nominated who are not on the rolls of a given party organization.

4.3. A candidate is considered nominated if he receives the highest number of votes compared to other candidates and more than one-half of the votes of participants in the meeting, provided that the latter is valid.

A meeting is considered to be valid if more than one-half of the CPSU members on the rolls of the party organization (or several party organizations) take part in it.

4.4. The minutes of the meeting indicating the number of CPSU members on the rolls of the party organization (or party organizations), communists in attendance at the meeting, candidates nominated and submitted for voting, as well as the results of voting for every candidate, are forwarded to the district electoral commission. The minutes are signed by the chairman and secretary of the meeting.

4.5. After the nomination of candidate delegates ends, the district electoral commission draws up a ballot (list) for holding a secret vote in the electoral district on the basis of the minutes of party meetings submitted to it.

Candidate delegates are arranged on the ballot in the alphabetical order, with their last name, first name, patronymic, title, and place of employment indicated.

The minutes of a meeting nominating the candidate and his personal written (cabled) consent constitute the basis for placing a candidate on the ballot.

4.6. Candidate delegates run in only one electoral district.

Prior to the beginning of voting a candidate delegate may withdraw. The electoral commission brings information on this to the attention of communists in a given district.

The party meeting which has nominated a candidate also has a right to recall him within the same period of time.

5. Voting and Tallying Results

5.1. All candidates nominated in the primary party organizations of the district are placed on the ballot for a secret vote in the elections of CPSU Congress delegates. The ballot indicates the last name, first name, and patronymic of the candidate, his title, and place of work.

5.2. Within the framework of an electoral district, a secret vote in the elections of congress delegates is held in the primary organizations and shop organizations with the status of primary organizations. To this end, vote counting commissions are elected prior to voting in the primary and shop party organizations which organize voting and the counting of votes in keeping with the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee on holding elections of leading party organs.

A protocol signed by all members of the commission indicating the number of CPSU members on the rolls and the number of those taking part in voting, and the results of voting for every candidate recording the number of votes "in favor" and "against," is forwarded to the district electoral commission.

Sealed ballots used in secret voting, as well as the separately sealed unused and canceled ballots, are attached to the protocol.

5.3. Voting is held on specially allocated premises where booths or rooms for secret voting should be installed, places for issuing ballots should be determined, and ballot boxes should be placed. The ballot boxes are placed in such a manner as to give the communists an opportunity to go through the booths or rooms for secret voting.

The vote counting commission is responsible for ensuring the secrecy of the expression of the will of communists.

Every communist votes in person. Ballots are issued on the basis of a list of communists belonging to a given party organization, upon producing a party membership card.

The vote counting commission provides an opportunity to vote for Communists absent on the day of voting (for health reasons, in the line of duty, and so on), including before the voting date.

5.4. A communist crosses out on the ballot the names of candidates against whom he votes.

Ballots of a format different from the established one, as well as those on which more than one candidate is left after voting, are considered invalid.

5.5. The elections are considered held if more than one-half of the CPSU members on the rolls of the party organizations of the district take part in them. A candidate who receives more than one-half of the votes of the CPSU members taking part in the vote in the district is considered elected.

5.6. In districts where no candidate receives more than one-half of the votes, runoffs are held by a decision of the district commission, in which only the two candidates who received the greatest number of votes compared to other candidates are placed on the ballot. The results of a runoff are determined through the procedures outlined above.

5.7. In the event elections in the district are considered null or void (if fewer than one-half of the party members in a given district take part in them) and no candidate running in the district receives the required number of votes (also after a runoff), an oblast party conference elects a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress for the vacant seat.

5.8. On the basis of the protocols of elections in the primary party organizations, the district commission sums up the results of voting in the district, verifies the validity of the meetings and elections, and compares information on the number of CPSU members with report data on the composition of party organizations. A protocol indicating the results of elections for every candidate signed by all members of the electoral commission, as well as sealed ballots for secret voting, is transmitted to the election commissions of the city and rayon party organizations and is kept on file in the CPSU gorkoms and raykoms until the next party congress.

5.9. The electoral commissions of a city or rayon party organization reviews the protocols of district electoral commissions and the eventual petitions of communists and party organizations in conjunction with holding elections and forwards the protocols of district electoral commissions and decisions on the petitions filed to the oblast electoral commission.

The schedule of the electoral campaign is set forth by a joint plenum of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom and Gorkom.

Leningrad Meeting Rescinds Ruling on Letter

LD0505064190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 5 May 90

[By "Panorama" Anchorman Igor Zorin]

[Text] The joint oblast-city conference of the Leningrad CPSU organization will continue work today. The conference has rescinded the decision of the joint plenum of the oblast committee and town committee. The decision was called "on the open CPSU letter to the country's communists as a politically erroneous one, facilitating a split in the Leningrad party organization." The participants expressed themselves in favor, in principle, of the setting-up of a communist party of the Russian Federation after the 28th CPSU Congress. At the same time they remarked that the holding of an initiative congress of communists of Russia within the CPSU is to a great extent premature.

Plant Workers Demand Independence for Enterprises

PM0905142990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Yevgeniy Solomenko report from Leningrad under the "Direct Line" rubric: "'Kirovskiy Zavod' Workers Throw Down the Gauntlet"]

[Text] The labor collective council of the Leningrad "Kirovskiy Zavod" Association has submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet a demand that full economic independence be granted to the collectives of all industrial enterprises.

The main propositions of this appeal to the country's parliament boil down to the following. A state enteprise must be able to dispose of its output itself, it must be able to decide to whom and on what terms it will sell it. Temporarily, for the duration of the transition to the market economy, this proposition will not apply to the state order. However, the state order must no longer be dictated from "above," it must be drawn up on a contractual basis as an agreement between the central "department" and the enterprise in question.

Enterprises must also be able to dispose of their entire net profit as they see fit. Payments must be made to soviet funds at city, republic, or country level, in accordance with the status of the plant or association. No payments to the ministry. According to the "Kirovskiy Zavod" workers, ministries and deparments must not act as landlords. The ministry should play the role of a middleman: If it secures an advantageous order for the enterprise, it will receive a percentage of the profit.

Once again the former "Putilovskiy" plant [old name of Kirovskiy Zavod] has proved its revolutionary character. The appeal of its labor collective council is a gauntlet thrown down to narrow departmental and local interests; no ministry, no present-day prototype of a sovnarkhoz [regional economic council] can be allowed to dictate its will to production workers; relations can be built only on the basis of equitable partnership!

"Why did we adopt this decision?" A. Zhitenev, member of the association's labor collective council and "Kirovskiy Zavod" party committee secretary, asks. "Because we are tired of making no headway. It is impermissible to preserve bureaucratic administration in the economy! It is necessary to radically restructure our economic life, and not somewhere in the distant future, but here and now."

The "Kirovskiy Zavod" labor collective council has urged the labor collective councils of other Leningrad enterprises to back its appeal.

Gorkiy City Soviet Votes To Change City's Name

PM0905140390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Anatoliy Yershov dispatch under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Restoring the City's Name"]

[Text] Gorkiy—A recent session of the Gorkiy City Council adopted a decision to restore the city's historical name—Nizhniy Novgorod. The decision has been sent for ratification by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Passions have long been raging on this subject. Thus, three years ago, a session of the city soviet's previous convocation voted... for the current name and, as was recorded in that decision, "this question will not be raised again in the future." But times are swiftly changing, and the deputies have now responded with understanding to public opinion in the city, which insists on the restoration of their native city's real name. After all, toponymy reflects our history and forms the people's memory. The name Nizhniy Novgorod must be restored to the city on the Volga as it bore this name over a period of many centuries until it was arbitrarily changed by Stalin in 1932 supposedly to immortalize the great proletarian writer. It is, incidentally, well known that M. Gorkiy had negative feelings about this....

Specialists from the Volga-Vyatka Department of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion conducted an opinion poll among the inhabitants of Gorkiy and the oblast, and the results showed that approximately one-half of people living in Gorkiy and one-third of the oblast's population advocated renaming the city.

The material costs associated with renaming the city are quite an important issue. An amount of R10 million was mentioned a few years ago and this, as executive committee members thought at the time, would in itself have been enough to stop any discussion on this subject among the city's inhabitants.

"A special commission comprising 17 persons was recently formed, which came to the conclusion that costs would amount to R2 million," A. Osokin, deputy chairman of the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee], says. "Although it cannot be ruled out that even these costs are overestimated."

New Tyumen Oblast First Secretary Interviewed

90UN1690A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Apr 90 pp 1, 2

[Report on interview with V. Chertishchev, new first secretary of the Tyumen CPSU Obkom, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent V. Bogodelov on his election victory: "The Loyalty of Siberia"]

[Text] Tyumen—*The first stage in the report and election conference of the oblast organization of the CPSU has ended. The competition in the election for first secretary of the obkom was keen. Six communists were still continuing to vie for this post right up to the "finish line." Among them were the senior organizer of the CPSU Central Committee, the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the deputy chairman of the Union committee on national education.... And the winner was Vladimir Sergeyevich Chertishchev, who was working as chairman of the Turkmen Republic People's Control Committee*

[Bogodelov] Vladimir Sergeyevich, first of all, it is probably necessary to explain to the readers how a "person from Central Asia" came to be a contender for the "number one" post of the largest party organization in Western Siberia?

[Chertishchev] I lived and worked here until 1985. Five years ago, the CPSU Central Committee reassigned me from the post of first secretary of the Tobolsk Gorkom [city party committee] to Turkmenia. The communists of Ashkhabad Oblast at first elected me second secretary, and later they elected me first secretary of the obkom [oblast party committee]. Last year, I was entrusted with the post of the republic's People's Control Committee.

[Bogodelov] As far as I know, at the beginning of this year, moreover, you became a people's deputy in Turkmenia?

[Chertishchev] And I will not hide the fact that I am proud of this. I was on the ballot in one of the rayons of Ashkhabad. There were three other contenders. During the election campaign I visited practically all of the homesteads of my constituents. I received more than 80 percent of the votes in the first stage of the elections.

[Bogodelov] But now it seems, how can I put it tactfully, you let your constituents down!

[Chertishchev] I was also reproached about this in Ashkhabad. But in the end, nonetheless, they accepted my arguments. Tyumen Oblast is in a difficult situation. A tense economic situation was aggravated by a crisis in the oblast party organization, which led to the resignation of the bureau of the CPSU obkom. And when I began to receive information about the nomination as a candidate to the post of first secretary, I considered that my place as a communist was in Siberia.

[Bogodelov] You were nominated by party members from Uray and Surgut, Tyumen, and Tobolsk....

[Chertishchev] Each of these cities in its own way is close and dear to me. My Tyumen Oblast biography began in 1967, when I moved from Krasnodar with my young wife to Uray. I worked on the oil pipeline, starting in the famous Shaimskiy fields. Then—Tyumen. I came to be the first secretary of the party committee of the "Sibkomplektmontazh." Well, further, instructor in the CPSU obkom, the second secretary of the Surgut Gorkom, and the first secretary of the Tobolsk Gorkom.

[Bogodelov] Judging by the fact that you are well-remembered in the oblast right up to the present, these were not simply rungs on the service ladder?

[Chertishchev] I am grateful to the communists for remembering me, for their trust. I will try to justify it.

[Bogodelov] In your speech at the conference, however, you rather critically assessed the activity of the obkom and its provisional bureau.

[Chertishchev] A lot of things were overlooked. A myriad of problems has to be resolved in quick order if we intend to fight for faith in the party.

[Bogodelov] The problem here, probably, is not only in the obkom or the provisional bureau. Let us look at the composition of the delegates of the conference. Forty percent are party, soviet, and trade union employees. 25 percent are administrative managers, and only nine percent are workers and ordinary villagers. Among the candidates nominated to the elective organs, communists "from the lathes" and "from the plows" represent approximately the same proportion. Nevertheless, you incessantly heard from the rostrum: We, they said, are a party of the working class and the peasantry.

[Chertishchev] I agree with you. I am convinced: At a minimum, half of the communists on the staff of the oblast committee should be rank and file workers. The same in the obkom bureau. Then it will be possible to talk seriously about the control of the party masses over the apparatus and about the ties of the party leadership to the masses.

The main reason for the crisis in the Tyumen party organization was, I believe, that the "staffs" cut themselves off and fenced themselves off from the communists. There is no use "going to the people" now. The appearance of a party leader anywhere in a shop frequently evokes only irritation, inasmuch as, they say, what is the benefit of it now? He cannot handle any of the shortages.... How do you take exception to this? I had numerous meetings before the conference with communists and with non-party workers. I recall how in one of the villages I came to a farm at 5 o'clock in the morning in order to talk with milkmaids immediately after the milking. I did not promise the women anything. However, after the conversation, they thanked me profusely. I asked what for. For the fact, they said, that at least you listened to us.

[Bogodelov] Vladimir Sergeyevich, you are assuming the post of first secretary at the height of heated explanations about the relations between the Tyumen oil industry workers and the government. Just during the last month, the demands of the Siberians were reviewed twice in the Council of Ministers. The position of the oil industry workers is sufficiently tough—all the way to stopping industries. What position do you intend to take? Or, perhaps, you share the view of a number of party committees that all of these are economic matters?

[Chertishchev] I believe: The demands of the oil industry workers are just, although I cannot accept the threat of a strike as an argument. As for the aloof position of the party committees.... Actually, in many cases now it is not the soviets who have the authority, but the economic managers. Under the conditions of the northern cities with their oil and gas monostructures, they now claim not only economic, but also political influence. They are making bombastic statements "in the name of the working class." It is a difficult situation, and it is still necessary to look into it thoroughly. But in any case, as we want to maintain the vanguard role of the party, we must not take the attitude of offended persons, but we must get into the thick of things.

So that people would again trust us, at least small moves for the better are needed. We also have to think about this very carefully. But we can do something now, not putting things off. For example, insist that city dwellers be allotted suburban plots of land not in the usual 4-6 hundredths [of a hectare], but 10-15 hundredths. Village residents should be allotted personal plots of 25-30 hundredths.

In the first days of May, an organizational plenum will be held of the new staff of the oblast party committee, at which a secretariat and working organs will be formed. At the beginning of June, the delegates of the conference will assemble again in Tyumen. During this period, the communists must develop a proposal for the platform of the oblast party organization.

[Bogodelov] In conclusion, just a few more lines for the biography of the new first secretary of the Tyumen CPSU Obkom. He was born in 1940. He has two engineering diplomas—food industry worker and oil industry worker. He graduated from the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee. He has been a member of the party since 1970. His wife is a design engineer. He has two sons.

Workers Movements Form 'Confederation of Labor'

PM0405154590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 4 May 90 p 4

[Report by special correspondents S. Bobrovskiy and A. Yermakov: "Hand With a Million Fingers.... First Congress of Country's Independent Workers Movements Held in Novokuznetsk"]

[Text] The workers movement, as it was represented until recently—Stakhanovites, communist teams' shock work—has been celebrated many times in poetry and lauded in songs that have rung out over the decades at May Day demonstrations.

On the eve of this year's May Day celebrations people representing a different kind of workers movement gathered in Novokuznetsk. They had announced themselves in no uncertain terms last July via the mass strikes by the miners of the Kuzbass and the other mining regions of the country. Today the workers (strike) committees, embryonic free trade unions, workers clubs, and other working people's organizations are becoming increasingly actively involved in social and political life.

"Our movement will be a really powerful and decisive force only when the fragmented organizations start to coordinate their efforts. It is time to embark on the path of unity"—these words, uttered in the organizing committee's report, reflected the delegates' general mood.

But it immediately became clear that unification is no easy task. In fact the assembly included representatives of more than 50 organizations (300 people) espousing different, sometimes conflicting platforms and conceiving the organization's ultimate goals and their place in it in a variety of ways.

"What do we need to create—a trade union or a party?"—the question was posed in that way by Vladimir Reznik, workers club member from Chelyabinsk. He wants a party. The delegate from the Leningrad Union of Workers Committees favored an independent trade union. "We are too weak for a party," a worker from Gorkiy suggested. "A trade union on social democratic principles—that is what we need."

Note that unanimity was not reached at the congress on the majority of questions under discussion. With one exception.

Many delegates who spoke on the first day had plenty of strong words to say about the apparatus, the partocracy, and the CPSU as a whole. "The CPSU cannot be regarded as a working class party," said Bulatkin, representative of the Gorkiy "Krasnoye Sormovo" political club. Delegate from Kemerovo Oblast Yerokhin called for a fight against the "mafia." It was also stated that the communist idea itself must perish once and for all. Evidently sensing approval in the auditorium, the speakers did not even bother with arguments in developing the now popular theme. There were voices of protest, although not from the platform, for some reason. During an interval we also saw Kuybyshev worker Isayev, member of the Marxist Workers Party-Party of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, trying to persuade an opponent: "No to the partocracy, which has ousted the working class from power! To those who are unthinkingly abandoning communist ideals and rejecting Marxism, we say: You've flipped, you guys!"

In his speech congress guest USSR People's Deputy N.I. Travkin urged support for the alternative—the "People's Anticommunist Party," which, he said, is in the process of being born. He was given a tumultuous ovation, but.... When a resolution was proposed in support of the new party, the congress rejected it.

The delegates spent a whole day "having it out" with the CPSU. There was practically no time left for the discussion of "internal" problems. Nor was there enough time for a detailed elucidation of positions on economic and organizational matters, for the elaboration of general tactics and strategy. Winding up the "Workers Party—Independent Trade Union" debate, the congress decided to create a... confederation. It is the first stage of unification. All movements and organizations that are collective members of the confederation remain sovereign and independent of one another and of the center in resolving political, financial, and organizational matters. The statutes of the Confederation of Labor (the name approved by the congress) lay down the general provisions: "The Confederation of Labor is a social and political association of workers movements and organizations of working people set up for the purpose of their consolidation and mutual assistance in activities to protect working people's rights, freedoms, and interests and transform society in accordance with the principles of democracy, humanism, and social justice."

Of course, the confederation of workers movements is not a "hand with a million fingers." Evidently conditions in society are not right for closer unification. Moreover, the new organization is already suffering factional stress. Even before the congress ended the "Platform of 33 Dissenters" and a trade union faction were formed.

But for all that, the first step has been taken. A center of crystallization has appeared in a hitherto fragmented workers movement. The statutes and declaration of the basic principles of the Confederation of Labor were adopted and a Council of Representatives formed. Its first session is planned for June.

Voronezh City Soviet Elects Clergyman

90UN1555A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Vladimir Komov in Voronezh: "The Preferred the Archimandrite"]

[Text] The news was unexpected for many people in the city: Archimandrite Nikon, the superior of Pokrovskiy Cathedral, was elected chairman of the Permanent Commission for glasnost, the mass media, and communications with social organizations of the Voronezh city soviet.

It took five rounds of voting at the session of the city soviet in order to elect the commission chairman. In the last round six candidates were entered on the list—a candidate of philosophical sciences, a deputy commander for the political section of a military school, two journalists, a sector leader of a scientific production association, and a clergyman. Supporting the candidacy of O. Mironov (Archimandrite Nikon) were Yu. Vlasov, deputy commander for the political section of the military school, who withdrew his candidacy; A. Gusev, secretary of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] rayon committee; and T. Karacharovskaya, deputy director of a secondary school.

O. Mironov received the majority of votes.

Vologda Oblast Deputy Expelled From Party

PM0205142190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 May 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent G. Sazonov under the rubric "Discussion Pamphlet No. 28": "'Party'... under General?"]

[Text] Vologda—In the report from Karelia under the heading "Dispute at the Crossroads" (Discussion Pamphlet No. 27) PRAVDA described how USSR People's Deputy A. Yudov asked to leave the party. But here is a case of the opposite kind. Despite his will and desire USSR People's Deputy V. Lopatin was expelled from the party. In defending his honor as a communist he was obliged to appeal to the CPSU Central Committee Party Control Committee and to the editorial office. What lies behind this situation?

Back at the elections Vladimir Lopatin—not a Vologda man by birth—obtained from the Vologda inhabitants, in a hard struggle, the largest number of votes and a people's deputy's seat. He tried to justify this trust. You can cite as many facts as you like. Here is a recent one. The deputy helped to prevent a strike at the Vologda region's largest enterprise—the No. 23 state ballbearings plant. He actively defends the region's interests against the center. Voters come to him.

But after his speech on military reform (Vladimir Nikolayevich is a servicemen) and after the exposure of high-ranking military men who had constructed expensive private dachas in the Moscow region using official money, after critical remarks directed against the Defense Ministry, he began to feel "pressure" at home (incidentally, he lives in a hostel with his family, he has no apartment). The pretext was the publication in the journal KOMMUNIST (No. 3, 1990) of the item "Defending the Defender," in which Major Lopatin also took part. The journal did not consider his arguments seditious. The General Staff assessed them differently: "He broke the secrecy regime." Enough, comrade officers, what secrets are there here? Many, many of the country's readers know of the spending of official funds on high-ranking officers' personal needs. Nonetheless the subunit where the people's deputy serves received a letter from Colonel General V. Korobushin with the instruction that Lopatin's statements were incompatible with membership of the Communist Party. The message was sent down to the primary party organization of the officers' house, where the deputy was registered. But the primary organization communists rejected the accusation. No personal proceedings were instituted. As though in retribution for its disobedience, the primary organization was immediately disbanded....

Lopatin was registered at the staff administrative party organization contrary to his wish (he asked to be registered at the subunit where he had served before). And a little while later Vladimir Nikolayevich telephoned the PRAVDA correspondent's center:

"Today," he announced, "my case is being investigated at a meeting. I warned that I could not attend: That is precisely the day the local press has announced the reception of working people, it cannot be repealed. I informed the command of this back on 1 April...."

Your PRAVDA correspondent decided to attend the meeting. To learn at first hand, as they say, what complaints the communists have against the people's deputy. Commander V. Zhdanov had no objection—come, he said. I was at the staff 20 minutes before the appointed time. For some reason Vladimir Mikhaylovich's mood had changed drastically. "But where is the written authorization to study Lopatin's case?" he said as he met me on duty. I explained I was fulfilling the editorial office's mission and I was interested in not military problems but party ones. "It's my party organization," the commander interrupted. "Things will be as I want...." He did not allow me to attend the meeting.

A strange "party," you will agree. Under a high-ranking officer. Strange secrets. But my visit to the subunit was not in vain—I managed to talk with the servicemen. Here, for instance, is what I was told by flight mechanic Valeriy Polevoy, a communist of 20 years' standing: "Lopatin is a very honest communist, a decent man. Of all the deputies there have been he is the only one who has helped us servicemen. Not verbally but in deeds. At his report to voters the auditorium was packed...."

"He is accused of breaking up the university of Marxism-Leninism," communist and serviceman Sergey Kononov noted. "But I am a student myself, I can confirm that is not so. There were shortcomings before, but they did not notice them. In addition Lopatin has his deputy's duties. According to the law. But our command does not want to consider that."

Communist Valeriy Ageyev: "The snag is that our subunit unanimously nominated him as candidate delegate to the 28th party congress. Our nomination was supported by several other units. So they are looking urgently for something to compromise him, to prevent him.... But we can see that Lopatin is doing his job and not simply engaging in idle talk...."

At the meeting which I was not allowed to attend Lopatin was expelled from the party. The next day the fact was made public in the auditorium where the oblast party conference had begun its work. V. Filippov, the delegate from Vologda, suggested that the conference create a commission to investigate the incident objectively. The presidium rejected the proposal: It is a case of a military unit's party organization, it said. Nonetheless Major A. Stolyarov, the delegate from that military unit, was obliged to mount the rostrum and give appropriate explanations.

"Yes, Lopatin was expelled yesterday," he confirmed, "for violating the statutes, as expressed in his loss of communication with the primary party organization at his place of registration and for dodging the fulfillment of his party and official duties. He did not pay his dues for three months...."

When I asked Stolyarov from the auditorium how long Lopatin had been registered in their party organization, he replied: two weeks.

But why did the esteemed major mislead the oblast party conference delegates? Lopatin was registered with the staff party organization 23 April. Yet two days later, 26 April, he was expelled by that party organization. What loss of communication is at issue? Yet this question did not arise at the deputy's previous place of party registration.

Now about his party dues. They were paid in full. Including April, which is recorded in the deputy's party card. Who needed this unfair shuffling, and why? I believe that the speech delivered at the conference by commander V. Zhdanov was also insincere. As for the disruption of work, here too the officers were cunning. After all, it was precisely from January through April that Lopatin, as chairman of the commission for military reform, was certified as relieved of his duties....

I cannot avoid the feeling that this whole story is reminiscent of a rapid act of reprisal and not an objective party investigation inasmuch as those who decided the question of his party membership did not even deign to meet with Lopatin and ask him for any explanations. Indeed, one can discern someone's obsequious and obliging agreement "not to allow Lopatin to attend the congress." At the same time real hothouse conditions have been created for anyone who wanted to attend the congress. At the oblast party conference the delegates spoke with indignation of the multiseat No. 14 okrug [national district] where (naturally without asking them) the communists of over 20 rayons were brought together). But who is running for the seats (incidentally, their number is being kept a deep secret)? The former and present first secretaries of the oblast committee, party city committee and rayon committee secretaries, the oblast soviet executive committee—in a word the "elite" and among them there is one rolling press operator and one lopping machine operator. That's internal party democracy for you. It is time not only to proclaim it from large and small rostrums but also to implement it in practice.

Contamination Threatens Reservoirs in Chelyabinsk

PM0905090590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 8 May 90 p 2

[Report by ZLATOUSTOVSKIY RABOCHIY correspondent N. Filyanov, followed by editorial comment, under general headline "Killer Water" and subheaded: "Chelyabinsk Oblast Population Concerned About Threat of Contamination of Drinking Water by Radioactive Waste"]

[Text] Chelyabinsk Oblast—Elderly inhabitants of Zlatoust tell the following tale: When the Gromotukha River flooded a defense enterprise in the late forties, Stalin himself tried to find it on the map—but in vain! A small river, but it had done a great deal of damage.

Since then Zlatoust has repeatedly found itself in deep water, but, as one can see, no conclusions have been drawn. For example, the city still has storm drains that were constructed in the last century by order of General Anosov (if only we could remember him). The dam that holds back the waters of the city reservoir was constructed before the revolution. Therefore, when the Ay and Bolshaya and Malaya Tesma Rivers burst their banks after three days of rain, melting the snow on the mountainsides, the gates had to be opened....

In a short time the streets of "Nakhalovka" (which is what people call the settlement of Kirovskiy) turned into a Venice of the Urals. Houses near the Kusa highway were under water. But the inhabitants were not in the mood for the bizarre—they had to sit it out on roofs, cupboards, and so on.

People were rescued by boat—there were no other facilities at hand. The water divided the city in two. The streetcar reached the "watershed," the passengers alighted, waded across, and reboarded.

Funny? Not really....

The workers at the V.I. Lenin machine building plant became unwilling "gondoliers"—the water had risen to a depth of 120 centimeters on the enterprise premises. Seven shops stopped working and the production of "Polyus" refrigerators came to a halt. The open-hearth and electric furnaces at the metallurgical plant were switched to "cold." Metallurgical production was paralyzed.

The water put an electricity substation out of action—a number of areas were left without power. Turbid streams of water were lapping near the rails of the Transsiberian Railroad.

Steps are being taken, as they say. Enterprises are quietly getting their work organized again. But a great deal of damage has been done. In all likelihood it will run into millions (if not tens of millions) of rubles. Housing has been affected (the residents had repeatedly complained to the authorities that they were sick of living under the threat of a flood).

A woman and a child died.

One could curse the forecasters, of course, for failing to give due warning, or complain about the rampaging elements. But it is not the first year the elements have gone on the rampage! And it is not the first year that flood commissions have been set up. So what good is it! [Filyanov reports ends]

There are several radioactive reservoirs on the territory of Chelyabinsk Oblast, formed as a result of many years of activity by the "Mayak" defense enterprise. Back in March the population was worried about rumors that during a flood they would overflow and drinking water would be contaminated. Our correspondent Sergey Smirnov contacted enterprise Deputy Director Yu. Tarasov. He replied that as a result of technical measures it had been possible to divert the floods from the reservoirs. There had been no marked rise in the water levels in the reservoirs.

Will we live?

New Tatar Weekly Published in Kuybyshev

LD3004132790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 30 Apr 90

[Summary] The (?BIRDEMLIK) [UNITY] weekly for the Tatar public of Kuybyshev Oblast has been set up. It is intended to promote the rebirth of the national culture, traditions, and customs of the Tatar people, as well as to improve interethnic relations in the Volga region.

Western Republics

Leaders Visit Kiev Victory Day Celebration

PM1005081790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 May 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Feat Achieved by the Whole People"]

[Text] Kiev, 8 May—A ceremonial meeting was held today in the "Ukraina" Culture Center to mark the 45th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory over Hitlerite fascism. Representatives of the hero-city's working people and veterans of the Great Patriotic War and the Armed Forces took part in it.

Colonel General B.V. Gromov, commander of the Red-Banner Kiev Military District, delivered a report.

V.A. Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, addressed the meeting.

On the same day flowers and wreaths were laid at the V.I. Lenin monument, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on Glory Square, and the monument to Hero of the Soviet Union Army General N.F. Vatutin.

V.A. Ivashko, other republic leaders, members of the Red-Banner Kiev Military District and Western Border District Military Councils, and veterans of the Great Patriotic War took part in the ceremony.

More on Parade

LD1005120890 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 9 May 90

[Excerpts] The military parade was held on Zhovtneva Revolyutsiya Square. Colonel General Gromov, Hero of the Soviet Union and commander of the Kiev military area, inspected the troops on parade. He greeted the servicemen and congratulated them on the victory anniversary holiday.

Afterwards, the commander made a speech in which he stressed that the victory over fascism was achieved by the joint effort of all the peoples of our homeland. A number of countries were liberated. Thanks to the joint efforts of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, peace took over on the continent. Boris Gromov underlined that this holiday is being marked in conditions of a fundamental renewal of the country and democratization of all walks of life. The new defense doctrine is being implemented. [passage omitted]

The troops then reformed for the march past and the parade in honor of the 45th anniversary of the great victory began. First to march past was a company of young drummers. On the platform were leaders of the Ukraine, military dignitaries, war veterans, and public representatives. [passage omitted]

Next the assault troops marched past. In the past war they were trained to carry out hundreds of daring actions against the fascists, both on land and at sea. They were also parachuted into the enemy's rear, rallying around themselves hundreds of thousands of partisans. [passage omitted]

The losses on our side were huge because throughout the war Stalin adhered to his own horrible rule: to attain the objective regardless of losses. Human life for him meant simply numbers in the hidden statistics. On his orders, millions of Soviet citizens were forced through the filter of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, those who had spent time as prisoners of war in German captivity or remained under fascist occupation. Vast numbers of them died, having been punished by long terms in Stalinist camps. However, ths page of Stalinist lawlessness has not as yet been fully opened. [passage omitted]

And then our correspondent, Andriy Sylenko, met with Volodymyr Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee Communist Party:

[Begin Ivashko recording] In 1945 I was 13 years old. I remember well the date 9 May 1945. It was as sunny as today. Only he who personally saw, who himself felt the sence of victory, can understand how much this day means in the life of the Ukrainian people. This is a sacred tradition, this is a day of memory, a day of sadness, a day of celebration—all of these feelinsgs are woven into this day. In my view, to forget our popular human traditions is one of our greatest mistakes. We cannot do this. If we persist in doing it, then sooner or later, now or in 10 years' time, people will curse us for neglecting what we received from our fathers and grandfathers. Therefore, for me personally, this anniversary appears as a holiday of freedom of the Ukrainian people, its liberation from oppression and occupation, and from all those terrible things we had been through. This holiday is always sacred for me. And I am so pleased at seeing so many people who have come here to take part in the celebrations. [end recording]

The parade continued with the military hardware rolling past: powerful armored carriers, vehicles with motorized troops and reaktiv guns—the grandaughters of the legendary kathyushas. [passage omitted]

Of course, we do not forget and we highly value the assistance given to us then by our allies in increasing the combat capacity of our Armed Forces, particularly the deliveries within the lend-lease agreement. Throughout the war we received from them nearly four percent of the military technology our Army possessed at that time. Nonetheless, it amounted to considerable help and we are sincerely thankful to our war allies. [passage omitted]

Nationalists Protest at Lvov Victory Day Parade

PM1005091990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 May 90 First Edition p 4

[Dispatch by correspondent Colonel V. Bogdanovskiy: "With Their Own Flag"]

[Text] Lvov, 9 May—The weather on Victory Day in Lvov turned out to be well suited to a holiday—warm and sunny. I shall not say that the whole city came out onto the streets and squares. Nonetheless many of those who sincerely wanted to greet and give best wishes to those who, sparing neither their blood nor their actual lives during the Great Patriotic War, defended the honor and freedom of the fatherland, gathered in the center.

The holiday seemed to have been successful. But some people wanted to cast a shadow over it. The last parade column had not had time to pass by the rostrum before a small group of young people with a poster reading "Death to the empire! Freedom for the nations!" broke off from the "speakers' corner" which has become renowned in Lvov. Here too were an elderly man in Cossack uniform and several more young people carrying a portrait of Stepan Bandera and a red and black flag. The people surrounding them took this escapade as an insult. They tried to reason with the young people and to stop them but even the considered words of gray-haired people had no effect. Especially as there were also defenders of the young people. Some people were already shouting: "There's democracy now, we have the right" and "Go back to Russia and give orders there...."

In brief, in May we are encountering not for the first time the noisy "democrats" who obviously do not care for our holidays.

Ukrainian Group Shows Support for Lithuania

LD1005100990 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0829 GMT 10 May 90

[Speech to Lithuanian Supreme Council session by unidentified female representative of Rukh (Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka) in Russian—live relay]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted]

The participants in a conference of representatives of democratic movements and organizations held in Kiev on 5 and 6 May 1990 condemn the actions of the president of the USSR, the Presidential Council, and the Government of the USSR in relation to the republic of Lithuania, and express their resolve to oppose the policy of economic blockade of Lithuania. They decided:

First, to carry out our political line of dismantling the [word indistinct] state political structures by means of creating independent states which will themselves determine their international legal status.

Second, to promote the expansion of direct economic and trading ties with the republic of Lithuania, with the intention of using the existing situation as an opportunity for our switch of the economy from colonial distribution relations to the international market.

Third, at the level of our organizations and movements, to provide humanitarian aid and, so far as is possible, to make deliveries of foodstuffs and vitally necesary goods to the republic of Lithuania as a disaster area. [passage omitted]

Lvov Rally Backs Dismissed Committee Chief

PM2304153990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[Correspondent V. Drozd report: "Comprehension. Former First Secretary and His Defenders"]

[Text] Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic—A rally was in full swing in front of the obkom [oblast party committee] building. The second one in a comparatively short time. However, whereas the first one was similar to those that have swept the whole country and demanded the resignation of the obkom and its first secretary so vigorously that even "Rukh" [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka] was forced to dissociate itself from the gathering, this time the "Rukhites" found themselves alongside people who had raised banners proclaiming "Hands off Ya. Pogrebnyak!" And individual party workers behaved no less emotionally there. What, then, has happened in the "holy family" of informal associations, if they have turned their boat around so abruptly? And what has brought together in one "crew" people with such different convictions? And yet, are they different?

On that day an obkom plenum was deciding the first secretary's fate and how to act in the new political situation in Lvov Oblast. The very combination of these questions made this plenum unlike all previous ones. And yet passions rose precisely over the "organizational conclusions," since it was precisely because of the position of the obkom first secretary and the obkom bureau that party members found themselves on the "opposition benches" of public life in the oblast. This was why both the plenum and the events around it attracted such close attention not only in the region.

Having begun unusually, the plenum continued in a way that is rare even for the present times: At about midnight local television invited viewers to a meeting with the first secretary who had laid down his powers and with V. Sekretaryuk, the newly elected obkom first secretary. A comparison of their statements merely proves how difficult the oblast party organization now finds it to comprehend its new, unaccustomed fate.

What has changed in it? It is possible to understand only after replying to several "whys." Why have the local organizations of the DBU [Democratic Bloc of the Ukraine], which gained an absolute majority on the soviets, suddenly shown such concern over the internal party affairs of communists, whom in other instances they would keep at arm's length? Why, having advanced the slogan "Soviets without communists," heaped a pile of fabrications and slander on the CPSU, soviet power, and the Soviet Union, and applied the most monstrous expressions to them, have they suddenly shown such concern over the fate of the obkom first secretary? (I will remark, by the way, that it would be strange even to presume that the leaders of the DBU would permit such overt interference in their own affairs or report back on anything to their own activists—which is what they indefatigably seek from party committees. Why such interest in the party from which power in the region has "ebbed away"? There is no denying that the method of misleading people and distracting them from one's promises has been tested not just today). Why did they proclaim the plenum participants "plotters" who had raised their hand against democratic processes? Why, finally, did Communist people's deputies and certain party workers find themselves alongside the rally participants?

The answer is both simple and difficult at the same time. It is simple if you consider that almost from the DBU's birth the forces that have gathered within it have enjoyed virtually most-favored status and operated under conditions of the obkom's "ideological neutrality." This was the course laid down for party committees by the then obkom first secretary. This is why party members found themselves without a rudder and sails, as it were, in a raging sea of public passions. Their nonresistance to evil both strengthened separatist, nationalist sentiments in local organizations of the DBU and occasioned defeat in the elections and served as a pretext for ousting party members from labor collectives.... This pretext is "substantiated" as follows: In a democratic state, they say, labor collectives must be outside politics. This is an explanation designed for simpletons. For there is no end of examples where the DBU hurriedly fills a vacuum before it has had time to form. Or here a leader of Shevchenkovskiy Rayon Soviet declares: Let us ban the Komsomol [Lenin Communist Youth League] and the young pioneer organization. In order to deliver children and young people from politics? On the contrary. They are clearing the way for a Bandera-type youth organization.

Reckoning that their election victory gives them complete freedom of action, from the very first days the DBU deputies began "cooking" decisions and making speeches which in no way conform to the republic's Constitution. In the economy: We do not need anything of "yours," i.e. from the country and the republic, but we will not give up "ours" either. In politics: We will unite with Ternopol and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts and create joint detachments for self-defense (against whom?—V.D.). In interethnic relations: We will send volunteers to Lithuania and turn it into Spain. (A familiar style—to decide for both the Ukrainian and the Lithuanian peoples at a stroke, without asking their opinion). In this way they hastily give a "legal basis" to their election statements: It is necessary to carry out not restructuring but construction in the republic. These concepts would seem to share a single, creative root. But that is just the root. What of the crown? It is only possible to restructure something that already exists. But it is possible to construct only on an empty space, starting from zero. So this is heard increasingly frequently in the oblast soviet: "Before us" there was nothing. Hence, if you discard the wordy format, this conclusion suggests itself: A new chronology begins "with us." And since Lvov Oblast, they say, is a small island of freedom and genuine people's power in the Ukraine, we can expect just about anything from the dictators in Moscow and Kiev. But we must not lose heart, they say. Fellow countrymen abroad and foreign firms (some hope!—V.D.) will help to assert "their" order first in the region and then also in the republic. The ultimate aim of these intentions is to take the Ukraine out of the USSR. And they do not conceal the fact that republic people's deputies from Lvov Oblast are prepared to try to achieve this aim even in the new Ukrainian parliament. Foreseeing that they would not encounter unanimous support there, they prepared in advance a charge against the republic Supreme Soviet: It is "wrong" in terms of its composition and does not express the Ukrainian people's aspirations.

Simultaneously with the offensive by DBU forces a polarity of opinions is also being manifested increasingly clearly among party members. Various clubs, platforms, and programs paint different pictures of the Ukrainian Communist Party's future. Some see it as a separatist organization of a parliamentary type. Others see it with a thoroughly eroded organizational structure. Yet others see it as part of the CPSU, but absolutely independent of the center. Here really sensible suggestions are no longer of substantial significance for, in the final analysis, they do not alter the essence. Their realization will produce not a combat vanguard but an amorphous formation ready to fit in with sentiments but not to tackle the difficult work of shaping them. Having such a "sheaf" of directions, certain party members, as Prof. V. Orlov graphically put it at the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum, are already looking for someone to surrender to....

Outwardly, the authors of the proposed reforms appear to be acting for the good of the party. But in actual fact their efforts are aimed at blowing up the party from within in its name. No one on the obkom has yet tried to explain this difference between the aims and their "format." Sometimes party members find it hard to understand the intricacies of attractive formulas, and they take a great deal on trust and so become the social base of various kinds of "reformers."

Individual rayon committees and party committees of large city enterprises noticed this danger (the DBU's growing influence and increasing disagreements among party members) as early as last fall and sounded the alarm then. They demanded the convening of report-and-election party conferences and the resignation of the gorkom [city party committee] and the obkom. For a while the "disturbers of the peace" on the obkom were pacified. As time went on, however, the more supporters the idea of strengthening the obkom and gorkom leadership gained. A day was even appointed for an obkom plenum. It was thwarted, however: The obkom bureau and the action group created by party committee secretaries failed to reach agreement on the procedure for holding it. In all probability the DBU, which was engaged in forming organs of power, was reckoning that the initiators of the holding of a plenum would not keep their word. And when the DBU saw for itself that the plenum would still take place, they feverishly cranked up their propaganda machine to maximum revolutions.

The then obkom first secretary also helped them crank the flywheel. He declared at one conference, not without his sights on the distant future: I would be glad to work some more, but the CPSU Central Committee Politburo is pensioning me off. It is not hard to imagine how pleased the DBU was at such a "gift" and what capital they endeavored to make out of it. The purport of the ballyhoo raised by the DBU boiled down to the claim that reactionary party functionaries had conceived a "palace coup." And certain party workers—supporters of the "Democratic Platform" and the "independent" Ukrainian Communist Party—took alarm. On the day of the obkom plenum they fired a salvo of appeals, a statement, and a resolution in the pages of the oblast Komsomol newspaper MOLODA GALICHINA (the former LENINSKA MOLOD), which recently defected to the DBU. If you discard the political blather, their essence is the same: Hands off the obkom first secretary.

And so DBU activists, people's deputies who were party members (some of them have already said they have left the CPSU), and party workers found themselves all together. The extremities came together. They were united by the presentiment that their monopoly on the region's political life was coming to an end.

The situation required the obkom plenum to at once clearly define its position on very urgent problems. Above all, how to build its relations with the DBU and with the soviets formed from its representatives. This was the conclusion: Without waiving principles, to do everything to seek cooperation with regard to the region's well-being and the people's better life. An extremely important conclusion, if you take into account the fact that the oblast party organization found itself in opposition. Comprehension of the fact that, having assumed power, they must not look down patronizingly on communist specialists is even becoming apparent in individual statements by DBU leaders on local soviets. The very near future will probably show which of these declarations will be followed by deeds and which will remain just words...

Lvov Deputies, Oblast Newspapers Dispute Reported

90UN1691A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 28 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent L. Sotnik, Lvov: "The Bank Notes Are Rustling...."]

[Text]**The first session of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies is continuing its work. However, it is difficult to call what is occurring "work," because the preparation and approval of constructive documents whose aim is to resolve economic and social problems of the region are being held up for various reasons. One of the reasons is a conflict that has arisen between the deputies and the obkom [oblast party committee] of the Ukrainian Communist Party. What is the gist of it?**

Two oblast newspapers are published in the Lvov region—LVOVSKAYA PRAVDA (in the Russian language) and VILNA UKRAINA—as joint organs of the obkom [oblast party committee] and the oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]. No one had any doubts about the legality of this until a democratic bloc came to power in the oblast. But the times have changed, and so a number of deputies raised a question about transferring VILNA UKRAINA to the oblast soviet in order to publish it exclusively as an organ of Soviet authority. However, the deputies proposed to the obkom that it take over LVOVSKAYA PRAVDA completely. But it was not possible to resolve the question of the publishing organs peacefully. The party obkom plenum adopted a resolution which affirmed that both newspapers are organs of the obkom and the oblispolkom. As to the claims of the soviet for its own publishing organ, it was proposed that it resolve the existing problem in the established legal way.

It would seem that everything was proper and reasonable. However, there was a sharp difference in the opinion of the deputies and the members of the bureau of the Lvov Obkom on the meaning of the word "legality." The deputies refer to the article of the Constitution which views the decrees of the organs of Soviet authority as binding on all citizens, enterprises, and organizations that reside in the territory in question. The conclusion? If the oblast party organization does not abide by a decree of the session of the soviet of people's deputies, of course, it is violating the law and is embarking on a course... of anti-Soviet activity. It is precisely this conclusion that is reflected in the special appeal to citizens that was adopted in the session by an absolute majority (one vote against). Thus, we have run into a hitherto unknown precedent: The party is an anti-Soviet organization?! Incidentally, the very same appeal has an eloquent paragraph which directs the oblast prosecutor to begin an investigation into the fact of illegality of the actions of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Obkom.

That is the way events look in the impassive statement. But passions around them are aroused and seething, spilling over also onto the streets and into work collectives. And, alas, the hard position of the obkom is not finding much sympathy and support anywhere. What is worse is that it has begun to lose even the little support it had in the soviets previously.

And several words about the situation in the session auditorium. Here, as in sessions of a higher rank, everyone calls for political culture, but the deputies quite often then and there demonstrate examples of a lack of culture and of intolerance. What point is there, for example, to the appeal of one of them to start a collection of signatures concerning a ban on the activity of the Communist Party of the Ukraine on the territory of the oblast? And this announcement and many similar ones are frequently greeted with applause.

Observing the session auditorium closely, I feel like asking myself this question once more: Where am I? In the financial transactions department of State Bank, at a church service, at an amateur arts concert.... Where does this strange combination of feelings come from? The fact is that the numerous delegations of citizens (including children's collectives) not only welcome the elected representatives, but they also present them Easter cakes, greet them with Christ's resurrection, sing songs, read poetry.... At the same time, bank notes are rustling in the presidium and are being arranged in tight bundles. These are donations from citizens for payment of direct television transmissions from the session. At the time I was submitting this report to the editorial office, about R300,000 had already arrived at the presidium session.

Minsk Democratic Platform Member Expelled

PM2404134790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 1

[Report by L. Dulinets under the rubric "Situation": "How They Expelled Him from Party"]

[Text] Minsk—Circumventing the party group and primary party organization of the specialized technical design bureau and counter to the decision of the primary organization party committee and, moreover, in absentia, the party committee of the "Integral" science and production association expelled Sergey Popkov, leader of one of the departments of the specialized technical design bureau from the party. The reason given for the expulsion? Violation of the party statutes.

This news so upset the "Integral" communists that the election of the candidate delegate to the 28th party congress scheduled for tomorrow had to be cancelled at short notice—many of them discerned a direct connection between Popkov's contentious expulsion from the party and the forthcoming elections.

The point is that the day before a number of "Integral" party organizations had nominated Sergey Popkov, people's deputy of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], leader of the party debating club at the enterprise and cochairman of the "Communists for Perestroyka" city party debating club attached to the political enlightenment center, as the contender for a delegate's seat at the 28th congress: Popkov's popularity (it was confirmed by the recent elections to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet) is very high.

Formally Popkov was expelled for failing to pay his party dues. But the situation requires elucidation. At the end of last year, having seen on the "Vzglyad" program an item about the children's hematology center in Minsk, the communists of the department in which Sergey works decided to temporarily freeze the party dues funds and sent a letter to the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee expressing the belief that the apparatus is directly to blame for the tragic plight of the Chernobyl children. They demanded that a Belorussian Communist Party congress be convened and that all funds from the fourth main administration be passed on immediately to save the children and that benefits and increments for the party apparatus be renounced immediately. The decision to freeze party dues and the reasons which pushed the communists to this step were announced in the CPSU Central Committee. But the communists did not actually receive a reply from the party instances. That is why they took an independent decision—to put 50 percent of party dues into the "Chernobyl children" fund. And to return the remaining debts to the party coffers. Popkov asked the meeting that the entire sum of his party dues go into the fund to help the children....

The specialized technical design bureau party committee examined the case of communist Popkov and reprimanded him, giving him three days to extinguish the debt. But the next day a higher ranking instance—the "Integral" production association party committee—repealed this decision and expelled Sergey Popkov from the party.

Popkov is one of the initiators of the conference of supporters of the "Democratic Platform" in Minsk. Attitudes to this fact may vary, but the question arises, why is a decision taken in circumvention of the party group and primary party organization? That was precisely what the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Youth Communist League] congress delegates were afraid of when they appealed to the country's communists.

Today the communists of the party organization to which Sergey Popkov belonged are trying to dispute the party committee decision. They believe the party committee flagrantly violated the Statutes.

Belorussian Chernobyl Measures Criticized

90UN1610A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 2

[Report by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent O. Yegorova: "Living With Radiation"]

[Text] Gomel Oblast—*Seventy percent of the territory affected by Chernobyl is in Belorussia. Its land and people are waiting for help from the world.*

At first glance it would seem that Svetlana Savenok and her family have been lucky. They were quickly given a two-room apartment in the settlement of Vorotyn at the "Rodina" sovkhoz [state farm], which was built after the accident. The house is a farmhouse type—they have their own little garden and cultivated beds. The children have plenty of room. But how many times I heard her say "No, no one here will talk to you about happiness...."

Before the tragedy they used to live in the same neighborhood as their parents; they were only four kilometers away from each other. Now everyone has been settled in different places—they have lost their relatives and people they had known for years, and hundreds of villages have been dispersed across the wide world....

For the first two years or so that they lived in the new place it was exactly like a railroad station building: No one tended the garden or raised the chickens. The rumors came and went: The neighboring village has been re-evacuated. People have returned home. Someone will give the word suddenly, tomorrow, and they will return to their own Kozhushka or Dovlyady, is this not so...?

Some are still waiting even now. But it seems that the Savenoks have reconciled themselves to it: Last year they turned in three suckling pigs to the state and planted two apple trees in the garden, along with nut trees and shrubs. And the main thing is that a daughter has been born into the family; this is now home for her. And the settlement has turned out not to be so bad: Social, cultural, and other services have been organized and her husband, a tractor driver, earns a good wage. They live in a more or less friendly fashion with the neighbors; in a "prefabricated" village this is always a problem. So why are those who have settled there not happy? It is nothing out of the ordinary: Local people have been waiting for years for a new apartment or house, and then just get pushed aside. The same amount of buckwheat in the store is not enough for everyone. The victims get it, the local people do not. Try explaining all that to people so that they understand properly.

Mikhail Bazulko, an expert on radiation protection from the Gomel Oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] who traveled down with me, told me about his own parents, who are now still living in the so-called zone of optional resettlement. What does this mean? If you want to leave, you leave. If you want to stay, you stay. But just remember: You cannot catch the fish in the river. It is also in particular forbidden to collect the mushrooms and berries in the forest.

"And how did they live before the accident?" Mikhail asks me. "I never once went south with my family for a vacation. They have everything there in the new settlements. Only they have a whole sack of dried white mushrooms, not to mention berries. There is fishing, hay, grass.... And all of this has become impossible—we have sinned against nature and against ourselves. Now everything is buried in the ground—everything, lock, stock, and barrel.

Truth to tell, I never thought I would hear such things: The countryside is like a graveyard. I know of only one other place like it in the world—Khatyn. It turns out that there is another. The no less dreadful graveyard of the villages. There are several of them around the rayon center at Bragin. Only you would not believe that people are living so close to deadly danger....

But they are. They are living there and they are raising children. At the rayon center at Khoyniki a new birthing facility was recently commissioned. Four years after the catastrophe people are living and receiving their "share of radiation" every hour. They are living there because they do not know where to go. Neither do they know how harmful it is to live there. They do not know what to do.

"People are living even where the barbed wire has been put up, dozens of old people," Vitaliy Nikolayevich Sych, deputy chairman of the Gomel Oblispolkom, [oblast soviet executive committee] told me. "And what is to be done with them? You cannot take the old fellows out by force. And it is a complex matter to deal with the people from the villages—people have started to return home, when they are ordered off to foreign parts the social tensions grow."

"No one talks about happiness...." I remember Svetlana Savenok. And in the village of Savichi every one repeats those words. They have gone in large numbers around the republic, and no one asked them there.

And the colors are not the same. And they sing different songs. But it seems that they have not really traveled far. They waved goodbye to the radiation and returned home to the zone of strict control.

"It is wonderful," says front line worker Ivan Romanovich Bereznyatskiy. "The telephone works, we listen to the radio and watch television. And no one registers you in the village. There are a hundred families in the village, including some who are registered nowhere. It is as if Savichi does not exist."

But in fact Savichi is considered to be a depopulated village. At the same time the mobile store goes there with essential products, and in other villages they have even opened stores, but they do not give them additional payments. They say that it is not authorized. And so they are villages, but at the same time they are not villages. So can they live there, or not?

The answer is unambiguous: They cannot, the radiation is high.

"But who will tend the memorial to the fallen soldiers?" Ivan Romanovich naively continues his story. "It is almost the 45th anniversary of the victory. You cannot just abandon the land, the house, the graves. If any of those who have gone away die, they will still be brought back here for burial, in their own place."

On the street the boarded up homes alternate with lovingly well-kept yards: It is spring, time for sowing. People are sowing potatoes. And everything else that you find in home gardens. And they have no guarantee that they will grow clean produce. Work it out for yourself: internal irradiation plus external radiation in the produce. But they stopped thinking about that long ago. As god gives, they say, so shall we live. And it is not true at all that the people in the villages are old people. Three months ago a child was born even in Savichi. What can it expect?

No one knows the answers to many, many questions. No properly organized information service has yet been set up in the oblast, and there is insufficient housing in the clean areas. And so people are wandering about the republic in search of some kind of refuge.

In this connection I recall a conversation with V.V. Grigoryev, first secretary of the Vitebsk Obkom [oblast party committee], who four years ago offered his area for the resettlers. But of course it was not done without rhyme or reason, but with a comprehensive program drawn up before hand in the first year, not four years later, as is the case now. The obkom secretary proposed that settlements be built in the Vitebsk area, not close to the zone—how many resources and how much construction material was squandered on those villages, in which, it now turns out, it is impossible to live! They would not listen to those voices at that time.

Who else, apart from us, would permit such criminal waste?

But even today they continue to build "not there." In the Gomel area alone there are 19 settlements, and no one knows what will happen with them. When the construction started the Ministry of Health gave its consent: Build, live there, it's safe. And they built. And then? That same Ministry of Health forbids anyone to live there: The neighborhood is contaminated with radionuclides above the permissible level. Is there no blame here? Meanwhile, 3,000 people have been forcibly resettled from the zone to the Gomel area because there was nowhere else for them to go. And in the Mogilev area 34,000 people, including children, are living in the control zone. The fate of each person and each child is tragedy on a human scale. Are we all today hearing the bells of Chernobyl tolling...?

I think that the problem of those resettled in Belorussia is much more delicate and dramatic. And for some reason little is now being said about this. The Belorussian people have since time immemorial been used to living in the one place. Their native hearth is here, the most precious of what is precious to them. Before the catastrophe fewer people left the republic than immigrated into it. Now everything has change. Migration processes are poorly controlled. Where is this leading? Now is the time to ask the sociologists, the demographic experts, the economists, the politicians. Surely history has known no tragedy that has so affected people who for various reasons have lost their permanent way of life. The consequences cannot be predicted when a people is being lost....

Anatoliy Alekseyevich Golovach, a candidate of medical sciences and a psychotherapist with great practical experience, is seriously concerned about this new medical and social problem. People living in the zone (and the zone covers virtually the entire republic if we take into account all the resettlers and those who have been through the crucible of the cleanup following the catastrophe) should be carefully studied. It is not only "radiation phobia" and nostalgia that should be of interest to the scientists here but also the effect of low doses of radiation on the nervous system and a person's psyche.

But it is common knowledge that we have no psychotherapists....

Up to now there has been no special diagnostic center in Gomel Oblast for catastrophe victims. And what about the radiation centers? There is a shortage of physicians—Gomel Oblast has one-third of the number it needs. Just as in the best years of stagnation, the departmental allocation of medical care has been adopted. What can be more immoral than a situation in which the local chemicals plant (which is daily polluting the atmosphere with impunity) is pumping out money to acquire imported medical equipment to provide free health care services for its workers? The "outsiders" pay regular money for these same services.

In the local hospitals there are shortages of basic medicines, vitamins and the simplest drugs to improve immunity. Against this backdrop the size of the catastrophe just multiplies, thanks to our usual slipshod way and our indifference and astonishing complacency, as if the situation will change all by itself.

No, there will be no miracle. We need enormous resources, and I think that the R18 billion on which the hopes of the republic program for the cleanup after Chernobyl have been based, will amount only to a miserable pittance compared to the resources that are needed. And the worth of the ruble is declining with each passing day.

So what if we are beggared—there is nothing to be ashamed of in that. Today virtually the whole world is offering us help. Some send disposable syringes, others the latest medical equipment and drugs, or, like Fidel Castro, they accept children who are victims into their own clinics for treatment. Not long ago an international nongovernmental organization, "Physicians for Peace," offered its services, assuring us that it could start its actions literally in only a few days. And then what?

It turns out that in order for us to resolve this "problem" we need permission from the government! But do the people still not need help, even if a decision has not been made? For it is a question of hundreds of thousands of people, millions if we include the Ukraine and Russia. So is it finally time to come to our senses and open up all possible borders for help, from no matter where it may come? It is time to make this help, just like the misfortune that has befallen us, national and worldwide. And there is no need to fear saying out loud the number of the account to which money can be transferred for the victims fund: 700073 Minsk, Operations Office of the Belorussian Republic Zhilsotsbank of the USSR, Interbranch Transactions 40019.

This was exactly how these problems were presented by those attending the interrepublic scientific-practical conference "Chernobyl: The Socioeconomic and Moral Aspects," which took place in Gomel. One of its sponsors (in addition to the informal organizations) was the Gomel Oblispolkom, whose leaders have been actively involved in the debate on the very acute problems, which they themselves named: The process of compartmentalization is complex and no concept has yet been approved for safe residence. One can only guess what will happen. Which is immoral—the lifetime 35 rem that has been suggested by the scientists in Moscow or the concept of clean produce for which the scientists in Belorussia have been fighting for so long?

"We do not now have Union support on many burning issues," said Nikolay Grigoryevich Voytenkov, chairman of the Gomel Oblispolkom, "and the problem of self-sufficiency for the oblast in terms of foodstuffs has still not been fully resolved. Nor has the question of foodstuffs going outside the oblast. There are no travel passes for health maintenance for children; the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions issued only one-third of what was requested. There is no comprehensive support anywhere, from medical assistance to resettlement. There are not even any leaflets on correct behavior in contaminated areas."

"At the same time," the oblispolkom chairman continued, "we are not sitting on our hands. As long ago as 1988 we took up and reviewed the interim maximum permissible level of radionuclides for meat and milk, and lowered them by factors of three to five...."

Humane. And where did these interim maximum permissible levels of contamination for water, air, or foodstuffs come from? Were they taken out of thin air by the Ministry of Health? For nowhere on earth do "permissible" doses of radiation exist. Even the smallest doses above the background level are already a danger, a misfortune.

It would seem that everything is very simple: No complicated mathematical calculations are needed here. But it turns out that what is complicated is changing anything. It is even more complicated to live in accordance with an elementary moral standard.

In four years no one has learned how to live with radiation.

Tension Over Housing Increasing in Moldavia

PM2604150790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent Colonel N. Mulyar article under the rubric "Political Situation": "Moldavia: Military Protest"]

[Text] Kishinev—Despite the outward calm, the situation in Kishinev is complex. It has been caused by the work of the republic's new Supreme Soviet, which, it is estimated, will last more than two months. There are around 40 points on its agenda, including the law "On Changes to Articles 6,7, and 49 of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution (Basic Law)," points relating to the Communist Party's role in society, and the law "On the Moldavian SSR's State Symbols," on the basis of which amendments will be submitted to Articles 167 and 168 of the republic's Constitution. At the same time, it is planned to discuss the draft laws "On Moldavian SSR Citizenship," "On Moldavian SSR Sovereignty," and other documents. Naturally, there will be debates at the session, and deputies will state their opinions, often mutually exclusive. But the process whereby solutions are elaborated in the course of acute discussions is normal today. However, passions are being whipped up around the session every day.

Pickets are constantly to be seen outside the Supreme Soviet Presidium building. There are groups of people carrying banners. Their contents differ. They range from demands for the abolition of the Communist Party to demands for the creation of a national army. People's emotions know no bounds. The pickets are aggressive. They have been making threats against deputies whose position strikes them as unacceptable. Threats against journalists are becoming a reality, too. Quite recently a group of enraged youths attacked Central TV's own correspondent Ivan Petkov and gave him a severe beating. Hostile things have also been said against the military.

"During the recess," republic People's Deputy Colonel V. Zagorodniy told me, "I decided to talk with the people. They received me amicably and asked me many questions. The dialogue was already nearing an end when a stranger suddenly appeared and went right onto the attack: 'Hightail it back to Russia, occupier!' And right away the people's mood changed...."

"Fuel was added to the fire by the TV appearance by V. Pushkash, deputy chairman of the Moldavian Supreme Soviet Presidium, who stated that for various reasons the situation in the republic with regard to citizens' housing provision is difficult," Colonel V. Terebov recounted. "Here is what he said: 'One of the reasons often given for the housing shortage is the migration process—that is, the presence in our republic of military men and specialists from other regions, often at the invitation of our enterprise leaders who are clearly not particularly concerned about the apartment situation in the republic and who take on people who could be found locally.' He went on to talk about suspending the operation of the USSR Council of Ministers resolution 'On Measures to Improve Housing Provision for Officers, Warrant Officers, Ensigns, and Extended-Service Servicemen Discharged to the Reserve or Retired' on the republic's territory. I soon felt the result of this explanation by Pushkash with regard to myself. At a trolleybus stop in the city center three men came up to me and started demanding that we leave our apartments and go back to Russia before it was too late...."

"Some people in Kishinev are deliberately whipping up people's feelings, encouraging ill will toward people in uniform, and spreading rumors that military people are commandeering many apartments allegedly built out of the city budget," Officer V. Kolesov noted. "In actual fact we ourselves are building hundreds of apartments, and are doing so wholly and fully using Defense Ministry funds."

At one of the Kishinev garrison's units I asked how many apartments had been allocated to military servicemen directly from the city soviet executive committee [gorispolkom] stock. I was given the following information: Between 1981-87 the unit received 24 apartments from the city soviet. On 1 January this year there were seven families no longer connected with the army still living in closed military camps. They should be rehoused, but where? Kishinev Gorispolkom has refused to allocate apartments for them.

"What am I to do?" reserve Major A. Borisov said bitterly. "I entered the reserve in 1988. Where was I to go? I had no family left in my village in Belgorod Oblast. I served in the Polar region, the Transbaykal region, and I ended up stranded out here. Now I was left without an apartment. Before this decree I had hoped to get one in Kishinev, but now...."

Of course, far from everyone shares the view of those who criticize the Army, the party, or the Soviet system. On a city street I talked with a passerby. He introduced himself: Ivan Yakovlevich Syrbu. He had been a longshoreman all his working life. He is retired now but continues to work as a watchman at an enterprise.

"I don't understand the current slogans and calls for Moldavia to leave the USSR or the insults aimed at Russians and the military. I have lived under the Romanians, and I remember how they beat me at school with canes and how poor our home was. Now we have everything, but there is no order."

"The Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Decree suspending the operation of the Union government resolution on the republic's territory aroused various reactions among officers," Colonel Chebotok said. "It is time for the USSR President to use his powers. The laws must be obeyed. Recently we met with workers from the Elektromash plant, who said quite bluntly: 'People are committing anarchy, why does the military keep silent?' We aren't keeping silent, of course. Military servicemen support the protest signed by Colonel General V. Osipov and Colonel General N. Goncharov and addressed to the republic's leadership, demanding that the decree in question be revoked on the grounds that it is contrary to existing USSR and Moldavian SSR law. Col. Gen. Osipov has also sent a report on this matter to S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

The latter document says, among other things: "In my capacity as a USSR People's Deputy I have begun receiving many complaints in connection with the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium's adoption of this decree, which infringes the rights and legitimate interests of military servicemen, people discharged from the USSR Armed Forces, and members of their families. I ask you, esteemed Sergey Sergeyevich, to examine the legitimacy of this decree as a matter relating to constitutional oversight and to publish your positive decision via the mass media."

Unfortunately, quite some time has passed since the message was sent and no answer has been received yet. Meanwhile the session is gaining momentum. Tension in the republic is not diminishing.

Caucasus

Armenia Adopts Decision on Nagorno-Karabakh

NC0905201390 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 7 May 90

[Text] Yerevan, 7 May (ARMENPRES)—The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has adopted the following decision in connection with the exacerbation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] by Azerbaijan and the militray commandant of the state of emergency in NKAO:

1. To give a political assessment of the acts by the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the leadership of the office of the military commandant of the state of emergency in NKAO. These acts have resulted in the exacerbation of the situation in NKAO and the Armenian SSR; in the violation of the Armenian people's political liberties, honor, and dignity; and in leading to the further complication of interethnic relations and to the destabilization of the social and political situation in NKAO and Armenia.

2. To appeal to the CPSU Central Committee, the president of the USSR, and to the USSR Supreme Soviet with the following proposals:

—To promptly send a special commission to Stepanakert headed by a member of the Presidential Council.

—To hold an urgent debate at the USSR Supreme Soviet on the situation prevailing in NKAO and to take urgent measures to protect the interests of the NKAO Armenians.

—To declare null and void the decree of Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium "on partial changes in the administrative-territorial division of Askeranskiy, Gadrutskiy, Mardakertskiy, and Martuninskiy Rayons, and the town of Stepanakert in NKAO of the Azerbaijan SSR."

—To instruct the USSR Defense Ministry, USSR procurator general, USSR Committee for State Security, and the USSR Internal Affairs Ministry to undertake a detailed investigation of the 26 April 1990 incident which took place in Stepanakert and to (?punish) the culprits.

—To instruct the USSR Council of Ministers, relevant ministeries, and supervisory boards to ensure an unimpeded supply of foodstuffs, raw materials, and energy resources for the Armenian SSR and NKAO, to create the necessary conditions for the normal economic and cultural ties between Armenia and NKAO, and to restore regular road and transportation lines.

—To resubordinate the commandant of the state of emergency district in NKAO to the Union Monitoring and Observation Commission.

3. To bolster the work of the republican party and soviet organs in connection with the search for the resolution of the situation prevailing in the republic in relation to the NKAO, and in order to continue intensive negotiations with the leaders of the Azerbaijan SSR on lifting the road blockade, for regulating economic ties, and for finding mutually acceptable solutions on NKAO.

4. To instruct the city and rayon party committees to undertake to actively explain to the people the need to search for solutions of all problems through constitutional channels and the need not to succumb to provocations and to irresponsible calls for illegal actions.

5. Not to allow the mass media to print publications and reports which might complicate interethnic relations and inflame emotions and enmity among people.

Armenian Supreme Soviet Proceedings Reported

NC1005055490 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Yerevan, 7 May (ARMENPRES)—The Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium met under Grant Voskanyan, chairman of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Acting on the advice of the 12th extraordinary session of the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium decided to appeal to USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev to (?restore) USSR citizenship to Baruyr Ayrikyan, who had been stripped of his USSR citizenship.

Upon instruction from the same session, the Presidium created a working group charged with determining the structure and by-laws of the defense council attached to the Armenian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

The Presidium took into consideration the report by Rafayel Kazaryan, chairman of the commission looking into temporary suspension of the 1990 spring conscription in the Armenian SSR.

Armenian Election Campaign Aspects Faulted

90US0865A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 27 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent V. Aydinyan: "Parliament or a Council of Managers?"]

[Text] **The elections to the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet will take place on 20 May. What is it going to be—a new parliament? Will it be able to lead the republic out of the crisis? Many people are asking themselves this question, but very few would dare to give a simple answer.**

When the republican newspapers started filling their pages with the names of candidates for deputies from issue to issue, the people suffered something like a light shock. I do not know about other things, but we have plenty of chiefs and we are quite used to the fact by now. But to know it is one thing and it is quite a different matter to see endless lists of nomenklatura officials from day to day. A plant nominates its manager, a hospital nominates its head physician, the kolkhozes [collective farms] nominate their chairmen. One can get the impression that it is shameful to be a boss without being a candidate for deputy. If you did not get nominated by your staff, that means they do not trust you; it means they can ask for your resignation tomorrow. The complete lists have not been published yet, but to date leaders of various ranks make up 60 percent of the candidates for deputies. "Are we going to have a parliament or a meeting of party and administration officials?" asks one of our readers. "No, we are electing a managers' council," objects another reader.

The situations are almost identical in urban and rural areas. The only difference is that in the cities they nominate more of major administrators while in the villages the nominations go mostly to party officials. One has to admit that there are quite a few worthy people who had deserved the honor through their active work on eliminating the consequences of the earthquake and on aiding the refugees. And they did all this at the time when a lack of authority was very evident in the republic. But still, is it going to be healthy to have so many representatives of executive power in a legislative organ? Would it not be possible for the future Supreme Soviet to become a hostage of the technocracy's interests? This seems to be the concern of many people today, all the more so because the majority of the constituents envisioned quite a different mixture of deputies.

Let us look at the data provided by the Sociology Department of the Philosophy and Law Institute of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences. A group of its employees, under the supervision of Candidate of Philosophy Gevork Pogosyan, have been studying the trends of the constituency for several months now. And it is only five percent of the voters who would want to see industrial managers and administrators among the deputies. Most of the voters want people unhampered by official duties, people capable of creating policies rather than solving concrete problems.

But as we see, the picture seems to be almost the opposite. Many people even long for the old times when the seats in the Supreme Soviet were assigned. In those days we could at least elect a certain number of workers, women, and young people. However, these people forget that the names of the candidates were also selected in the high offices whose owners valued the obedience of their nominees more then anything else.

The struggle among various political forces lends a certain touch of drama to the preelection campaign. The Armenian Popular Movement [AOD] aims to take the lead. In one of the Yerevan districts, for instance, 49 percent of the candidates for deputies turned out to be AOD supporters, and only 19 percent sided with the CPSU. But one thing is important to mention here: Many party committees managed to regroup their forces; they learned to work with the people in the mode of glasnost; some of the party secretaries became very popular with the people. If they also conduct an active election campaign, they can count on success and victory over the uncoordinated informals.

But in general counting the "pro" and "con" votes does not do much good today. The problem is that almost half of the population is in a state of political apathy; they have not decided who they want to vote for, if at all. He who knows how to awaken these sleeping powers and make them side with him will win at the elections.

Among those polled, 57 percent do not pay any specific attention to the candidate's party affiliation. They consider his personal qualities to be much more important. The people do not want to play games known as the struggle for power; they want to elect a parliament that would become involved in the crucial problems of the republic. A variety of opinions in such a parliament would help to adopt the best solutions instead of causing endless fights and debates.

Which directions do the constituents consider most important for the work of the future Supreme Soviet? The main priority, of course, is given to the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh. But the second place was taken, unexpectedly for many people, by the fight against corruption, bribery, and the Mafia. These are followed by an entire list of critical, sore points: the approval of the multi-party system, the development of the native school and language, creation of free enterprise economy, elimination of the aftereffects of the earthquake, help for the refugees, improving the conditions of everyday life, and ecological improvements in the republic. Does each of those who want to be deputies because of the prestige realize that he will have to answer to the people in full measure?

Here is one more figure to help answer the question often heard outside the republic. Only three and a half percent of the constituents agreed to vote for the candidates who demand that the republic secede from the USSR.

And that means that Armenia links its dream of independence—natural for every nation—with further democratization of the country; the republic sees its future as part of the renewed Soviet Federation.

So, will there be a parliament in the republic that would comply with the requirements of our tempestuous and changing times that are full of drama? That depends on the wishes of the voters, their ideas and activity.

Armenian Party Leader Meets Press Representatives

NC1005055390 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1215 GMT 8 May 90

[Text] Yerevan, 8 May (ARMENPRES)—Vladimir Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, held a meeting with the editors of the republican newspapers and periodicals; the leaders of the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] state television, radio, and ARMENPRES; and the special correspondents of the mass media in the Armenian SSR.

In greeting the journalists, he evaluated the current highly complex situation in the republic and refered to the issues of extricating Armenia from the political, socioeconomic, and spiritual crises which face the public.

Those present exchanged views.

Vladimir Movsisyan summarized the results of the meeting. He noted that over the past years numerous grave problems have accumulated in the republic, including problems related to earthquake restoration and resettling thousands of refugees. The situation has become further aggravated because of sharply exacerbated interethnic relations. An unusual politicization of the public consciousness is taking place, and the democratization process has led to the formation of scores of new organizations and associations. Therefore it has become urgent for all the healthy forces of the people to coalesce, and to begin constructive cooperation and dialogue on an equal basis.

The complexity and urgency of the situation demands responsibility from the republic's editorial collectives and from all journalists, said Movsisyan. The reader has the right to expect correct and considered pronouncements from them and concrete proposals for stabilizing the situation, surmounting the crisis, and solving the problems brought by our times. The journalists of the republic could rely on the help and assistance of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee and of the government in their enterprise, said Vladimir Movsisyan.